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Aid has a significant impact on governance and public spending in sub-Saharan Africa. In 
Mozambique (amongst others) aid accounts for more public spending than domestic revenues do. 
Even in countries less dependent on aid, international donors influence policy making by investing 
in a technical competitive advantage over domestic policy makers in sectors ranging from climate 
financing to resilience and public financial management. This doubly affects South Africa both 
because South Africa is a large recipient of international donor aid and because South Africa is an 
international donor in its own right in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
The problem is that how international donors set their priorities and allocate their aid at country 
level is not sufficiently answered in the literature. International donors are seen by many as 
unpredictable even though they have an outsized influence on domestic policy and spending and 
are not accountable to the sub-Saharan voters. This research project contributes to the literature on 
the political economy of donor allocations of aid in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
The research approach focuses on country programmable aid, EU joint programming and donor 
country strategy papers. The foundation is comparing and contrasting international donors stated 
policies on ‘country programmable aid’ with what transpires in practice. Key entry points were the 
relationship between donor country strategies and the beneficiary country’s national development 
plan, and the extent to which donors made use of political economy and or context analysis and 
analysis of sector strategies. The key findings are that there are (and what might even be 
predictable) patterns in how donors programme their aid at country level, not explained by the 
particular context nor accounted for in the beneficiary country’s national development plan. These 
patterns relate to a tendency to decontextualize aid programming accompanied with a narrative of 
donor moral and technological superiority and unrealistic programming objectives. The finding is 
important because it implies that these patterns result from implicit rules governing how 
international donors allocate aid, thus making them predictable features of an aid relationship, 







1.  Introduction, Literature and Methodology 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Since graduating with my masters’ degree in the social sciences in 1999, I have been working for 
the European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) and Governments of Ethiopia and Kenya on 
allocating aid and development assistance largely in sub-Saharan Africa but also in other parts of 
the world. By aid/development (assistance) I mean Official Development Assistance (ODA) granted 
by government organisations such as the EU and its member states to other governments and non-
state actors in beneficiary countries. This doctoral research focuses on a subset of ODA commonly 
referred to as country programmable aid. Country programmable aid is donor financial aid provided 
on a country by country basis that is meant to be contextualised and refined to the specific 
beneficiary country needs. This drive to contextualise aid to the beneficiary country’s need and 
political economy goes back to at least 1957 (Carbone 2008: 219) and, as such, represents a five 
decade old donor project of trying to improve beneficiary government ownership1 of aid 
programmed at country level. One of the key drivers of country programmable aid was for donors 
to demonstrate that they were replacing donor driven solutions with support to beneficiary led 
developmental processes.  
 
In 1957 when this all started, it may have been a technical and administrative challenge to identify 
what the beneficiary government’s development policies are so that donors could support them. 
However, today, sixty-nine (IMF: 2015) developing countries have multi-annual, medium term 
national development plans typically based on the widely consulted Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper approaches, that gained acceptance in the late 1990s (Gould and Ojanen 2003). On paper, 
then, it would appear a relatively simple exercise for donors to use their country programmable aid 
to directly support the beneficiary government’s national development or poverty reduction plan. 
Understandably, donors would need time to wind down legacy programming that may have 
predated the development of beneficiary country plans. There would also be cases in which 
beneficiary governments might not consult or get donor input to their plans and donors might 
                                                             
1 Whitfield (2008) raises important questions about what donors actually mean when they talk about 
ownership, pointing out that ownership is often cited as lacking when it may actually relate to an 
unwillingness to take ownership of what is perceived to be an agenda set by donors. Whilst a compelling 
avenue for exploration this research focuses not on whether partner government officials actually have 
ownership over stated policies embedded in national development plans but rather on the extent to which 







argue that donor driven solutions should have primacy over the beneficiary’s. Over time, though, 
one would expect that donor’s country programmable aid strategies would come to mimic, if not 
entirely replicate the beneficiary country’s development plans as stated in donor’s own policies.  
 
After working with donors on allocating aid in over thirty different countries, however, I noted that 
regardless the country context or specific challenges, there is a recurring pattern to how 
development assistance is planned and allocated. I observed that this pattern recurred in country 
programmable aid and did not appear to originate in the beneficiary country’s own plans. I thus 
hypothesised that the pattern might be an indicator of some of the unspoken or unintended 
consequences of donor aid. Although alluded to in the literature2 in various shapes or forms, I did 
not find a satisfactory explanation or analysis of this pattern thus prompting me to investigate it 
further and propose its study as the focus of this doctoral research.  
 
Loosely speaking the pattern relates to how aid identifies ‘needs’ through a process that is 
accompanied by problematizing beneficiaries and in particular beneficiary country government 
officials. Central to this process of designating a ‘need’, is a donor justified call for action that 
creates a narrative positioning beneficiary government officials as either unable or unwilling to act 
on behalf of the poor. The rationale is structures along the lines that donors are compelled, 
themselves, to act and speak (and make funding decisions) on behalf of the beneficiaries. This act of 
‘speaking on behalf of others’ appears to be accompanied with a moral imperative and emphasis on 
new technologies.  
 
The doctoral research proposed was to investigate whether the pattern is a symptom of an internal 
logic in development itself. In this regard, I focus on what appear to implicit rules that govern how 
development resources are allocated regardless the beneficiary country context. This research 
draws heavily on my professional experience in terms of framing the research question. However, 
in order to produce a research study that is verifiable, the research focused primarily on data 
publically accessible. In this regard, the core of the research is contrasting donors stated policy 
objectives with what transpires in practice in donors own publically available country strategies. 
This research was largely made possible by way of the growing international consensus on the need 
                                                             







for donors to use their aid in direct support of beneficiary country development plans or Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). By comparing and contrasting donor strategies with the 
beneficiary country national development plans (strategies), the research was able to uncover what 
appear to be predictable, albeit implicit donor rules that explain how donors will deviate from their 
own stated policy objectives in programming aid at country levels. 
 
The research approach covers three beneficiary country and donor specific case studies, the 
rationale for which is explained in the section 1.4 below. The first and largest case study is on South 
Africa as an emerging donor. South Africa as a donor is reviewed first and in most detail because as 
an emerging and African donor that specifically eschews ‘problematic traditional donor’ behaviour 
it provided a unique opportunity to look at how aid is allocated when a donor has no legacy 
programming, colonial or cold war history that could potentially shape decision making. The 
second case study is on the United States of America and its financing HIV/AIDS programming in 
Namibia. This case study allowed an intimate perspective on how the world’s biggest bilateral 
donor allocates aid at the country level and how it impacts the actual spend on project activities (in 
this case HIV/AIDS). The third case study is on the European Union and the European Union 
Member States in South Sudan which again provided a rich experience because with South Sudan 
being a new country there was no legacy development programming (although emergency and 
humanitarian activities were ongoing) in place when these donors designed their country strategy. 
A chapter follows, comparing the case study findings with Bangladesh, Palestine, Ethiopia and 
Mozambique in a bid to reduce the risk that some of the findings are geographically or country 
specific coincidences. This comparator chapter also includes a review of the dominant international 
policy themes emerging in the post-2015 development debate and what they imply for the findings. 
The research concludes by reflecting on the findings and their potential contribution to the 







1.1 Literature Review and Rationale  
In sub-Saharan Africa, international development3 has become pervasive in the public space with 
debates on governance and sovereignty at the national level often made in reference to a donor 
driven and donor financed narrative. Despite the 2007 financial crisis, international official 
development assistance (ODA) is still one of Africa’s fastest growing industries (recently as much as 
16% annually4). While there is pressure to decrease overall aid budgets, there is apparently more 
pressure to redirect funds from middle income countries like China and Brazil to Africa meaning 
ODA will likely continue to grow for the foreseeable future. In some countries like Ethiopia and 
Mozambique, ODA has become larger than the resources of sovereign governments. Better 
understanding how international development assistance works is thus important to 
understanding public administration, resource allocations and governance in Africa particularly to 
the extent that aid produces something other than called for in beneficiary government 
development plans.  
 
This literature review first explains what the literature says about the current state of aid and 
particularly the donor shift to ex-ante country programmed aid that claims to support beneficiary 
government development plans. This section then looks at what the literature says about how 
donors justify allocating aid post-Cold War. The literature review then covers some of the 
prominent analysis and critiques that focus on when aid does not deliver on its stated objective 
and/or produces something other than what is explicit in the stated objectives. This is followed 
with an introduction of what the literature says about aid as a mechanism or machine that both 
services policy but also becomes more than the sum of the policy objectives, often being referred to 
as something that has a life of its own. Finally, the literature review touches on the data on aid and 
public spending in a selection of sub-Saharan African countries covering the period immediately 
before and after the 2007 global financial crisis. This data analysis draws attention to the 
importance of aid to public sector governance in sub-Saharan Africa. 
  
                                                             
3 What I mean by international development is “official development assistance” which is essentially 
cooperation financed by government organisations in support of developing country governments and non-
state actors at the national level. This does not include global instruments such as the Global Environment 
Facility, private philanthropy or lending amongst others. 







Donor Justifications of Financial Allocations to Beneficiary Countries 
Aid as a stand-alone objective with dedicated financial allocations from donors emerged most 
clearly after the end of the Cold War’. In many ways before the Cold War ended, aid was justified as 
an investment in shoring up strategic geo-political interests and continued influence in the former 
colonies.  In the late 1990s, following a period of post-Cold War ‘aid fatigue’, there was a paradigm 
shift that focused on justifying in terms of its value to the beneficiaries. In this period the global 
discourse surrounding aid was repackaged as concentrating on a globally recognisable and 
common set of priorities that essentially spoke to combatting or eradicating poverty. In 2000, 
under the stewardship of the United Nations, this focus on poverty alleviation was elaborated into a 
global and structured narrative with the universal adoption of The Millennium Development Goals5 
(MDGs). In 2015 these goals were updated with the Sustainable Development Goals “end poverty, 
protect the planet, and ensure prosperity for all” (UN 2015b: Introduction Page not numbered) that 
expand the reach of aid to seventeen goals (up from eight MDGs) and now one hundred and sixty-
nine performance areas. 
 
The post-Cold War period’s new rationale for aid, however, only accompanied a much bigger 
structural change in the winding down of Socialist economies. The sweeping liberalisation of 
formally closed economies created vast opportunities and threats for the same Western countries 
that finance the bulk of global aid budgets. As countries liberalised, trade barriers came down, 
production, industrial activities, services and other value adding processes were increasingly 
dispersed globally between developed and developing countries, former Western allies and former 
Western foes. Increasingly complicated and unprecedented acceleration in cross-border 
relationships including the emergence of newly powerful regional blocks, trade and security 
partnerships created considerable pressure to update the dominant aid framework to the new 
global context. This pressure translated into concerted effort to rationalise the increasing 
interactions between countries of disparate levels of development as a ‘partnership’ and to ensure 
that the voice and space for aid was better protected from accusations of undue influence. In this 
changing relationship aid was reconstituted around development themes, most notably poverty 
alleviation, responsible and sustainable development.  
 
                                                             







In light of the changing global context, the late 1990s witnessed a paradigm shift in the way donors 
engineered their aid programmes. The narrative of aid being primarily about responding to needs 
or emergencies steadily gave way to aid as support to medium term development plans. This 
fundamentally meant that more and more aid allocations were justified on an ex ante basis. The 
move to ex-ante programming meant that donors now justified making multi-year financial 
allocations to beneficiary countries before specifying what particular project would be financed. Ex 
ante programming transformed and is still transforming aid from piece-meal project responses to 
centrally planned integrated and national level interventions. This shift was given a more definitive 
voice with the World Bank study, Assessing Aid in 1998 and greater institutional and organisational 
resources with the 1999 Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt reduction initiative, the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) framework also in 1999, and the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) in 2000. Aid post 2000 now operates in a structurally different reality in which it is no 
longer defined as being a reactive or response based approach but rather framed as being forward 
looking and planned6. The post-2000 development narrative focused on aid structurally channelled 
through and/or aligned with beneficiary country national medium term development plans or 
PRSPs and long-term international development targets (the MDGs).  
 
This change to aid as something planned and intended also makes possible this doctoral research 
(explained more in detail later in this chapter). Before aid was planned in advance, it would be too 
easy to dismiss unintended or unstated outcomes of aid as simply being about difficulties and 
unexpected challenges of working in a foreign and formally unknown context. With aid shifting to 
an ex ante approach, this research is able to ask whether there is evidence of these unintended 
outcomes in the planning process? If indeed there is evidence that these outcomes result from the 
planning process and not from implementation, then this research is able to ask if the unintended 
consequences of aid are more about the political economy governing donor decisions than the 
challenges experienced in implementation itself? 
 
                                                             
6 This move to aid as planned is seen by the likes of Easterley and Moyo as one of the primary impediments to 







The shift to aid as something programmed and justified by the beneficiary country’s needs was 
accompanied by a surge of literature and analysis trying to explain or give reason to how aid is 
allocated and for what purposes in beneficiary countries7. The majority of the literature focuses on 
how donors justify their aid allocations after the end of the Cold War by comparing aid allocations 
in the 1980s to those in the 1990s. During the Cold War, aid appeared to be motivated primarily by 
political, security and related strategic interests. Donors also spent considerably more in small 
countries in what appears to be a decisive strategy to buy influence. One of the assumptions 
appears to be that aid goes a long way to buying allegiances (i.e. votes in international forums and 
organisations such as the United Nations) in smaller countries (Stone 2006) with much being made 
of voting patterns of smaller Pacific and Caribbean countries. A widely cited body of literature thus 
emerged demonstrating a strong correlation between aid, military assistance and UN voting 
patterns by beneficiary countries (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Bermeo 2008, Dollar and Levin 2006). 
This positing of aid as being about geo-political interests was complemented with 
disproportionately large investments in historical partnerships, such as between nations with 
former colony status and their former colonisers.  
 
After the Cold War, the apparent lack of a compelling narrative to continue funding international 
aid combined with uncertainty about the future role of aid saw donor spending progressively 
decline, bottoming out in the late nineties (see chart below). By 2001, however, the new global 
narrative compelling donors to eradicate poverty combined with the means to make ex ante 
financial allocations accompanied the beginning of a new era in increased spending on aid. As the 
chart below shows, since hitting a low in the late 1990s of less than $70 billion, donor spending on 
aid almost doubled in real 2009 dollar values to over $130 billion by 2010.  
 
                                                             
7 See Alesina and Dollar (2000), Burnside and Dollar (2000a), Burnside and Dollar (2000b), Burnside and 
Dollar (2004), Collier and Dollar (2000), Berthelemy and Tichit (2004), Berthélemy (2006a), Berthélemy 
(2006b), Roodman (2005), Sundberg and Gelb (2006a), Sundberg, and Gelb (2006b), Dollar and Levin (2006), 












Before the end of the Cold War, there is little evidence in the literature that traditional donors 
accompanied aid with a focus on good governance or corruption to the extent they do today. 
However, since the 1990s the literature shows a growing correlation between aid allocations and 
spending on political institutions and good governance. The US in particular transformed its 
narrative around aid to strongly emphasise how aid was justified by democracy and 
democratisation (Dollar and Levin 2006). The small country and colonial bias of the Cold War also 
appears to be emphasised less in donor decision-making. The EU’s latest consultations (EU 2015), 
for example, on aid to its former colonies8 makes concerted effort to move beyond a ‘post-colonial’ 
narrative. Donors now also focus on beneficiaries in close geographic proximity (Bermeo 2008), 
                                                             
8 The European Union and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries have a broad development, trade and 
political agreement called the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. This agreement expires in 2020 but 







such as in Eastern Europe and the Caucuses for the EU, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean 
for the US, the Pacific for Australia. Economic criteria also grew in importance with donors 
allocating more aid to countries with higher growth rates and where they had greater interests in 
sustaining and expanding bilateral trade (Berthelemy and Tichit 2004). Whilst there is no definitive 
evidence to the contrary, there is a notable lack of evidence showing that donors placed greater 
emphasis on recipient need in the 1990s despite their professed commitment to poverty alleviation 
(Dollar and Levin (2006)) Although some analysts find signs that that aid in the 1990s became 
more reactive to levels of poverty (Claessens, Cassimon and Van Campenhout 2009) others contend 
that during the Cold War poorer nations actually received more aid (Bermeo 2008). Whilst the lack 
of definitive evidence in the literature may make this issue ripe for debate, it is important to note 
that the OECD (2013) analysis on aid spending definitively shows how donor behaviour does not 
follow donor policy in this space, with the 2013 survey on aid spending bemoaning the fact that “aid 
to poor countries slipped further…. [accompanied by] a shift in aid towards middle income 
countries” (OECD 2013b). 
 
Donor Narrative Justifying Aid Allocations  
The literature draws attention to limitations in making universal assumptions about how different 
donor countries justify their aid. However, it also provides sufficient evidence that post-Cold War 
aid was justified by donors in reference to the following criteria four criteria that speak directly to 
the need of beneficiary countries: poverty levels, economic growth rates, governance and social 
policy. Additionally, donors tend to also justify their aid allocations by appealing to the importance 
of bilateral trade and cultural/historical ties, criteria which the likes of Berthélemy (2006a) point 
are clearly more about self-interest or at least mutual interest and not purely beneficiary need. The 
literature shows that in some shape or form most DAC (i.e. members of the OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee) donors use or speak to these criteria in justifying both how much aid 
allocate and in creating a narrative or imperative to act.  
 
The need of the recipient country typically measured as Gross Domestic Product per capita is the 
most commonly cited justification for donors allocating aid. The literature shows that aid spending 
is negatively correlated with income per capita (Bandyopadhyay and Wall 2006). Berthelemy and 







reduce aid on average by $1.20 per capita. There was a renewed consensus at the end of the 1990s 
that aid should go to those countries most in need with poverty alleviation being the primary goal. 
Perhaps as a result from the 1990s to the early 2000s, European donors largely formalised the use 
of poverty selectivity as the basis for selecting beneficiary countries (Dollar and Levin 2006). 
However, the OECD (2013b) surveys and analysis on donor spending paints a more nuanced 
picture: whilst it is true that donors have spent more on countries worst affected by poverty, they 
in fact are increasingly shifting their spending to “middle income countries” at a higher rate. The 
data does not prove the literature incorrect because funding to low income countries is still 
growing but it does point to a gap in the literature on how aid spending also shows a donor 
preference for spending in middle income countries like South Africa, Brazil and China that are in 
fact already donors in their own right.  
 
In terms of economic performance, a growth rate increase of 1% is associated with an accordant 
increase in aid by $0.50 per capita, whilst 1% increase in FDI flows is accompanied by an increase 
in aid of $1.20 per capita (Berthelemy and Tichit 2004). Whilst the jury is out about whether aid 
contributes to economic growth or not, the narrative that donors deploy around justifying their aid 
implies that donors are more likely to allocate funding to a developing country that is growing and 
better integrating into the international economy than not. 
 
One area in which the literature implies that donor allocations of aid are consistent with donor 
stated policies are in relation to governance and social policy. Countries ranking higher on civil 
liberty and political freedom indices generally receive more aid, especially with regard to aid from 
the US and the UK. Similarly, countries with good social policy particularly around health 
(particularly infant mortality) and education (primary school enrolment) tend to attract more aid. 
Declining infant mortality rates are correlated with greater aid spending: Berthelemy and Tichit 
(2004) found that, a decrease in infant mortality by 10% is associated with aid increasing by $1.20 
per capita. Primary school enrolment is also positively correlated with aid, but less significant than 
infant mortality.  
 
In terms of the remaining ‘self-interested’ criteria, Berthelemy and Tichit (2004) also found a 







associated to aid increasing on average by $0.04 per capita. Additionally, and unsurprisingly 
Berthelemy and Tichit (2004) also found that former colonies get outside aid allocations from most 
European donors and the UK and France in particular: France and the UK give an additional $12 per 
capita and $5 per capita to former colonies over other beneficiary countries respectively. Bermeo 
2008 makes a compelling argument that a large justification for the extra allocations of aid to 
former colonies are part of a bid to stem the tide of migration. In fact, this argument has echoes 
today with the UK for example, pledging increased aid (Wright 2015) to Lebanon, Jordan and 
Turkey as part of a drive to reduce the flow of Syrian refugees into Europe. 
 
Whether a donor chooses to allocate aid based on good governance or economic performance, the 
decision ultimately appears to be driven by the interests the donor country has in the beneficiary’s 
development. The indications are that aid spending continues to be guided by political and 
economic strategies despite donors invoking a post-Cold War rhetoric that posits aid as being about 
a moral imperative to reduce poverty. 
 
Political Implications 
Reading the literature through a political lens, it emerges that with the end of the Cold War, 
advanced Western/traditional donors sought to maintain their foothold and influence in the 
developing world through redefining aid. To do so required a transition from a Cold War narrative 
that largely argued for funding and investing in allies to shore up ‘democratic’ states in the ‘fight 
against Communism’. In a post-Cold War and post-colonial era, the plain faced justification of 
political interest gave way to a focus on poverty. The globally held aspiration to eradicate poverty 
thus became the most commonly referred justification for international development cooperation 
with the underlying assumption that by financing development abroad, donors can demonstrate the 
value of a Western economic and governance model to the global poor. 
 
In order to be credible, the ‘war on poverty’ needed to guard against accusations that it was simply 
masking colonial or imperial interests. The literature reviewed above concludes that OECD donors 
have developed a working matrix of purported objective justifications that allows them to assert 
that they finance development cooperation where:  







2.) Donor aid can get a return for the poor (through good governance and sound policies), and  
3.) Donors can contribute to a virtuous cycle of expanded social spending in the context of 
sustained economic growth.  
 
These principles, then, are tweaked to allow for cultural and historic ties that enable OECD donors 
to justify special relationships with ex-colonies and/or neighbours such as Mexico and Central 
America for the US or Africa, the Baltic and Eastern European for the EU. Furthermore, being able to 
lean on objective criteria for allocating development financing is also deployed in justifying 
budgetary allocations in donor legislatures where such spending is easily criticised. 
 
Navigating the Literature on Improving and/or Dismissing the Relevance of Aid as a Project 
Primarily focused on or Useful to Poverty Alleviation  
 
“This is the tragedy in which the West spent $2.3 trillion on foreign aid over the last five 
decades and still had not managed to get twelve-cent medicines to children to prevent 
half of all malaria   deaths. The West spent $2.3 trillion and still had not managed to get 
four-dollar bed nets to poor families. The West spent $2.3 trillion and still had not 
managed to get three dollars to each new mother to prevent five million child deaths.”  
Easterly (2006:14/15) introduction to White Man’s Burden 
 
In the aid and development space a literature review cannot reasonably be done without 
acknowledging that an enormous amount of money is being spent on improving the effectiveness of 
aid thus also contributing to a literature that has a foot both in the academy and in the donor 
organisations. Much of the literature used in this dissertation and indeed in the field of 
development studies is written by researchers that are part of or related to a global project that 
strives to improve the effectiveness of aid in terms of how it delivers on its stated objective of 
alleviating poverty. In this space, there are significant financial and intellectual resources invested 
by donors (e.g. the World Bank Institute), international philanthropies (e.g. the Gates and Ford 
Foundations) and aid organisations (e.g. Oxfam) in research on improving aid. Jeffrey Sachs, for 
example, both critiques the aid industry and works on trying to improve the effectiveness of aid 
programmed through the United Nations9. Dambiso Moyo consulted to the World Bank and William 
(Bill) Easterly worked at the World Bank for over a decade before establishing New York 
University’s Development Research Unit10, also committed to improving poverty alleviation 
                                                             








practices globally. The critical research done by these analysts contributes to a larger project 
targeted at reforming and improving how donors approach aid and what constitutes successful or 
unsuccessful aid. This project is one that clearly contextualises critical analysis within a broader 
narrative that posits aid as a ‘force for good’ and the research as serving to improve the 
effectiveness of aid (or at least recognising how aid practices need reform). In this context, analysis 
focuses on the appropriateness of policy or practice. Presuming development is a force for good 
frames negative results as failures to be rectified (Easterly 2002, 2004, 2006, Moyo 2010, etc.). 
Moyo (2010) for example, argues aid is a failure insofar as she wants to demonstrate the evidence 
and argue that beneficiary countries are more so better positioned to drive their own development 
than donors are. Easterly similarly (2002) argues that aid could be improved by donors focusing 
less on planning aid outside of a real world context and more on supporting home grown (partner 
country owned) solutions and success stories. As Easterly concludes in White Man’s Burden 
(2006:226), “donors [tend to] bypass success stories because those countries” that are already on a 
good growth path do not attract the level of attention that countries perceived as disasters do. 
Jeffrey Sachs (2005) in his The End of Poverty opts for a slightly different approach and advocates 
for better and more sophisticated planning of aid itself as the primary means to alleviating poverty. 
Sachs’ approach gained a lot of high level donor attention, being translated into a global integrated 
rural development initiative, the “Millennium Villages”11. The debate on how best to improve aid 
continues with marked and often pointed exchanges such as with Sachs (2006) accusing Easterly of 
brushing over how “neglectful” donor aid management practices undermine poverty alleviation. 
Equally, Easterly (2007b) asserts that aid planned by experts like Sachs only demonstrate a 
“remarkable naiveté” on how much is presumed about what can be achieved in foreign aid 
interventions. Similarly, researchers such as Chin and Quadir (2012) put forward the notion that 
OECD “officials in Paris” determine what constitutes effective aid and thus failures to meet these 
publicly stated ambitions is a measure “of breakdown in the established global aid regime” and thus 
an entry point to critique aid as failing in its stated objectives. The debate on how to improve aid 
continues to this day with contrasting perspectives contributing to the literature and the field but 
no definitive answer presenting itself yet.  
 








A related but different body of literature is associated with broader politically aligned projects that 
critique the developed world’s influence on global politics through aid. International aid is seen as 
evidencing a global project that is inherently negative or self-serving and not much more than an 
extension of prevailing geo-politics. This body of analysis effectively frames aid as a project of “the 
un-self-reflexive faith in the winning virtues of the West” (Sylvester 1999: 705 but also in the same 
space Escobar 1995 and Ferguson 2006) or as an extension of capitalism rooted in modernist 
theory (e.g. Zizek 2008 and Campbell et al. 2010). These analyses tacitly accuse aid and 
international development as being the extension of a post-colonial, modernising and/or capitalist 
project that is variably unwanted but always at the service of Western interests.   
 
Both of these perspectives share the presumption that international development is a mixture of 
policy and results that need to be addressed, refined or challenged. For Easterly (2002, 2004) and 
Moyo (2010), development policy and practice is to be improved to better help the poor. For Zizek 
(2008), development is an extension of a post-political bio-politics grounded in capitalist self-
interest.   
 
Both approaches speak to important projects in their own right. For the purpose of this doctoral 
research, however, whilst contributing a significant analytic framework they also draw attention to 
a gap between the two bodies of literature. Both approaches, for example, problematize 
government officials: whether they be donor aid policy makers designing substandard projects or 
beneficiary country government officials that are unable to set the developmental agenda and 
assert their lead in donor financed aid. In both cases the research speaks equally to officials and 
policy makers as having a problem that needs fixing. The gap that presents itself relates to asking 
what aid looks like outside of the presumption that donor or partner government officials should 
behave differently. What would an analysis look like that takes cognisance of the findings of these 
projects but does not package them as problems needing redress by either donor or beneficiary 
officials? Here this doctoral research aims to better sketch what aid might look like outside of a 
literature that focuses on wanting to fix aid or whether beneficiary countries should reject it. The 
opportunity, it seems, might be to navigate between these bodies of literature and ask what aid 
produces regardless of its’ stated political or policy objectives. That being said, the research must 







important is because the pattern to which I referred in the introduction appears to recur both in 
contexts where donors are programming aid for beneficiaries that appear to be pro-Western as 
well as in those beneficiary countries where they appear to be hostile to Western interference. The 
question being asked then, is do the patterns speak to a feature of aid that recurs regardless of 
whether aid is a ‘force for good’ or a means for capitalist self-interest and whether it is predictable?  
 
This gap is important to analyse in the ‘real world’ too because the arguments presented above are 
not as successful as researchers would like at least in terms of reforming aid. Sachs’ Millennium 
Villages aside, critiques of aid are too easily politicised, neutralised and dismissed by the same 
officials that the literature hopes to change. To some extent, because it is intimately intertwined 
with donor country foreign policy and beneficiary country official policy, criticisms of the 
effectiveness of aid is often perceived correctly or incorrectly as being politically or ideologically 
motivated. The point of this research, then, is to try to approach the project in a way that does not 
lead to results that could be perceived as shaming policy makers into making aid better or 
admitting their self-interest. Instead the research attempts to focus on features of aid that policy 
makers themselves are unable to control and might themselves be unsure about what purpose it 
serves or impact it has, primarily because this is where the perceived gap in the literature lies. A 
good example of how the machinery of aid takes on a life of its own outside of the control of its very 
own policy makers and managers is a study the OECD Development Assistance Committee donors 
recently commissioned on how to improve their own results. The study found that the main reason 
why donors are so poor at delivering results is “a lack of institutional demand for results 
information for decision making and learning” (OECD 2014a) in donor’s own organizations. In 
other words, donor officials both recognize and invest in getting better results whilst also tacitly 
acknowledging the reason for the lack of results is that the organizations they themselves command 
have no interest in results at the institutional level.  
 
This research project, then, attempts to focus on aid as an institution and less so on aid as a 
collection of policy decisions (even though policy is an essential and determinant component). The 
research question then, is nuanced by the possibility that the patterns identified and analysed 
might recur even if donor policy changes. The research draws on the literature but guards against 







when donors talk about development or aid as a ‘machine’ (see below) they are referring to a real 
institutional mechanism that produces predictable products or by-products regardless the user, 
context or most recent policy.  
 
The Development ‘Machine’ or Mechanism 
In my experience donor officials often introduce their contributions (and lack of control) to 
development planning in reference to “the machine” and what happens “in the house” compared to 
what is produced outside, or at least what is visible to stakeholders and the public. By this, officials 
are referring to a mix of implicit and explicit rules governing the organisation, its narrative, 
symbolic and disciplinary mechanisms as well as the fact that development has some aspects of a 
production process12. Much like in a factory, donors manufacture a development intervention that 
while perhaps meeting the needs of the beneficiary, is very much shaped by the limitations, reach 
and strictures of the machinery used. Henry Ford once cited the limitation of his factory by telling 
his customers they could order a car in whatever colour they want provided it is black. In a similar 
sense, regardless the particular challenge, the policy or politics, if a problem is fed into this donor 
’machine’, ‘development’ as a project or intervention is produced. This does not mean all projects or 
interventions are the same but that a certain type of machine is only capable of producing a specific 
set of products. This machine as a series of explicit rules is documentable through textual exegesis 
in reading publically available donor rules, regulations and guidelines and in documenting how 
these produce policy and country strategies. The machine is alluded to in some of the ethnographic 
and anthropological literature on development too: Crewe and Harrison’s (2002) Whose 
Development, goes a long way to documenting how seemingly ‘neutral’ technical agro-processing 
initiatives are actually embedded in a structure that replicates masculine superiority while 
generating a narrative that positions beneficiary cultures as the primary “barrier[s] to 
development” thus providing contrast to international organisations that are compelled to 
intervene (also see Escobar quote on following page and Olivier de Sardaan’s (2005:2) complain 
that the development “literature is the source of an endless stream of value judgements”.). This 
research study touches on a similar line of thinking but instead of focusing on what transpires in 
projects and amongst practitioners rather focuses on  what could be termed ‘explicit rules’. By 
                                                             








explicit rules the focus is firmly on the stated policy objectives of South Africa, the United States of 
America and the European Union in how they justify their approach to supporting beneficiary 
country development plans. The research works to understand the rules governing this 
‘machinery’13 thus contributing to the literature on what aid produces at project level but with a 
new focus on understanding how what aid produces in projects relates to what are stated and 
publically verifiable policy objectives.  
 
Documenting what development donors14 produce builds on a growing body of literature (Eyben 
2010, Escobar 1991, 1995, Ferguson 1990, Gould and Ojanen 2003, Hilhorst 2003, Malkki 1996, 
Mosse 2005a/b, Olivier de Sardaan 2005, etc.) that looks at development in terms of incentives and 
disincentives that shape behaviour, governance and organisational culture. The use of ‘incentives’ 
and ‘disincentives’ is emblematic of a literature that tacitly acknowledges that aid and development 
is essentially produced by an administrative mechanism or machine that has rules, inputs and 
outputs that are very much restrained by the limits of the machine itself. These rules combined 
with an understanding of incentives and disincentives are the building blocks of a model that 
promises to predict how and why donor officials behave and spend aid monies.  
 
The classical body of literature in this space speaks to the aid and development machine as an 
institution producing symbolic meaning and identity in the developing world. Escobar’s (1991) 
analysis of aid, for example, points out that the act of problematizing others is closely related to 
shaping development into a “legitimate response” that enables donors to speak on behalf others. 
 
There is also an apparent neutrality in identifying people as a "problem" without 
realizing….that this definition of the "problem" has already been put together in 
Washington or some capital city of the Third World…second, that problems are 
defined in such a way that some development program has to be accepted as a 
legitimate solution; and finally, that along with this "solution" come 
administrative measures that make people conform to the institution's discursive 
and practical universe. This effect is reinforced by the use of labels such as "small 
farmers," "illiterate peasants," or "pregnant women” -some of the favourite labels 
                                                             
13 The particular focus will be on the European Commission. The EC is the second largest donor to Africa (see 
OECD.org 2012 Aid to Africa) and I am well acquainted with its procedures and guidelines that are publically 
available.  
14 Development for this proposal includes what is commonly known as aid or cooperation. While it overlaps 
with charity, philanthropy and humanitarian or relief efforts, this paper distinguishes development by its 







of development institutions which not only reduce a person to a trait, turning him 
or her into a "case" or abnormality to be treated, but also make it possible to 
dissociate explanations of the "problem" from the nonpoor and to assign them to 
factors internal to the poor. In short, labels and institutional practices are issues 
of power; they are invented by institutions as part of an apparently rational 
process that is fundamentally political in nature. 
                                                                                                                   Escobar 1991:667 
 
Donors allocate funding in line with prescribed organisational procedures and guidelines (explicit 
rules) that tend to emulate widely accepted norms of ‘project cycle management’. The first three 
stages of the project cycle (programming, identification and formulation) are documentable acts of 
problematizing others. The EU’s (2004:17) guidelines on allocating funds to a project explain that 
donor officials should design projects to support “the overarching policy objective of the [EU]….and 
to…the real problems of target groups and beneficiaries”. The EU calls for a (2004:67) “problem 
analysis [that] identifies the negative aspects of an existing situation and establishes the ‘cause and 
effect’ relationships between the identified problems” as the basis for allocating its financial 
resources but always after setting the agenda to ensure that aid monies pursue EU policy objectives 
first and foremost. As can be imagined and is explained by Escobar (above) there is always the 
potential for a contradiction when the needs of the beneficiary do not align with the policy 
objectives of the donor and their perception of what the beneficiary most needs. Much of the 
literature on the failures of aid points to the problem being that the incentives are aligned to 
ensuring that donor policy objectives win out over the needs of the beneficiary. Ferguson’s The 
Anti-Politics Machine (1990) exposed the nuances of this contradiction perfectly in his chapter on 
The Bovine Mystique also published in more detail as a stand-alone paper (1985). Put simply, 
Ferguson explains that farmers in Lesotho hold on to their cattle primarily for cultural and social-
economic reasons related to cattle being a symbol of status as well as wealth. Donors in Lesotho 
such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and indeed even the government’s Ministry of 
Agriculture, wanting to show case new technologies on predicting agriculture futures, predicate 
their projects on the financial value of cattle. However, approaches focused on the liquid financial 
value of cattle underestimate the cultural, traditional and status values of cattle that effectively 
render cattle as a non-tradable asset. Accordingly development actors15 typically problematize 
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Basotho farmers as being ignorant of market dynamics and thus holding onto cattle even when 
prices slump or cattle feed becomes scarce only because the farmers did not have access to market 
information. Ferguson’s analysis (1985) in The Bovine Mystique demonstrates that investments in 
market information and agricultural futures will not change the behaviour of Basotho farmers 
largely because the problem is not at all about knowing the future price of an agricultural asset. 
Ferguson (1985:654) finds that, whilst other agricultural assets can be freely exchanged for cash, 
Basotho culture designates cattle as an asset that “cannot be converted to cash….except 
under….conditions specified as a great and serious need” of which the prospect of losing value or 
even the possibility of cattle dying from drought simply does apply.  This doctoral research, thus 
hopes to contribute to the literature on how donors problematize others with the hope that the 
findings add texture to existing literature (Escobar 1991) but also to verify if this dynamic still 
holds true in the context of global aid effectiveness commitments (OECD 2005, 2011) to better 
contextualising aid to the country context.  
 
There is a second body of literature, however, that is comparatively less well-known but essential 
to analysis of the administrative procedures and organisational rules, or, what otherwise might be 
called the structure of the machine that actually shapes what aid does and what it delivers on a day 
to day level. Gasper (1999, 1999b, 2000), a researcher at the Institute for Social Studies concludes 
that the logical framework approach “used by nearly all aid funding agencies” (Gasper 2000:20) to 
this day tends to undermine the autonomy of donors rather than enable them to do what they want 
to do a finding supported by others too (MacArthur 1994; GTZ 1996). Furthermore, Gasper and 
Castillo (2009:4) demonstrate there is sufficient evidence that these donor procedures actually 
“harm participants’ autonomy despite being supportive to other goals, and thus have negative 
longer-run significance.” Similarly, contradictory findings were evidenced by Gould and Ojanen 
(2003) in their analysis of public consultations around the design of a Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper in Tanzania: instead of donors getting the consultations they spent and money pursuing, they 
complained about beneficiaries parroting what the donors already new and said. More recently, 
Simon Hartmann (2011) found that one of the key factors in donor aid delivering results is that 
donors tend to stay invested in sectors attractive to their headquarters rather than to the 







in demonstrating what needs to be done better but rather in acknowledging and paying “the costs 
of identifying and dismantling the incentives of donors” (2011:10).  
 
Combining this literature together, allows this doctoral research to focus on development as a 
machinery or mechanism that could potentially stands outside of ideology whether or not it is in 
fact used, commandeered or even created in pursuit of a specific ideology. By documenting 
development as a machine or mechanism, this doctoral research could contribute to the debate 
about how development has become “post-political” (Zizek 2008) and more importantly to explain 
how development as a product/tool needs to be analysed outside of its ideological bent at least in 
the service of better documenting how it is a significant and predictable influencer of public policy 
in developing countries. This is important to explain because, as a mechanism, development is 
neither reformed nor restrained by changing ideology or policy: as a mechanism or machine it is 
either a tool this is or is not put to use.     
 
Another important aspect of this research arising from Zizek’s (2008) notion that aid or 
development is becoming “post-political” is that if donor driven development is not primarily 
driven by stated needs and policy (but rather by rules and constraints of a ‘machinery’), then we 
need to closer interrogate analysis founded in the presumption that development is necessarily a 
force for good. In this regard, the research could contribute to an emerging line of enquiry that calls 
question to the value of framing international aid or development as a force for good or bad. To 
assert that aid/development is neither good nor evil enables the study to strip much of the existing 
literature of its normative bias and helps construct a picture of what donor development does, how 
it shapes beneficiaries and, contributes to a narrative about governance. 
 
Aid and Public Sector Governance in sub-Saharan Africa 
Whilst aid has a global reach, for many countries in Africa it has a notably outsized influence in on 
public sector governance because it has increased dramatically in real terms and as a proportion of 
public expenditure. Aid itself is growing and despite the financial crisis net ODA rose to US$ 119.6 
billion16 in 2009. As donors phase out of middle income countries like Brazil and China, Africa will 
                                                             







likely to continue receiving a growing share of aid: of 2009’s US$ 120 billion aid disbursements only 
a fifth went to sub-Saharan Africa17 but ODA is increasing to Africa much faster than GDP growth.  
 
Table 1.1 Select African Countries: Growth in ODA, GDP. ODA as % of Government Revenue 
Country 2008 ODA 
USD million 
Annual Growth 
in ODA 2002-8 
(OECD 
QWIDS18) 








Swaziland 57 23.5% -0.4% 11% 
Kenya 1,528 23.5% 1.8% 26% 
South Africa 1,133 20% -1.9% 2% 
Ethiopia 3,208 20% 6.8% 133%* 
Malawi 815 16.5% 5.9% 164%* 
Uganda 1,659 16% 4% 83% 
Ghana 1,280 14.5% 4.7% 38% 
Mozambique 1,938 -1% 4.3% 167%* 
*Donors are spending more than the beneficiary government receives from domestic 
revenue collection. 
 
Increasing aid to Africa is often a political imperative too. President Obama made doubling 
American aid an election promise. The UK’s Conservative led government of 2011 slashed national 
expenditure in every sector except for aid and national health care and even adopted in law 
(Andersen 2015) a commitment to spending 0.7% of gross national income on aid. At the same time 
the numbers of donors are increasing: South Korea, for example, allocated US$ 700 million to ODA 
in 2007 and will increase ODA fivefold by 2015. Other notable emerging donors include Brazil, the 
Czech Republic, China, India, Turkey, the Gulf States and South Africa. Traditional donors are also 
focusing more on Africa. Australia, for example, is opening new offices and Spain is directing more 
resources to sub-Saharan Africa. In a 2007 IDRC study, Chin and Frolic noted, “Africa is slated for 
the largest increases in Chinese foreign assistance over the next five years.”21  
 
When governments in Africa rely mainly on tax revenue from elites and the private sector, there are 
lower incentives to prioritise the needs of the wider population. Many African governments now 
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20 Financial Times (2009) 
21 Chin, G & B. Michael Frolic 2007, Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: The China 







raise more money from donors (see above) than they do from domestic revenues22. This further 
dilutes the incentive for governments to be directly accountable to citizens; despite commitments 
to the contrary, donors do not report to Africans on how aid is spent. The implications of aid on 
governance in Africa, then, are significant.  
 
In Ethiopia in 2009, for example, Human Rights Watch (2009) authored a report on politicisation of 
aid. The report demonstrated that donor-supported food and basic services were being denied to 
opposition communities in Ethiopia. In practice, this has meant starving and denying life-saving 
medical treatment to those citizens opposed to the government leadership. When the report came 
out donors created a working group to investigate the claims. The larger donors deployed their staff 
to the working group so as to change the purpose of the group from reviewing the allegations to 
manufacturing a narrative and evidence that donors have good control mechanisms embedded in 
their aid programming. Not unexpectedly, this resulted in a report (DAG 2010) that “concluded that 
there are generally good accountability mechanisms and safeguards in place that provide checks on 
possible distortions.” This sort of manoeuvring enables the international aid project to continue, 
regardless the results or the implications: the table above shows that aid to Ethiopia increased from 
US$ 1.2 billion a year in 2002 to US$ 3.8 billion a year in 2009 despite the Ethiopia’s (largely 
unchecked) continued violent oppression of opposition.  
 
During apartheid, Western donors in South Africa utilised independent grant makers23 such as the 
Transitional National Development Trust (TNDT) and Ecumenical Church to support community 
mobilization and critical engagement with authorities. Independence was ensured by establishing a 
board or governance committee that is not beholden to donor interests. While these systems are 
not perfect, they were excellent at supporting local empowerment and critical civil society. Once 
apartheid ended, however, donors wanted greater access to government. The Transitional National 
Development Trust was transformed into the government managed National Development Agency, 
funding to the Ecumenical Church was essentially cut off. Years later, many of the organisations that 
benefited have either closed shop or effectively become contractors to government or donors; 
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many of the activists now work directly for government and some are as intolerant of criticism as 
their predecessors are.  
 
What these examples show is that the way aid is spent in Africa can have an outsized impact on 
governance and protection of human rights making the focus of this research also important to a 
larger community of scholars than just those focused on international aid and development 
cooperation. Additionally, South Africa itself is in the process of establishing the South Africa 
Development Partnership Agency which will formalise its ambitions to be an international donor in 
its own right. This research thus has potential links to the South African foreign policy literature24.   
 
Limitations of the Official Development Literature  
Most of the analysis and the literature is based on data available from the Western leaning 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD has a Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) comprising Western and like-minded donors. By way of maintaining 
an open and online database (used in all the case-studies cited in this research) and regular peer 
review and specialised studies, the DAC has created a formidable body of knowledge on the policies 
and practices of Western/traditional donors that is simply not available on other donors such as 
South Africa, Russia, China or Brazil. There is as yet to be a comprehensive study on the effects of 
the shift in the global aid architecture: those studies that do contain data on ‘emerging donors’ tend 
to acknowledge that the data cited is incomplete or inadequate. Furthermore, aid pre-2007 and 
post-2011 also reflects a bias towards America’s ‘War on Terror’ and the correlation between 
military intervention and aid in a ‘post 9/11’ world (Sachs 2005, Bermeo 2008), the implications of 
which are not yet fully understood.  
 
The primary impediment to compiling definitive explanations for how donors allocated their aid 
relates to the lack of evidence to support the notion that donors conclusively replaced their Cold 
War based aid policies with global commitments to poverty alleviation. The paradigm shift donor 
governments and multilateral organisations asserted on the new priority of poverty alleviation is 
largely not taken at face value at least partly because commitments are either not implemented or 
implemented in a piece-meal manner. A good example of this is the global consensus that aid should 
                                                             







be increased and pegged as a fixed proportion of developed countries’ revenues (i.e. the 0.7% of 
national income commitment), that aid should specifically target poverty reduction, and aid should 
be given to countries with good governance and sound political and economic institutions. 
Originally this target was for 1% as proposed by the World Council of Churches. In the 1960’s the 
OECD DAC members agreed the target in principle but when called to formalise their commitment 
successfully argued the target should be reduced to 0.7% by subtracting an estimated 0.3% from 
the 1% that flowed to developing countries in the form of private flows. A target of spending 0.7% 
of Gross National Product (GNP) on Official Development Assistance was first formally agreed in 
1970 in a UN resolution on 24 October 1970. The target of allocating 0.7% of GNP to aid became the 
reference point for 2005 political commitments to increase ODA from the EU, the G8 Gleneagles 
Summit and the UN World Summit. However, in reality DAC donors continue to spend less than half 
of the amount committed while often allocating aid according to criteria that clearly demonstrate a 
bias away from poverty alleviation. For example, the US still allocates vast amounts of ODA to Israel 
and Egypt in support of a peace agreement. Fifty years of donors committing and recommitting to 
the 0.7% target despite not meeting it only illustrates how necessary it is to qualify international 
commitments and recognise the limitations of the commitments and the accordant literature. All 
this evidences the difficulty in drawing universal conclusions about donor behaviour even though 








1.2 Locating the Research  
The literature detailed in the section above evidences the fact that donors do not always allocate aid 
as per their stated policy priorities. After the Cold War ended, donors invested in a new narrative 
justifying their intervention in developing countries under the rubric of combatting global poverty. 
The imperative to respond to poverty insofar as it is located in the developing world was 
accompanied by an important administrative tool (‘ex ante’ programming) enabling donors to 
allocate aid to medium term objectives as well as or in place of responding to verifiable need. ‘Ex 
ante’ programming at country level is a subset of aid commonly known as country programmable 
aid. Country programmable aid25 is justified as aid being in support of beneficiary country 
development plans.  
 
The literature review also demonstrates that donor aid produces unintended results whether 
through failure or due to aid having an unstated or unacknowledged intention. Furthermore, with 
aid being institutionalised through rules and procedures and public sector management and 
governance structures, the actual way in which aid is transformed into projects and activities is to 
some extent predictable and mechanistic. The mechanistic nature of programming aid has spurned 
a field of literature that demonstrates how donor practices can produce results contrary to or not 
justified by the stated donor goal of poverty alleviation. An analysis of aid flows shows that whilst 
what donors do could be of limited consequence in richer countries, in the poorer countries in 
Africa, aid has a major financial influence on public policy and governance of public expenditure. 
Notably in some countries in Africa, donors spend more than governments do on social services. 
 
The practical question that follows, then, is whether this is a feasible and accessible field of study? 
The answer presented itself in terms of what donors delineate as country programmable aid and 
specifically in how development (programming) is produced by donors at country level. In this 
regard, what is referred to as development or aid is as it is defined and elaborated at national levels 
in recipient countries (e.g. in coordination with Ministries of Finance or Foreign Affairs). The OECD 
formally differentiated this type of aid as country programmable aid and defines it as “the portion of 
aid that providers can programme for individual countries or regions, and over which partner 
countries could have a significant say over.” The OECD (2015) estimates that country 
                                                             







programmable aid constitutes more than half of all aid spend, more than five times what OECD 
donors spend on humanitarian emergencies and twenty times the aid allocated to non-
governmental organisations.  
 
The path that aid monies follow in this context is that donors typically allocate a financial envelope 
to be spent in a beneficiary country. The allocation can be annual or as much as seven years as is 
the case for the European Union. This envelope is then allocated to sectors in the form of a country 
strategy document. Funding at sector level is then allocated to projects that extend through 
government partners, NGOs or private contractors to beneficiaries. The programming strategy is 
formulated as donors allocating aid to respond to or solve a ‘problem’ listed in the beneficiary 
country’s development plan. Funding is allocated to the extent which donors respond to or fix a 
specified problem26. The problem is framed as something that once solved, donors can safely stop 
spending money on27 without fear they will be blamed for discontinued delivery or services. The 
focus on spending aid on solvable problems is one critical aspect that differentiates what donors 
consider as developmental from humanitarian assistance (and charity). 
 
In terms of the history of aid, the feasibility of this doctoral research is very much time bound and 
only became a practical area for study in the late 1990s with the rise of country programmable aid. 
Country programmable aid encompassed the promise that  donors would increasingly allocate their 
funding  in direct support of beneficiary country development plans. This explicit change to aid 
being framed as programmed and forward looking (rather than responsive and needs based), 
allows this research to question whether the unintended consequences of aid are the result of 
donor actions that happen prior to their being confronted with the unexpected challenges of 
working in a foreign and formally unknown contexts. The shift to ex ante programming allows this 
doctoral research to ask if the unintended consequences of aid are due to the political economy 
governing donor decisions more so than the challenges experienced in implementation. This 
distinction is important because much of the literature (e.g. Ferguson, Li and Moyo describe above) 
is a critique concentrated on how the results of aid are due to their lack of contextual relevance, 
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European Commission (2004) Project Cycle Management Guidelines, Section 4.3, Section 5 (particularly 5.3) 
Brussels: European Commission 







almost as if donors wanted to they could choose to make aid more relevant to the context. My 
hypothesis, however, is that donors’ stated policy of making aid more relevant to the local context 
only masks other unstated, unrecognised or even unintentional incentives. These incentives ensure 
that aid predictably produces patterns that are not to be found in beneficiary country poverty 
alleviation/development plans. The following diagram illustrates the process and decision making 
of donor funding in regards to where country programmable aid is located within the public, 
administrative and political space that is the subject of this analysis.  
 
In this regard, it is important to delineate this research study’s focus from analysis of how aid and 
development cooperation works at the community or local levels. Similarly, this research does not 
focus on how international development and aid priorities are set such as through the United 
Nations systems or through electioneering or foreign affairs policy making. The shaded areas in the 








Table 1.2: Donor Decision Making in Beneficiary Countries – Where to Locate ex-Ante 
Country Programmable Aid (Author’s own analysis)? 
Location 
 





Choose country, identify how much will 
be spent over how many years and 
condition the type of funding on priorities 
that have political resonance (e.g. 
supporting women, environment, etc.)  
Pressures: International Commitments, 
Competition to Maintain a National 
Profile, domestic politics (e.g. diaspora 
influence, environmental or health 
lobbies, domestic NGOs).  
    




EU Joint Country Strategy for South 
Sudan and comparator strategies for 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mozambique 
and Palestine. 
 
USAID regional strategy for 
institution building in the HIV/AIDS 
sector in Southern Africa. 
 
South Africa government policy 
statements on the African 
Renaissance Fund and the 
establishment of the South Africa 
Development Partnership Agency. 
Donor country manager designs a 
medium-term response strategy that 
earmarks funding by sector and priority. 
Pressures: Demonstrate relevance to 
other donors (peer group), demonstrate 
added advantage to headquarters, have 
access to senior government decision 
makers, respond to needs of resident 
nationals. 
    
Country Level – Sector: 
 
Sector response strategies, project 
documents, etc. 
Donor country manager designs a 
medium-term response strategy that 
earmarks funding by sector and priority. 
Pressures: Competition with other 
donors. 




Donor country manager designs a 
medium-term response strategy that 
earmarks funding by sector and priority. 
Pressures: To design an intervention in 
line with decisions made above. 
    




Donor country manager designs a 
medium-term response strategy that 
earmarks funding by sector and priority. 
Pressures: to ensure funding criteria 
ensure beneficiaries respond to needs 
above. 
 
The evolving international aid and development effectiveness declarations that culminate in the 
2011 Busan Partnership Agreement (OECD 2011), points to growing donor pressure on jointly 
identifying developmental challenges with the beneficiary government. Developmental challenges 
that donors and government agree on better withstand criticism that aid is about donors pursuing 
their own agenda and/or interfering in domestic politics. Similarly, when aid finances beneficiary 
government priorities, it serves to disburse blame in the event of failure whilst creating a 
framework in which aid can deliver for donors, beneficiaries and government alike. This logic 







government ownership and alignment28 creates a natural entry point for the research. Both donors 
and beneficiary governments have agreed at the highest level to align donor aid with the 
beneficiary government’s development plan and use the same sector definitions. This research then 
focuses on the above detailed policy space to study the extent to which donors deviate from what is 
detailed in beneficiary government plans and use competing sector definitions.  
 
1.3 The Research Question and Analytical Framework 
Escobar (1991, 1995), Ferguson (1990), Li (2007) and Mosse (2005a, 2005b) et al provide 
compelling evidence that when analysing aid projects on the ground aid achieves something more 
than just its stated objective of alleviating poverty, and in many occasions achieve these other 
things even whilst failing to meet its stated objective.  Gaspers (1999), Gould and Ojanen (2003) 
and Hilhorst (2003) show that the administrative procedures and technocratic practices that aid 
deploys in programming often deliver results contrary to the stated objectives of aid donors. 
Escobar (1991:667) explains further that the administrative and technocratic aspects of aid are 
about power: the “labels and institutional practices are issues of power; they are invented by 
institutions as part of an apparently rational process that is fundamentally political in nature”.  
 
One challenge with most of the analysis reviewed is that it is too country case specific to be reliably 
applied in any context. Whilst the case studies are compelling, the contexts vary sufficiently that 
critics can dismiss the findings as being the result of specific country, cultural and project dynamics 
rather than being about how aid itself works. Li’s (2007) case study is on Indonesia, Ferguson’s 
(1990) is Lesotho and Gould and Ojanen’s (2003) is on Tanzania (with Gould adding case-studies 
from Vietnam and Honduras in his 2005 book) and all are on the intersection between aid as a 
practice or activity and the specific political, economic and cultural context. The question that arises 
is whether it is feasible to document the aspects referred to by these researchers but less so as an 
analysis of that happened when aid interacted with ‘reality’ and more so in terms of improving the 
understanding of what aid will likely produce regardless the country context or donor?  
 
                                                             
28 The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness commits donors to aligning with government policy and 







The rise of country programmable aid and the accordant donor commitments to directly support 
beneficiary country development plans allows an analysis of aid that was not hither to possible. It 
has now become possible to directly compare and contrast donor country strategies to those of 
beneficiary country development plans to identify what aid produces regardless the context of 
donor and before being shaped by the beneficiary’s ‘reality’. Because donor country strategies are 
designed prior to activities taking place, they cannot be easily dismissed as result from or being 
shaped by an interaction with ‘real beneficiaries. Furthermore, if an analysis of these donor 
strategies reveals a pattern recurring in different country contexts (see methodology below for 
caveats) and with different donors, then there is evidence that the pattern is generated by aid itself. 
Of course, an analysis of what is present in donor country strategies that is not present in the 
beneficiary country development plans will not capture all of the unstated or unintended results of 
aid. However, to the extent this analysis is possible, it will produce reliable evidence that donor aid 
predictably produces unstated and/or unintended results regardless the context or stated intention 
of the donor. 
 
Based on the literature review documented above and my experiences as a development 
practitioner, the research questions build incrementally as follows:  
 
1. Do donor policies actually reflect donors’ stated intention to use country programmable aid 
in direct support of the beneficiary country development plans?  
  
If yes, then, 
  
2. Are these policy intentions translated into instructions on how to draft donor country 
strategies?  
If yes, then, 
  
3. To the extent that donor policies call for donor aid to be contextually relevant in supporting 
the beneficiary country development plan, is there evidence that donors are using political 







aid programming and if so what evidence is there that donors have contextualised their 
programming?  
  
If yes, then, 
  
4. Speaking to donor commitments such as in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(OECD 2005) to align to beneficiary country development plans, to what extent do donors 
align their programming to the beneficiary country’s sector policies and strategies as they 




5. When comparing and contrasting donor country strategies with beneficiary country 
development plans, do donors actually produce a narrative of moral and technological 
superiority? Is there evidence to suggest that this narrative results from implicit or unstated 
rules on programming aid (i.e. the machinery of donor decision making)?  
 
And, if so 
  
6. What does this narrative illustrate about the ambitions of donor aid and what appears to be 
at stake in asserting this agenda in programming?  
 
These questions form the structure of the analytic framework throughout this dissertation. 
Essentially, these questions seek to answer whether there is evidence to suggest that donors do not 
follow their own stated policy ambitions in planning aid. Further, in each case study, the analysis 
follows a unique line following the path demarcated by the donor’s own stated policies. The 
purpose here is to create an analytic framework that compares what transpires with what appears 
to be in the donor’s stated interests. The hypothesis, then, is that aid produces features that run 
contrary to donors’ stated interests and also contrary to what can be explained as resulting from 







framework, then, is intended to contribute evidence to the question whether or not it is the actual 
practice of giving aid that contributes to much of the findings in the literature.  
 
The research aims to generate empirical insights into how donors identify development priorities 
at the beneficiary country level and how the development machinery transforms these priorities 
into donor country strategies (and eventually financed projects). Explaining the constraints and 
logic to how donors allocate development resources is important to literature because it deepens 
analysis on the possible purpose of development assistance, better explain the constraints and rules 
by which it operates, better informs and explain what development produces. The research also 
contributes to understanding the relationship between donor driven development and the 
implications for the current narratives on governance in sub-Saharan Africa. This narrative is 
important for African governments because it shapes agendas and has a real impact on governance 
and resource allocation. Because the donor narrative is so strongly connected to the allocation of 
public resources in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, it is a political force in and of itself. Thus 
the study’s focus on narrative contributes to empirical evidence on how the development 
machinery allocates its vast resources (see analysis above showing aid to be larger than beneficiary 
government spending in some countries).  
 
The research also acknowledges the role of the ‘project cycle’. For the EU and other donors, the 
project cycle is a top down approach that begins with the allocation of an overall financial allocation 
for a period of up to six years29. EU officials decide on “the indicative allocation to each sector of 
intervention”30 before consultation or problem analysis has been undertaken. Each step of the 
project cycle builds on assumptions from the previous step with the end result being the actual 
allocation of financial resources and expenditure on projects thus transforming decisions made at 
the country strategy level into the terms and conditions for granting aid.  
 
                                                             
29 For example, in South Sudan the allocation for 2014-2020 was €200 million 







1.4 Research Methodology  
The genesis of this thesis is almost twenty years of experience working with international donors 
on programming and country strategies in particular. My professional experience in the aid sector 
strongly informs my observations which are used in this research. In order to minimise the risk of 
bias any observations I make in the thesis have been verified either in the literature or in the key 
informant interviews (profiles of those quoted in annex). The core of the research, as I explain 
below, is on verifiably and publically accessible data in the hope that the findings presented are 
replicable. Nonetheless, my voice as a participant researcher carries some weight because of the 
work experience I have accrued combined with the access to decision making and decision makers 
that I have enjoyed. In this regard, I have advised donors (mainly the EU, EU Member States and UN 
systems) at a senior decision making level on formulating their country development strategies in 
over thirty countries in Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Central and South 
East Asia and the Pacific. In relation to my thesis, over the course of two years I had professional 
experience advising donors on restructuring the national aid architecture in Mozambique, on 
building a coalition for a joint country strategy in South Sudan and in advising on how to better 
contextualise HIV/AIDS programming in Namibia, all of which contributed to my access to 
information on the case studies presented in this research. At the same time, working with the 
Open Society Foundation of South Africa, the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in Africa (Idasa) 
and the Institute of Security Studies allowed me access to South African government officials which 
made possible the research on South Africa as a donor. As such, it is important to acknowledge, that 
whilst the research is replicable it also benefits from my unique professional experience and access. 
 
In selecting the case studies, the focus on country programmable aid ruled out the development 
banks as a potential focus because even though organisations such as the World Bank and African 
Development Bank have country strategies, the execution of their loans are based on agreeing 
terms and conditions for loans making them more directly shaped by world economic and political 
factors of the beneficiary country. The United Nations agencies and programmes were also ruled 
out because it was unclear to what extent these multi-lateral donors are shaping their strategies to 
fit their fund raising needs (most UN agencies and programmes rely on external funding for the 
bulk of their activities). Accordingly, it was decided to focus on bilateral grant making donors, of 







South Africa was selected as a case-study specifically because it is not a traditional donor and 
because South African policy makers have made specific commitments to wholly supporting 
beneficiary country development plans with the promise of being a unique donor in their avoiding 
donor driven solutions. USAID was chosen both because it is a major donor and because it has an 
outsized influence on funding HIV/AIDS programming. The focus on USAID thus allows the case 
study to closer connect the donor’s strategy at the country level to what will become 
programmed/financed activities. Finally, the EU was selected because, combined with the EU 
Members States, it is the biggest grant making donor in Africa and likely because it is a member 
owned organisation, it makes its country strategy papers available to the public. 
 
South Africa as a donor does not (yet) produce country strategies for its programming in 
beneficiary countries. However, South Africa has generated significant policy guidance to prove that 
its stated intention is for country programmable aid in support of the beneficiary country’s 
development plans. The study of South Africa as a donor is particularly valuable because South 
Africa strives at the policy level to differentiate itself from traditional donors in promising to be an 
African development partner that eschews what it sees as traditional donor tendencies to use aid in 
patronising or self-interested manner. In this regard, the case study on South Africa is based on 
close analysis of South Africa’s stated donor policies, a review of the literature on South Africa’s 
results as a donor, interviews with researchers in the field and with a South African government 
official responsible for designing South Africa’s aid policy. The case study on South Africa also 
illustrated an apparent divergence from what the literature says about how donor’s select 
beneficiary countries. Based on the literature on how donors select beneficiaries, South Africa 
should be more inclined to using its aid in Mozambique rather than in Burundi, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and South Sudan, where it is currently focussed. The South Africa case study thus 
includes a close analysis of the aid coordination architecture and operating environment in 
Mozambique to identify whether there is any self-evident reason to explain why South Africa has 








USAID is the single biggest bilateral grant donor in the world and to Africa (OECD 2013) thus 
making the sheer volume of its spending influential to the governance and delivery of public 
services. However, USAID’s country strategy papers are not easily engaged with both because they 
are not necessarily made public and because when approached USAID officials appeared hesitant to 
speak about the US’s strategy at the ‘whole of country level’. At the same time, the initial analysis of 
USAID’s aid spending in Africa found that the US is spending disproportionately on combatting 
HIV/AIDS and is in most countries far and away the biggest donor both in terms of country 
programmable aid and through international funds such as the Global Fund for Aids, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria. The US is by far the biggest contributor to the Global Fund (GFATM 2014) contributing 
$9 billion in the decade to 2013, a third of all contributions and more than double the next biggest 
donor. In terms of country programmable aid, the US’s influence comes into perspective most in 
richer African countries with high HIV/AIDS rates such as Botswana, Namibia and South Africa and 
where other donor spending is proportionally less important. For this reason, USAID’s 
programming on HIV/AIDS in Namibia was identified as a good case study. The United States 
provided half of all aid disbursed (OECD 2014) to Namibia in 2012 with more than 40% of the total 
$305 million spent on health. However, 94% or $120 million of the total donor health expenditure 
is on HIV/AIDS. The US provides three quarters ($84 million in 2012) of disbursements on 
HIV/AIDS in Namibia. The remaining disbursements to HIV/AIDS largely comes from the Global 
Fund ($35 million) to which the US is the biggest donor too. USAID’s HIV/AIDS programming to 
Namibia also presented as an ideal case study because Namibia is a comparatively rich country that 
spends more on HIV/AIDS than donors do with the US having committed in a number of instances 
to directly supporting the Namibian government development plan. Additionally, much of USAID’s 
programming was framed as direct support to the Namibian government and done so through 
publically available strategy documents thus allowing comparatively good access to the literature 
necessary to conduct the comparative analysis. Finally, the US Government (2014) had developed 
clear guidelines and instructions on contextualising programming to the local country context thus 








The third and possibly most important case study is on the EU’s programming in South Sudan. 
Because South Sudan is a new country, the EU country strategy did not reflect legacy programming 
of a developmental nature (previous support was largely humanitarian or emergency in nature). 
Furthermore, the donor community and EU and EU Member States in particular financed and 
participated in the development of the beneficiary country’s national development plan (South 
Sudan Development Plan). This means that at least on paper, to the extent that the EU’s strategy 
diverges from the beneficiary country’s development plan it is not easy to dismiss this due to 
quality concerns or because the EU is forced to continue legacy programming due to internal donor 
incentives. Another reason the South Sudan case was so appealing is that it was actually the EU’s 
first joint country strategy for the European Commission as well as the EU Member States. This 
means that the strategy is not just the result of an internal European Commission process but the 
result of a consulted and public process thus making the analysis more accessible to researchers. 
The EU’s approach to developing joint country strategies is also grounded in clear instructions that 
stipulate that the programming approach is to directly support the beneficiary country’s 
development plans. These factors thus provide fertile ground for an analysis of the EU’s 
programming. 
 
For each of the case studies the methodology included an analysis of the donor’s policy documents 
to identify to what extent the particular donor was committed at the policy level to country 
programmable aid and to directly supporting the beneficiary country’s development plan. 
Recognising that a stated policy is not necessarily translated into instructions, the donor 
procedures and guidelines were also analysed to the extent that the donor had produced specific 
instructions to their respective officials to directly support the beneficiary country’s development 
plan. Further, the donors were analysed to the extent that they had produced and/or committed to 
using political economy or local context analysis so as to make their projects and activities relevant 
to the beneficiary country’s political economy. This analysis then provided the basis to compare and 
contrast the donor’s programming strategy with the beneficiary country’s development plan. In this 
regard, recognising donor commitments to the contrary and Escobar’s (1991:667) observation 
about the power embedded in donor “labels”, particular attention was paid to where donor sector 
definitions diverged from those of the beneficiary government’s. This analysis of sector definitions 







countries (presented in a mini-chapter prior to the conclusions and comparing with Bangladesh, 
Ethiopia, Mozambique and Palestine) to check whether these findings were case specific or not.  
 
Documentary based analysis was supplemented with key informant interviews with donor and 
government officials in each of the country case studies as well as with implementing partners 
where relevant (such as was the case in the USAID case study). Finally, during the research process 
and once the overall findings were becoming clearer, the research findings were discussed with 
fifty-two key informants of which thirty-three are quoted in this thesis (see annex for respondent 
profiles). Respondents were selected for their intimate working knowledge of donor programming 
of country programmable aid. The bulk of the respondents not quoted in the text were excluded 
because they explicitly asked not to be quoted even after promises of anonymity were made. Key 
informant interviews were unstructured and respondents were approached due to existing 
working relationships or referrals. The interview would begin with me explaining that I am 
conducting doctoral research as well as working in the field; I would then explain that the research 
study is largely based on textual analysis but I would very much like to get feedback on my initial 
conclusions if the respondent is willing. Once the respondent indicated his or her willingness I 
explained the research ethics considerations and obligations whilst also promising anonymity. 
After explaining that the interview findings could be quoted in the final thesis but only attributed to 
general descriptions of job function and type of organisation, the interview would proceed. 
Typically, the interview would take the form of probing about the contradictions the research 
uncovered mainly between the stated intentions of allowing beneficiary government officials to 
take ownership and my analysis illustrating that programming almost invariable invoked a 
narrative that undermined ownership of beneficiary government officials. After allowing the 
respondent to explain and speak on the subject, I then probed further and asked about whether this 
aspect of the aid relationship might be more about the way donors perceive themselves rather than 
the actual capacity of the beneficiary governments. In most cases, respondents confirmed this 
dynamic although the explanations given varied across the spectrum from accusing beneficiary 
governments of being incompetent to plain facedly accusing donors of ‘imperialist’ type intentions. 
In more than one occasion respondents were hostile and defensive claiming that aid is changing 








The research benefited from me having significant familiarity with the workings of donors and 
access to senior donor and government officials thus allowing for participant observation. Having 
worked as a senior advisor to the European Union on aid effectiveness, I have been involved in 
numerous studies and strategy making processes that relate to the case studies used. My work 
experience also allowed me to identify which respondents are more likely to have intimate 
knowledge of donor country strategy processes, a feature of aid that tends to involve senior officials 
more so than project managers and sector experts. In this regard, the research approach has been 
to only use documentary evidence that is publically available and verifiable which, in turn, 
contributed to the research focusing on published strategies and policies. This did incur some cost 
to the research because there were numerous internal or confidential documents or 
communications uncovered that could have strengthened the research findings. However, it was 
decided not to use such documentation for fear that it would transgress ethical considerations even 
though these documents were often shared by the officials of the organisations writing them. 
 
Substantial fieldwork took place in all the case study countries most notably in Bangladesh, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Palestine and South Sudan as well as in Brussels, Belgium when 
interviewing EU officials. South African government donor officials were interviewed by telephone 
and in person at conferences hosted by the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria and South 
African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), in Johannesburg South Africa in 2014 and 2015. US 
donor officials were interviewed in Namibia and by phone. My professional experience granted me 
preferential access to government and donor officials, many of whom explicitly said they were 
speaking ‘off the record’ and only doing so because they had confidence that I would not reveal 
their identities. Across the board respondents made clear that they had no authority to comment on 
the findings when they diverge from their respective organisation’s ‘official position’. In this regard, 
it became apparent early on in the research process that without the promise of confidentiality 
respondents would not speak. As such respondents are not named in the research and their profiles 
are purposefully kept opaque except for in cases where I was explicitly informed of their 
willingness to be identified. However, to give more context when quoted, respondent profiles are 








The study is thus purposefully based on primary and publically available data; secondary data was 
used to frame the questions and corroborate findings more than anything else but the interviews 
are not necessary to the evidence presented in the findings. Findings were triangulated between the 
literature, official donor policy and related documents. Key respondent interviews, thus, only acted 
to prevent the risk that my perspective was biasing the findings. 
 
This study is guided by the ethical provisions of the University of Cape Town and professional 
standards in the field.  
 
The research contributes to debates on the socio-political and political economy of development. In 
particular, the study aims to contribute to understanding how development speaks for others, 
influences government and resource allocations in Africa. This study contributes to empirical 












South Africa is an ideal and unique case study for this research because South Africa is firmly an 
emerging donor that strives to differentiate itself from what it sees as patronising or colonial 
behaviours common to traditional donors. South Africa continues to receive donor funding from 
traditional donors and has a long history of being a beneficiary which affords its policy makers an 
intimate understanding of undesirable donor behaviours. In this regard, South Africa presents itself 
as a good case study in speaking to the likes of Bill Easterly (2002, 2002b, 2004, 2007) and Dambiso 
Moyo (2010) who imply that with the appropriate intent and an understanding of the problems, aid 
can be improved. At the same time, to the extent that South Africa produces similar unintended or 
unstated results to that of ‘traditional donors’, it could support the argument that recurring 
unintended and unstated results are generated by the act of giving aid itself rather than being 
unique to how traditional donors behave. 
 
South Africa has emerged as a donor in the context that accelerating globalisation and regional 
integration is seeing South Africa’s economic and political interests increasingly extend beyond its 
own borders. Within Africa and Southern Africa, in particular, South Africa’s private sector has 
made considerable progress in capturing markets and building supply chains in sectors such as in 
formal retail, telecommunications and servicing the financial, industrial and extractive industries. 
At the same time, South Africa’s post-Apartheid government has made measurable and increasing 
investments in raising its international profile both bilaterally through expanding the network of 
representatives abroad and in the global architecture such as through raising its profile in the 
African Union, United Nations systems and groupings such as that of Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa (BRICS). South Africa has also sought to increase its international influence through 
shaping the international debate and accordant structures on development cooperation. In the 
development cooperation space, South Africa is in the process of transforming what has been 
something of a reactive funding mechanism, the African Renaissance Fund, into a full-blown 







research, then, could also be of value to the South African government in questioning how the 
establishment of SADPA could be aligned with South Africa’s economic interests. 
 
This chapter is split into two sections. The first section focuses on South Africa and its policies and 
approaches to being a donor. The second section results from the finding detailed at the end of the 
first section (2.6) that concludes that the literature and policy imply South Africa should provide aid 
to Mozambique more so than its current focus on Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
South Sudan. The second section is an analysis of the feasibility of South Africa being a donor in 
Mozambique, thus analysing the possible space for South Africa as a donor in what role it could 
potentially play in the national aid architecture.  
 
It is important to note that this chapter on South Africa follows a different structure to the 
chapters on USAID (Chapter 3) and on the EU (Chapter 4) most notably because South Africa 
has not drafted specific beneficiary country strategy papers (at least not for public access). For the 
US and EU, the analysis focuses on comparing the partner country’s national development plan with 
the respective donor strategy to support the self-same national development plan. This analysis, 
however, was impossible for South Africa due to the absence of a South African country strategy, 
which is not unusual for an ‘emerging’ donor. O’Riordan, Benfield and DeWitte’s (2010) analysis of 
European Union donors found, for example, that all of the European Union donors (except for the 
European Commission) programme aid on occasion without a country strategy with the newer 
European Union donors of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland only starting to adopt 
the practice. Furthermore, the literature on South Africa’s practices as a donor is much harder to 
come by than with the EU or US. Accordingly, this chapter adopts the approach of analysing South 
Africa’s donor behaviour throughout Africa and wherever the literature is available. It then 
compares this analysis to what South Africa’s approach would look like if its programming 
resembled its stated policy priorities and apparent national interests in programming aid to 
Mozambique. Whilst the South Africa case study does not as easily fit the analytic framework as the 
US and EU case studies, it is nevertheless potentially more important because South Africa is an 
example of a donor that cannot easily be categorised as being part of a Western model of exerting 
power abroad. In fact, as this case-study shows, insofar as South Africa behaves in some ways like a 








The first section focuses first on analysing the policy and economic context (2.1) that shapes South 
Africa’s decision making as an actor in the international development cooperation space. 2.2 then 
explores South Africa’s stated policies and what they imply about where South Africa should invest 
its development resources. The findings point to a possible competition between South Africa’s 
‘official’ policy of investing more in partnerships with countries of strategic economic importance 
and the African National Congress’s stated policy of using development cooperation to counteract 
the influence of Western/neo-Imperial interests in Africa. Regardless South Africa’s ambitions, 
however, the country’s ambitions will be constrained by its capacity to exert itself abroad and 
compete in what sometimes looks like a crowded space for dialogue in beneficiary countries. 2.3 
draws attention to the likelihood that South Africa is significantly overestimating its ability to 
compete as a development partner, thus also invoking a technological superiority over its 
beneficiaries that may not actually exist. Aside from South Africa’s stated policy objectives, there 
are serious and growing economic and trade interests that the literature implies should influence 
decision making in SADPA. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 draw on trade analysis (the graphs were compiled 
with the assistance of Tom McLellan, a graduate student at the University of Cape Town, whose help 
is appreciated). The analysis of the trade data shows South Africa’s burgeoning trade relationship 
with sub-Saharan Africa and the world. Excluding energy, gas and petroleum products, South 
Africa’s combined global imports and exports have grown almost fourfold from just over US$40 
billion in 2002 to US$170 billion in 2012. To put things in perspective, South Africa’s exports in 
2012 exceeded government revenue. Just as importantly, when energy, gas and petroleum products 
are excluded, South Africa is steadily growing a trade surplus that implies greater beneficiation of 
value to South Africa in the long term. At the same time, the importance of sub-Saharan has itself 
grown at double this rate; the eight-fold increase in trade with sub-Saharan Africa has seen it grow 
from around a tenth to almost a quarter of the value of South Africa’s combined global trade. Within 
sub-Saharan Africa, the top seven markets for South Africa’s exports are in Southern Africa, 
cumulatively comprising three quarters of South Africa’s exports to sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
When South Africa’s trade relationships are combined with its stated policy objectives and what the 
literature says on how donors select beneficiary countries, Mozambique presents itself as a most 







important partner already but one of rapidly growing importance due to its booming economy and 
vast natural resource discoveries. From a developmental perspective, Mozambique’s comparatively 
higher poverty rates also make it a suitable site for SADPA to invest in. Furthermore, aside from 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique is the only of South Africa’s neighbouring countries that cannot be 
influenced through the vast resources South Africa transfers by way of the Southern Africa 
Currency Union mechanism (in 2014/2015, responsible for R52 billion in untied transfers to 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland’s treasuries31). 2.6, then, applies the policy priorities 
and comparatively grades the potential value of Mozambique with that of Burundi, South Sudan and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo as a potential beneficiary of SADPA resources. 
 
The second section of this chapter delves deeper into what a SADPA investment in Mozambique 
could look like. Mozambique is currently one of the fastest growing economies in the world with a 
large population (about two thirds the size of South Africa) hungry for the sort of consumer goods 
and services that South Africa provides. Having discovered the second largest gas fields in the 
world as well as vast deposits of coal and graphite, Mozambique’s spending power is only expected 
to grow. The analysis of the trade data in section ten shows that exports are growing to 
Mozambique at a rapid pace but imports are growing even faster due to Mozambique’s supply of 
energy. If this trend continues, it is likely Mozambique will be of even greater importance to South 
Africa since the more it depends on Mozambican energy, the more the trade relationship expands to 
include security and common environmental interests too. Furthermore, as Mozambique converts 
its natural resource finds into working mines and processing plants, South Africa’s vast extractive 
industry service sector could also benefit. Similarly, the expected influx of foreign exchange as 
Mozambique’s production comes on line, will likely increase the country’s purchasing power and 
could be an enormous opportunity for South African producers and service providers in everything 
from fresh produce through financial, education and other high skill services more readily available 
in South Africa than anywhere else in the region.  
 
The economic opportunities in Mozambique have not gone unnoticed by South Africa’s policy 
makers and the private sector. 2.8 collates findings from interviews with South African enterprises, 
the South African embassy in Maputo, the South African Department of Trade and Industry and the 








South African chamber of commerce in Mozambique. The private sector is rapidly expanding its 
presence in Mozambique. South African retailers such as Pepkor (now with fifty stores in 
Mozambique) are expanding in Maputo and further north but so too are companies such as Sasol, 
MTN and Standard Bank, amongst others. The South African government is also trying to help and 
promote South African investment in Mozambique with some evidence that it has been proactive 
and effective in engaging and supporting the private sector. However, there is still a perception that 
South Africa as a ‘brand’ is not fully valued; further interviews with a number of some private 
sector actors revealed significant suspicion of government efforts. Unfortunately, much of the good 
work done by the Departments of Trade and Industry, International Relations and Cooperation is 
overshadowed by a deep suspicion that the government hampers rather than helps. Recent 
initiatives by DTI, for example, to force a code of conduct on South African businesses32 were 
viewed as poorly at best and plainly obstructive at worst. Evidently much needs to be done to 
strengthen the partnership and build trust on the shared objective of expanding South Africa’s 
economic stake in Mozambique. 
 
South Africa is not the only country positioning itself to improve its profile and influence in 
Mozambique. Traditional donors such as the United Kingdom, acting as traditional donors, account 
for more public expenditure in Mozambique than the government itself does. Furthermore, 
emerging powers such as Brazil, India and China are making inroads and trying to position 
themselves as preferred alternative trading and investment partners. At the macro-economy and 
rule setting level traditional donors have established a vast infrastructure to shape and influence 
policy in everything from tax reform to health and education. That being said, whilst traditional 
donors spend upwards of R25 billion a year on their relationship with Mozambique, the 
relationship itself is fraught. The research finds (2.9 and 2.10) that there is considerable suspicion 
and tension between the donor community, the United Nations system and the Government of 
Mozambique often attributed by donors to poor communication, suspicions of corruption and what 
appear to be the legacy of a relationship previously grounded in dependence on donors. The biggest 
signifier of this eroded relationship is that most of the working forums intended to deliver 
meaningful dialogue and cooperation have given way to a single but bloated forum revolving 
around negotiations on general budget support. This forum, known as the G17, is further associated 
                                                             







with infighting and bickering amongst traditional donors more so than being seen as an effective 
mechanism to secure influence. 
 
For South Africa, the challenges traditional donors face in Mozambique, however, could be an 
opportunity. SADPA will have limited resources and thus cannot reasonably buy its influence in 
Mozambique through the sheer volume of its development assistance. However, getting dialogue 
forums working is not an expensive investment and is very much suited to South Africa, a country 
that can both empathise with donors and recipients due to its shared experience as both. In this 
regard, 2.10 finds that SADPA could invest its limited development resources in getting 
coordination and dialogue working in terms of private sector development and energy. Both these 
sectors currently struggle to maintain a productive policy dialogue between the government and its 
development partners’ despite being vitally important to the broader development objective of 
poverty alleviation. At the same time both these sectors are vitally important to South Africa’s own 
interests being intimately connected to making it easier for South African’s to do business in 
Mozambique and to securing a stable supply of energy.  
 
Finally this chapter concludes (2.11) by reflecting on what South Africa’s actions as a donor say to 









Section One – South Africa as a Donor 
 
2.1 Context 
Since its first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa has made concerted efforts to ensure it has 
a significant influence on the international stage. South Africa held a seat for two terms on the 
United Nations Security Council, lobbied successfully for a South African chair of the African Union 
in 2012, led international peace processes such as in Burundi and Sudan, and convinced Brazil, 
Russia, India and China’s BRIC grouping to include South Africa. South Africa is now in the process 
of financing33 its own international development agency, the South African Development 
Partnership Agency (SADPA) which will formalise the funding it has made available for 
international development cooperation through the African Renaissance Fund.  
 
With South Africa transitioning to a more formalised and structured approach to international 
development cooperation (in establishing a dedicated agency), there will be greater attention and 
oversight on how it chooses to allocate its limited developmental resources. Whereas a fund such as 
the African Renaissance Fund lends itself to opportunistic decision making, a legislated agency, such 
as SADPA will be expected to follow the norms of any other government department or agency.  
This means that it will need to formulate clear strategies and policies on how it is to spend its 
resources if it is to comply with the strictures of South Africa’s Public Financial Management Act 
(PFMA34). With increased public scrutiny and oversight, SADPA will be required to ensure that 
SADPA’s funding decisions meet standards35 of “transparency, accountability and the effective 
financial management”  "in accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost-effective” (SA Treasury 1999). The logic driving this research is that SADPA 
will be pressured to establish an objective framework to justify its financing decisions so that its 
management will be able to guard against accusations that funding decisions are only politically 
motivated and exclusively in the interests of a captured elite. This research, thus investigates what 
such a framework would look like and what it implies for where SADPA should be investing its 
limited resources. 
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2.2 South Africa’s International Policy (and Developmental) Objectives  
South Africa’s policy basis for asserting itself as an international development partner rests on the 
two pillars of “creating a better South Africa” through protecting the country’s interests abroad, 
“and to [create] a better and safer Africa and a better world.” Financing for these pillars is “through 
key vehicles such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African 
Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund; strengthening political and economic integration 
of the SADC; strengthening South-South relations”36 (SA DIRCO 2010). Financing for international 
development cooperation is positioned under the Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation’s (DIRCO) programme 4 which details allocating funding outside DIRCO’s recurrent 
budget for participation in international funds and organisations as well as dedicated funding for 
development cooperation projects. Formalising South Africa’s capacity to fund development 
cooperation abroad is cited in the foreword of the DIRCO 2010-2013 strategic plan, where Minister 
Maite Nkoana-Mshabane calls for “the establishment of a South African Development Partnership 
Agency (SADPA) to promote development partnership”37. 
 
Whilst the government has made broad statements to establish SADPA, however, it has been slow 
to live up to its policy commitments. So much so that one senior analyst at a 2015 conference on the 
subject commented that “in many ways SADPA is no more than a press release.” (ISS 2015) The 
formal establishment of the agency has not gone according to government plans. This has meant 
that the organisational capacity that was needed to reinforce DIRCO’s ability to contract, monitor 
and implement projects has not been created. Nonetheless, South Africa continues to spend 
consistently on development cooperation, financing projects through the African Renaissance Fund 
(ARF) facility but with an increasing bent towards acting as a ‘development partner’ rather than a 
donor. Contrary to some other donors’ data on spending is easy to access and published annually in 
the Treasury’s financial reports and forward looking spending plans. DIRCO reported that the 2012 
and 2013 ARF expenditure at close to R1.1 billion38. This is the basis for the notion that SADPA’s 
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36 2012 Estimates of National Expenditure, Vote 5 International Relations and Cooperation, Treasury, 
Pretoria,  
37 Department of International Relations and Cooperation Strategic Plan 2010-2013, Department of 
International Relations and Cooperation, Pretoria, South Africa, 







budget will continue to be in the same region or at least around R500 million a year. Just over half 
of ARF spending was on humanitarian assistance with another 30% on socio-economic 
development.  
 
Aside from the evident focus on being a ‘development partner’ in the acronym SADPA, the most 
consistent line on this approach comes from DIRCO officials themselves. Shoayb Casoo (SA DIRCO 
2012), a director at DIRCO and regular participant in South African and international forums on 
development cooperation, goes to great lengths to argue that South Africa is not a traditional donor 
and rather a ‘development partner’. Casoo argues that South Africa’s is a very different approach to 
that of Northern or more developed countries. Indeed, the literature also speaks to how “increasing 
inequality, which is a feature of globalisation, is expressed both domestically within SA, and in its 
relations with the region” (Carmody 2014: 237). Much like other Northern donors such as Ireland 
or Italy that also struggle to reconcile domestic poverty with their role as an international donor 
albeit with a major difference in that “domestic public discourse about development cooperation 
[is] nearly non-existent” (Yanacopulos 2014:204). SADPA, accordingly comes across as a 
technocratic solution, with little evidence of public consultation in its apparent attempts to avoid 
the problematic practices ‘traditional donors’ are criticised for, instead latching on to  what South 
Africa calls a ‘South-South Approach’. Casoo (2012) asserts that “South Africa has a unique history, 
position and advantage to play a major role in Africa’s development”. South Africa claims it will 
differentiate itself from traditional donors because its approach involves “co-crafting the policy 
focus; sharpening the delivering mechanisms and broadening the instruments for development 








Table 2.1: SADPA’s Framework and Approach 
SADPA FRAMEWORK - 
DRAFT POLICY AREAS  
SADPA APPROACH  
PRINCIPLES  
Solidarity; cooperation over competition, mutual benefit, 
equality, national ownership, creation of viable states based on 
self-reliance, sustainability – Philosophy of Ubuntu  
AREAS OF SUPPORT  
Includes both regional priorities and individual country 
priorities; both DAC and Non-DAC sectors  
STRATEGIC APPROACH  
•Demand driven priorities – co-crafted; mainstream issues; 
capacity focus  
•People Centred Development – development of societies; 
benefit people  
•Partnerships – Co-ownership, mutual benefit; North and 
South; South-South; and Non-Government  
•Catalytic initiatives – quality of progress rather than quality of 
aid; unlock potential  
•Development effectives – national ownership, sustainability, 
capacity generating, Paris Declaration  
•Results Based Management – results orientated  
IMPLEMENTATION 
APPROACH  
A flexible framework with many different development 
cooperation modalities and partnerships, but with good 
governance elements embedded in the methodology  
INSTRUMENTS  
•Mainly grants & technical coop. Loans, JVs & PPP’s – with 
commercial sectors  
•budget, sector, programme, project, basket  
ROLE OF PARTNERS  
All partners must make a contribution & take responsibility for 
programme, and results  
CONDITIONALITY  
Development progress must support the partner/ region, 
procurement within the region; other conditionalities – to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.  
QUALITY ASSURANCE & M&E  
Strong focus on rules for accountability, good governance, 
reporting and monitoring, knowledge management and 
evaluation (within limits); reporting to SA Parliament & public  
Source: Casoo 2012 
 
The problem with South Africa’s logic that it will be a better donor compared to many Northern 
countries and their donor organisations is that they equally make similar assertions to what South 
Africa does above. They also argue that they are uniquely more ingenuous or less motivated by 
their own national interests than other donors. Furthermore, these assertions shared by traditional 
donors and South Africa alike are not much different from the emerging international trends cited 
in section 5.3 (below) on how donors internationally agree to promote  greater partner country 







Pacific’s Cotonou Agreement, for example, goes even further than South Africa does in this rhetoric 
of being an equal development partner. The Cotonou agreement actually transfers the contractual 
authority over EU monies to beneficiary countries to the point that the EU itself is unable to spend 
its own development resources without the express permission of the partner country. All this 
means, that whilst donors still treasure the concept of being a ‘development partner’ rather than 
just a donor, the term ‘development partner’ itself appears to be devalued with confusing and often 
competing definitions of what is meant depending on which donor is actually using the term. 
Simply put, when South Africa asserts it is different because its approach is as a ‘development 
partner’ rather than as a donor it only echoed claims made by the majority of traditional donors 
too.  
 
When probed about what differentiates South Africa’s approach, government officials tend to 
emphasise that South Africa’s approach to international development in Africa is more genuine 
because of its shared experience as a ‘third world’ country of ‘ex-colonial’ status. When interviewed 
by phone in early 2014 a senior DIRCO official explained that international development “is in our 
DNA” (DIRCO Official, March 2014). He went on to say that South Africa has a moral imperative to 
provide development assistance because poverty “is like avian flu, what happens on one part of the 
continent affects us on the other. [You must not approach SADPA] thinking like a traditional donor, 
you must think about this from a South-South cooperation perspective.” “We want a partnership 
approach that does not result in us telling them [meaning beneficiary countries] what to do.”39  
 
The problem is that these assertions on their own do not guard against behaving in the same way as 
more ‘traditional donors’. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 2013 reviews of South Africa’s 
development programming in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan found that 
what South Africa actually finances and implements is largely no different to what other DAC 
donors do. Projects funded by South Africa are similarly designed, often using the same 
implementing partners (e.g. UNDP) and share the same sort of success and sustainability failures of 
other DAC donors. Despite South Africa’s stated intention to differentiate itself from traditional 
donor failures, it is earning something of a reputation for simply replicating mistakes made in the 
past by traditional donors. As one Northern donor senior official quipped at a conference in 
                                                             







Ethiopia (March 2014), "In terms of an African agenda and South-South cooperation, at present 
there is a lot of anti-colonial rhetoric. South-South cooperation is likely to end up in the same boat 
as north-south cooperation, with exactly the same principles of ownership etc.” 
 
It is possible that South Africa’s intention to behave differently to Northern donors is not met 
because it just does not have capacity to do so, rather than being a sign of empty rhetoric. A survey 
of the literature, however, shows that the assertion that South Africa is different to other donors in 
that it sees African governments as ‘equals’ is not backed up by the evidence. In fact, the literature 
clearly points to South Africa having the same sense of superiority to the rest of Africa that many 
Northern donors are criticised for having. The Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2002)40, for 
example, reports on the 2012 Working Group on the African Union where in presenting to 
parliament the Deputy Director General of the Department of International Cooperation (Foreign 
Affairs) “expressed concern at the ignorance amongst some African countries” (PMG 2002). The 
Deputy Director General went on to argue that South Africa should invest in international 
development cooperation to support “the fight against colonialism and poverty, and concerted 
efforts at nation building… constitut[ing] the building blocks towards African solidarity”…. “It is 
against this background and the resultant marginalisation of the African continent that the concept 
of an African renewal has emerged. In South Africa, the notion of revival and renewal was 
encapsulated in the idea of an African Renaissance.”41 These comments point to South Africa’s 
policy makers positioning themselves as somewhat ahead of or more advanced than the rest of 
Africa. If anything, this implies that South Africa is emulating how Northern donors42 approach 
Africa with the presumption that they will lead rather than support, educate and ‘conscientise’ 
while helping poor Africa ‘emerge’. More recently a May 2014 study on perceptions of South Africa 
by its peers in the African Union reveals the belief that South Africa behaves with a sense of 
superiority, acting more like a regional “hegemon” than a South-South development partner (Lucy 
and Gida 2014).  
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From discussions in parliament, the narrative of superiority becomes wedded to a sense of moral 
obligation and a moral imperative in Government’s official documents. On the second page of the 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation’s 2010-2013 Strategic Plan, Government 
reports that (italics added) 
 
“Critical to our strategic approach in ensuring that the Consolidation of the African 
Agenda becomes a reality, we are all then summoned or beckoned to relentlessly: 
promote programmes aimed at regional economic integration; prioritise the 
implementation of NEPAD; work towards the establishment of a South African 
Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) to promote development partnership (the 
conceptual framework of which has now been approved and efforts will now be 
focused on design and operational issues); advance AU-EU relations in the context of 
the Africa-EU  Action Plan; mobilise support for the harmonisation and  rationalisation 
of RECs; strengthen the AU and its structures; continue to invest our resources in the 
promotion of peace, security and stability among countries of Africa; and last but not 
least, champion the attainment of MDGs in African countries by 2015.” 
 
This imperative to intervene and ‘improve’ Africa might be tangentially linked to South Africa’s 
political, economic and security interests but it is not motivated by those interests. Instead, as 
recognised by Vickers (2013), South Africa’s foreign policy is driven and justified by the history of a 
struggle against apartheid, hence the appeal to idealised notions of ‘solidarity’ and struggles against 
‘marginalisation’ and ‘colonialism’. The foreign policy recommendations from the African National 
Congress’s 4th National Policy Conference of June 2012 illustrate this point perfectly: 
 
South Africa’s “independent views and courage on the international and diplomatic 
stage have been acknowledged by many countries, their governments and political 
parties.” “The emergence of growing economic powers, especially China, India and 
Brazil, have a perspective that is informed by their struggles against colonialism, and 
therefore accustomed to acting multi- laterally, thus share our commitment to 
rebuilding and transforming the institutions of global governance.” South Africa 
must combat the “hypocrisy of Europe, the United States, and the NATO military 
alliance that is consistent with their divisive policies in the Middle East, as well as 
North Africa.”43   
 
At least to some extent it would appear that South Africa’s foreign policy and approach to 
establishing a development partnership agency is partially associated with a narrative of 
superiority (whether justified or unjustified) over other African countries. What this implies is that 
                                                             







South Africa’s policy makers may suffer the same superiority complex as traditional donors despite 
their trying to put forward the notion of a development partnership amongst equals.  
 
2.3 South Africa’s Competencies as a Donor44 
In August 2013, the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) released a report titled 
South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA): Strategic Aid or Development Packages for 
Africa?45 The report provides a unique insight into Government’s thinking. In the section on South 
Africa’s perceived comparative advantage, the author, Neissan Besharati, draws on official remarks 
made by the DIRCO Deputy-Minister Marius Llewellyn Fransman at what was a SAIIA–DIRCO 
Roundtable held in Pretoria in December 2012. This section shows that that South Africa’s 
narrative on its competence as a development partner is in-line with how Northern donors 
conceive of their strengths. It is also worth noting that South Africa’s understanding of its strengths 
and capacities does not seem to be backed up with any reasonable data or understanding of the 
complexity of the challenges at hand, a situation mirrored by many Northern donors. It is almost as 
if its sense of superiority over its African peers has fed the presumption that the challenges facing 
African Governments are easily overcome and thus do not require significant investment by South 
Africa in its own capacities to deliver as a donor or development partner. 
 
Besharati (2013) reports that Government sees proximity and it being ‘an insider’ as a comparative 
advantage for South Africa because of physical proximity and the price of airfares. This is largely 
incorrect and belies common sense. While South Africa does have an advantage in Southern Africa, 
it is in practice as far away from western, central, northern and eastern Africa as European 
countries are, not because of physical distance but because of the number of flight connections 
required and the price of tickets. In fact it is often more expensive46 to fly from South Africa to 
central, northern or western Africa than it is to do so from Europe. Due to growing numbers of 
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45 Neissan Alessandro Besharati, South African Development Partnership Agency: Strategic Aid or 
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2016 compared to $760 from Paris to Juba, taking 15 hours. For many Western and North African 







flight connections, India, China, Turkey and the Gulf States are now considerably closer to many 
African countries than is presumed by South Africa’s decision makers. Furthermore, this notion is 
even more difficult to understand when considering that South Africa’s main donor activities are in 
Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. All of which are as, if not 
more, accessible from Europe than South Africa. At the same time the fact that Burundi and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and to a lesser extent Rwanda are Francophone, mean that 
linguistically South Africa is considerably further removed from French speaking donors such as 
Belgium, France and the EU. 
 
Besharati (2013) goes on to report that DIRCO believes South Africa has specialist expertise not 
available to many Western donors, particularly in exporting South Africa’s developmental model 
abroad. There is simply no evidence for this. Consider any sub-sector of development cooperation 
(from de-mining through peace-keeping to tax reform and public financial management) and the 
casual researcher will see established and well-resourced Western think tanks, training 
programmes, armies of consultants and international NGOs, quite able to compete with South 
Africa’s best. Furthermore, even if South Africa has specialist expertise in its own ‘developmental 
model’ it is not immediately clear which countries in Africa are trying to emulate it. It sounds very 
optimistic to think that African countries will be more receptive to South Africa exporting its 
development model than they are to European or other developed countries exporting theirs. This 
consideration aside, it is quite plausible that more attention is paid on the continent to emulating 
Rwanda’s and Ethiopia’s developmental model than South Africa’s. After all, Ethiopia and Rwanda 
are amongst the fastest growing economies in the world, while South Africa’s growth is largely 
stagnant. Additionally, Ethiopia and Rwanda offer an example of a developmental model that is not 
accompanied with uncomfortable and often difficult to implement governance and rights reforms 
that are central to South Africa’s developmental model.  
  
Another comparative advantage cited by Besharati (2013) is South Africa’s skills in peace-building, 
reconciliation and democracy, based on Africa’s perception of South Africa “acclaimed as a beacon 
of democratic freedom in Africa.” There was a moment in the 1990s when this was true but if 
Government really believes African officials think of South Africa like this today they are 







xenophobic violence, propping up Mugabe’s brutal regime, devastatingly high crime rates and 
persistent corruption. It is unclear which African countries are striving to replicate South Africa’s 
success story. 
 
Besharati (2013) cites South Africa’s institutional and human resource development capabilities as 
a comparative advantage. There is a basis to argue this might be plausible but it is much more 
nuanced than South Africa’s policy makers appear to acknowledge. It is difficult to see how South 
Africa’s training and research institutions compare to those in the West, particularly those in the 
USA, in terms of attracting Africa’s elites. South Africa’s comparatively low fee rate and the good 
standing of South African universities in Africa only works so far. For example, at the highest levels 
such as in doctoral programmes, the American academic machinery both better finances successful 
prospective students and typically offers them education and research ranked considerably higher 
on international scales than that provided by South African education institutions47.  
 
Outside of the academic sphere, however there has been some apparently deserved recognition48, 
arising from the work of South Africa’s government owned Public Administration Leadership and 
Management Academy (PALAMA) in strengthening the capacities of public officials in South Sudan, 
Burundi and Rwanda. PALAMA was credited for not only delivering well in terms of South Africa’s 
own standards but also attracted the attention of other donors, with Canada contributing close to 
R120 million to the project at current exchange rates. Unfortunately, however, staff turnover both 
in the South African government and in the beneficiary countries, eroded PALAMA’s gains and lays 
question to whether its success is replicable or simply the result of an exceptional official being able 
to deliver at the right time in the right context 
 
Besharati (2013) correctly points out that South Africa has a comparative advantage in public 
financial management and tax collection. However, there is no evidence to suggest that African 
countries will be more open to South African advice on public financial management than they are 
to that from much larger donors like the World Bank and IMF. At the same time, the world class 
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expertise in the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and Treasury should not be confused for 
skills that are automatically deployed in an international development setting. From within SARS 
and the Treasury, officials act to implement policy with the support of their hierarchies and public 
institutions. On the other hand, when providing advice to other country officials on public financial 
management, there is no authority or institutional support to rely on.  In an international 
development setting, public financial management is as much if not more so about diplomacy, 
persuasion and partnership building as it is about transferring a technical skill. There is little 
evidence to suggest that SARS and Treasury have invested in developing these softer skills 
necessary to be effective in an international development arena nor that SARS or Treasury are 
particularly committed to even doing international development work. 
 
Lastly Besharati (2013) points to South Africa’s success investing in infrastructure and agriculture. 
South Africa does appear to have strong capacities in infrastructure and agriculture but the 
deployment of such skills in the development cooperation space is limited because South Africa 
does not have (or has not made available) the depth of capital necessary to compete with Western 
donors, let alone its so-called ‘southern peers’. The sheer volume of capital available for lending 
from China, Brazil, Russia and the Gulf States dwarfs South Africa’s. That being said, South Africa’s 
Industrial Development Corporation still enjoys a strong reputation as a competent development 
actor in Southern Africa that could perhaps be better mobilised by SADPA.  
 
While Besharati’s study implies that DIRCO may not have fully internalised its own capacity 
challenges, they are well recognised by senior Government decision makers at the executive level as 
reported in South Africa’s National Development Plan (NDP) 2030. The NDP calls on the Department 
of International Relations and Cooperation to safe-guard and improve relations in the region but it 
starts with a withering assessment of South Africa’s competencies in Africa. The NDP makes clear 
that South Africa is not seen as a peer or special friend by African leaders. Within “the southern 
African region, there is the perception that South Africa is acting as a bully, a self-interested 
hegemon that acts in bad faith among 5 neighbouring countries. As such, South Africa enjoys less 
support in the region than it did in the period immediately after 1994, when the country held pride 
of place among world leaders. Indeed, the difficulty the country faced in securing the top leadership 







factors that have limited South Africa’s reach. While the issue of the African Union leadership has 
been resolved, a significant effort is required to increase South Africa's role and space that 
promotes and protects the comparative advantages of all countries on the continent towards 
mutual gain.” (SA NPC 2012: 238) The NDP sees the role of SADPA to both repair these strategically 
important relationships and ensure sufficient organisational capacity that currently does not exist: 
“despite playing a key role in peace settlements on the continent, South Africa has gained little by 
way of expanded trade and investment opportunities. South African diplomats have great skill in 
drafting memoranda of understanding, policy statements and agreements, but lose momentum 
when it comes to implementing agreement terms or following up on promises of benefits.”  (SA NPC 
2012: 238) 
 
The NDP further observes that South Africa lacks the sort of capacities that DIRCO claims to have, 
which is in line with the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 2013 findings on the effectiveness of 
South Africa’s interventions in Africa. In Burundi49, Memorandums of Understanding on “defence, 
education, agriculture, economic cooperation and sports and recreation” signed by South Africa in 
2011 remain two years later in “an embryonic state”. South Africa’s interventions were seen as “ad 
hoc, piecemeal and without substantive impact”. Despite South Africa “portray[ing] Burundi as a 
shining success story of intervention in Africa” stakeholders report South Africa as not being 
involved since 2009. The ISS analysts, commented that: “Returning to Burundi four years later we 
could find little trace of the ten years that South Africa participated in peace-making and 
peacekeeping activities, at a relatively substantial cost. Its post-conflict development and 
peacebuilding interventions have been too few and far between to make a visible and lasting 
impact. (Hendricks and Lucey 2013a)” Similarly in the Democratic Republic of Congo the Hendricks 
and Lucey (2013b) argue that “the majority of [South Africa’s] interventions can be characterised as 
short-term and uncoordinated programmes that have lacked sustainable impact. There is also little 
evidence of follow-up or of monitoring and evaluation to [re]address issues as they arise.” Bad 
“planning and a lack of understanding of the context may have produced tensions” producing an 
unintended consequence only too familiar to more established donors. ISS findings on 
interventions in South Sudan and Burundi, unfortunately paint a similar picture. 
                                                             
49 ISS POLICY BRIEF 48 and Burundi Missed opportunities for South African post-conflict 








This contradiction has not gone unnoticed by South African decision makers. Vickers (2013: 549) 
states that “as a development partner in Africa, which involves substantial aid spending, [South 
Africa] is not delivering any commercial dividends for the country, especially in situations where 
South Africa has underwritten the costs of peace, stability and post-conflict reconstruction. In 
several African crises, South Africa’s peace diplomacy has paved the way for external powers to 
enter these markets and reap the rewards.” Vickers (2013) goes on to point out that this picture is 
particularly stark when considering the Democratic Republic of Congo where despite South Africa’s 
intervention in the country, it found itself losing investment and trade opportunities not just to 
Northern partners but to emerging ones such as China too. 
 
While Besharati (2013) does not touch on it himself another important comparative advantage that 
South Africa could deploy is its shared experience as a Southern development partner. For example, 
in the February 5th, 2014 interview with Mr. Casoo of DIRCO he pointed to the possible role South 
Africa could play in mediating tensions between Northern development partners and beneficiary 
countries particularly because South Africa can draw on experience as both a recipient of aid and a 
donor in its own right, thus appealing to both donors and recipients.  
 
Much like India or Brazil, South Africa is a regional powerhouse with policy development capacities 
that make it a recognised international actor in its own right. In Africa, the ability to play this 
mediating role is further reinforced by its comparatively strong relations with other African 
countries and its commitment to the African Union. To deploy this comparative advantage, 
however, South Africa would need to participate in the global architecture at country level. In South 
Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, interviews with other development partners 
seem to indicate that South Africa is not participating in the architecture (often despite explicit 
invitations such as in South Sudan). Similarly, in Mozambique, South Africa is not participating in 
the global architecture at country level. One example, however, was uncovered. In Jamaica, South 
Africa participated actively in the global architecture at country level, even playing an important 
role in contributing to improving the relevance of international actors to Jamaica’s national policy 
making process. In 2012, South Africa participated and contributed to the international 







cooperation. In an August 14, 2014 telephone interview with the Jamaican Ministry of Finance50, 
the official interviewed commented that Southern development partners are instrumental in 
empowering the Jamaican government’s own policy positions.  
 
The official pointed out that the narrative between Western developed and developing countries 
has in the past focused almost exclusively on adopting developmental models proffered by 
international development partners such as the World Bank. The implied logic is that if these 
models are adopted, development challenges will always be overcome. More problematically, 
however, should these Western models fail to deliver, the tendency is never to question the validity 
of the model itself but rather blame the failure on the partner country’s unwillingness to implement 
the model as presented. With Southern development partners such as South Africa playing a 
greater role in the global architecture at country level, this tendency is balanced with other country 
cases in which the model fails. The primary added value, then of Southern development partners, is 
to be an ally to developing countries in questioning the applicability of Western packaged 
developmental models. When managed correctly, participation of Southern development partners 
is enormously beneficial for national interests because it creates the policy space in which the 
beneficiary country has immediate allies when it questions the applicability of a ready-made model. 
This has further tangible benefits because every country context is different and having the space 
and allies to help emphasise this points allows beneficiary countries, such as Jamaica, to insist that 
developmental models and their associated projects are better contextualised through more 
intensive debate on assumptions and conditions for replication. 
 
Aside from the capacities challenges detailed above, there are few indications that South Africa is 
positioned to play an influential role when it comes to emerging themes that will likely shape the 
international debate on development cooperation.  In section three the following emerging 
international priorities were identified: 
 Size of Funding and 0.7% of GNP Target: South Africa has made no commitments to meeting 
the OECD DAC target of spending 0.7%51 of Gross National Product on international 
                                                             
50 Conducted by Alexander O’Riordan with an official from the Planning institute of Jamaica in the Ministry of 
Finance and Planning. 
51 The 0.7% ODA/GNI target was first agreed in 1970 in a UN resolution on 24 October 1970. It has been 







development assistance. With South Africa being a developing country and few OECD DAC 
countries meeting the target there are good reasons South Africa should not aim to meet it. 
However, with South Africa currently spending only 0.05%52 of its annual budget or just over 
0.01% of GNI on development cooperation, it will be hard for South Africa to justify getting 
greater influence by appealing to the level of the country’s commitment. That being said, it is 
worth noting that South Africa currently transfers as much as R30 billion a year (just under 3% 
of GNP) (Fabricius 2015) in subsidies through the Southern African Customs Union. Should 
South Africa be able to redirect these subsidies to financing development cooperation, South 
Africa would not only become one of the world’s most generous donors but also transform itself 
into the single biggest and possibly most influential development partner in Botswana, Namibia, 
Lesotho and Swaziland.  
 
 Transparency: The ISS studies identified South Africa’s processes for reporting, monitoring, 
oversight and selection as weak. DIRCO itself recognises the need to strengthen its capacities to 
manage and implement projects. Furthermore, there are no signs that South Africa is intending 
to submit data to transparency initiatives like the International Aid Transparency Initiative or 
even to the OECD, in a similar manner to how some of the Gulf States, China and the Gates 
Foundation are doing. 
 
 Joint Programming (and Differentiation): The only country South African operates in that 
has completed joint programming was South Sudan but when approached to participate in 
2012 the South African embassy was non-responsive53. In Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the ISS criticised the South African initiatives as not being coordinated or 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
15 member states of the European Union agreed to reach the target by 2015 (although they are currently 
trending at only 0.3% for2013 according to the OECD). The 0.7% target served as a reference for 2005 
political commitments to increase ODA from the EU, the G8 Gleneagles Summit and the UN World Summit. To 
be fair the target is something of a thumb-suck having originated as a target of 1% put forward by the World 
Council of Churches. In the 1960’s the OECD DAC members agreed the target in principle but when called to 
formalise their commitment successfully argued the target should be reduced to 0.7% because they estimated 
0.3% flowed to developing countries in the form of private flows, by their nature out of governmental control. 
(OECD.org, The 0.7% ODA/GNI target - a history). 
52 R500 million annual ARF allocation divided by R1 trillion 2013 general government budget. 
53 Alexander O’Riordan reached out to the South African embassy in 2012 in his role of coordinating the joint 








designed and implemented in parallel to existing coordination systems. That being said the 
research did uncover minutes of a coordination meeting in Jamaica where the South African 
ambassador to Kingston played an active role in trying to coordinate with other international 
actors. Additionally, it is worth noting that DIRCO appears to have invested considerable 
resources in coordinating its approach to designing SADPA with other emerging donors and 
consulting some South African civil society organisations and think tanks, notably the South 
African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Institute of Security Studies (ISS) and Accord. 
Given the benefit of the doubt, there may be some interest in South Africa participating in joint 
programming and other joint initiatives. Nonetheless, South Africa is held back because of a lack 
of skilled staff at embassy level mandated to play an active role in the international architecture 
as it presents itself in beneficiary countries. 
 
 Climate Change: The OECD’s 2013 report on the state of development financing reports South 
Africa as being one of the biggest recipients of official development assistance financed climate 
change projects, implying significant local capacity. Additionally, there is evidence that suggests 
some national capacity in the sector, albeit embedded in private consultancy firms like One 
World and in international agencies like UNDP. Amongst government the Department of 
Environmental Affairs, is recognised by many as having a strong negotiations team, good 
technical capacities and strong policy making experience. South Africa also can draw on the 
capacities in state owned organisations such as the Centre for Science, Innovation and Research 
(CSIR), Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DBSA). DBSA is purported to be in the process of strengthening its capacity to act as a national 
implementing agency for the South African government. If South Africa were to summon its 
expertise in the climate change space, it would likely have a comparative advantage it could 
deploy in competing with traditional donors in securing the confidence of beneficiary 
governments. This would especially be the case if South Africa would position itself as offering 
to share its technical expertise as well as experiences as an African government negotiating a 
good return from traditional donors when it comes to climate financing. 
 
 Fundamental Human and Democratic Rights: South Africa has deep and extensive 







has increasingly been seen as in conflict with the state.  South Africa’s continued support for 
Zimbabwe, the governmental response to xenophobic violence and recent steam rolling over 
constitutional rights in the 2015 State of the Nation Address has undermined South Africa’s 
credibility as a government to lead in this space. Furthermore, the 2013 closure of Idasa, 
Africa’s premier rights based organisation, has left a measurable capacity gap that does not 
bode well for South Africa, should it wish to project itself abroad as an influential actor in the 
human and democratic rights spaces. 
 
 New Deal for Fragile States: The 2009 New Deal for Fragile States (OECD 2009) has created a 
very important opportunity for political and policy dialogue in fragile states. This is a significant 
shift from the past in which engaging with governments in fragile states was largely just a 
rubber stamping process or an after-thought to the international humanitarian and relief 
machineries. South Africa is actually very well positioned to play an influential role in this 
space. Not only has South Africa invested in raising its profile at the African Union but it also has 
credibility from Jacob Zuma’s role in the Burundi peace process and Thabo Mbeki’s in South 
Sudan. At the same time South Africa has strong South African organisations to partner with, 
most notably the Institute for Security Studies and the peace-building organisation, ACCORD. At 
this stage the only thing holding South Africa back from expanding its influence in this space is 
itself, in that it seems to show little interest in participating in the spaces created by the ‘New 
Deal’. 
 
 Results: South Africa’s Statistics South Africa is one of the more competent statistical 
organisations on the continent and could prove to be a resource that SADPA could use. South 
African universities furthermore have comparatively strong statistics departments and are 
accessible to African governments partly due to their lower costs. However, a dearth of 
numeracy skills and strong domestic competition for skilled statisticians, monitoring and 
evaluation experts does not lend itself to South Africa easily deploying these skills abroad. 
Furthermore, the National Development Plan acknowledges that South Africa is far from 
meeting its own benchmarks for effective results based monitoring of government activities. 







through leading and or competing in the international debate on results in development 
cooperation. 
 
 Complementing and Partnering with the Private Sector: South Africa actually has excellent 
and possibly transferable experience in terms of how it partners with the private sector and 
state owned enterprises in development related projects. Notably the Mozambique 
development corridor and Lesotho water-energy schemes are very interesting projects that 
could be better show-cased and secure South Africa considerably more influence in the 
development cooperation space. This is especially so because South Africa’s experiences are 
distinctly African and they are state driven experiences that resemble the sort of developmental 
state interventions that China is famous for.  
 
 
2.4 South Africa’s International Trade Interests54  
South Africa has experienced dramatic growth in its international trade (Graph 2.4.1) growing from 
a combined import and export total of under $50 billion on 2002 to over $200 billion in 2012. 
Dramatic export growth has tracked import growth meaning that South Africa is increasingly 
integrated and dependent on sustained international trade for its own national prosperity. At the 
same time, South Africa is not winning the trade war: a persistent negative net trade flow means 
that growing exports is a political and economic priority.  
 
                                                             







Graph 2.4.1: South African Trade Flows in Billions of U.S. Dollars 
 
Source: UN Comtrade  
 
When petroleum products (Graph 2.4.2), gas and electric current are removed from the trade data, 
however, it becomes clear that South Africa has something of an export advantage. On the one hand 
this means that the 2014/2015 subsidence in international energy prices should improve the trade 
balance but on the other, it means that South Africa’s continued success and prosperity is 
dependent on safe, reliable and cheap access to imported petroleum, gas and electricity (the last 
two of which, as this chapter shows later on, make Mozambique a strategic priority waiting to be 
tapped).   







Graph 2.4.2: South African Trade Flows in Billions of U.S. Dollars (Excluding Petroleum 
Products, Gas and Electricity) 
 
Source: UN Comtrade  
 
South Africa’s major trading partners by geographic composition (Graphs 2.4.3 and 2.4.4) are 
detailed below. Here it is important to note the changing relationship with the most noticeable 
change being a move away from trade with high-income nations, (e.g. Western Europe and North 
America) and towards low and middle income East Asian nations and most notably sub-Saharan 
Africa which accounts for a growing and disproportionate share of South Africa’s exports.  Notably, 
South Africa’s imports from sub-Saharan Africa are also skewed by a higher proportion of spend on 
energy related imports than any other region. This means that sub-Saharan Africa is both a 
strategically important growth market and an equally important source of energy. 







Graph 2.4.3: Geographic Composition of Exports 
 
Source: UN Comtrade  
Graph 2.4.4: Geographic Composition of Imports 
 








The analysis off the data also shows that South Africa’s exports are still resource dominated, with 
primary products and resources based manufacturing consistently accounting for over half of all 
exports. In 2012 these categories accounted for 53% of exports. The surge in ‘other’ exports is from 
the increased value of the gold South Africa exports. Gold is classified separately to other minerals 
as it is mainly just used as a store of wealth. As has been witnessed since the oil price slipping in 
2014, other internationally traded commodity prices have slipped as well. If this trend continues, 
then, the possible boon from cheaper energy will be undone by the lower prices South Africa gets 
for its exports of gold, iron ore, coal and other extracted resources. Notably the data shows that 
imports are increasingly dominated by primary products because of South Africa’s growing need to 
import fuels. In 2012 oils and crude accounted for 71 percent of all primary product imports. 
Imports of general electronics, cars and some processed resources drive the remainder of imports.  
 
The top export partners (Table 2.4.1) shows an almost equal weighting of developed and 
developing partners for South African exports. The top ten export destinations consist of five 
developed nations and five developing nations, of which three are sub-Saharan Africa nations. 
 
Table 2.4.1: Top Export Partners 2012 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
Rank Nation Trade Value (Billion US$) % of Exports 
1 China 10.32 10.40% 
2 United States 7.82 7.88% 
3 Japan 5.70 5.74% 
4 Botswana 5.07 5.12% 
5 Namibia 4.08 4.12% 
6 Germany 4.05 4.08% 
7 India 3.72 3.75% 
8 United Kingdom 3.34 3.36% 
9 Zambia 3.06 3.09% 







The top import partners (Table 2.4.2) are mostly a mix of industrialised nations and oil producers. 
However, China, India and Thailand also feature due to a rising role for developing nations as a 
source of low cost imports. China tops the list with an even larger percentage of total South African 
imports than exports.  
Table 2.4.2: Top Import Partners 2012 
Rank Nation Trade Value (Billion US$) % of Imports 
1 China 14.61 14.08% 
2 Germany 10.23 9.86% 
3 Saudi Arabia 7.94 7.65% 
4 United States 7.48 7.21% 
5 Japan 4.61 4.44% 
6 India 4.59 4.43% 
7 Nigeria 3.72 3.59% 
8 United Kingdom 3.51 3.38% 
9 Angola 2.80 2.70% 
10 Thailand 2.70 2.60% 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
The major energy producing nations of Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Angola disappear from the top ten 
import partners without energy imports. They are replaced by the high income nations of France, 









South Africa’s trade with sub-Saharan Africa is becoming increasingly important (Graph 2.4.3), 
especially with regards to exports. Whilst South Africa’s balance of trade with the world has 
deteriorated South Africa is experiencing a substantial and sustained positive net trade flow with 
sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Graph 2.4.3: Percentage of Total Trade with sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
South Africa’s total net trade flow in 2012 approximated $5 billion, but when sub-Saharan African’s 
data is isolated, South Africa records a net positive trade flow of $15.5 billion (Graph 2.4.4). The 
positive net trade flow with sub-Saharan Africa increases further to $20.2 billion when energy 








Graph 2.4.4: South African Trade Flows with sub-Saharan Africa in Billions of U.S. Dollars 
 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
While the amount traded has increased, the distribution of exports and imports to sub-Saharan 
Africa amongst the various technology levels has not changed much over the decade. However, the 
distribution of exports is very different to that of South Africa’s exports with the world at large 
(Graph 2.4.5 following page). The major difference is that the technological composition of South 
Africa’s exports is much less resource focused for sub-Saharan Africa than the world. For sub-
Saharan Africa it is the manufactured products which dominate exports, even the export of basic 
manufactured goods such as toys, pottery, furniture is larger than primary product exports.  These 
manufactured goods, being not resource intensive, are perhaps more important to other exports 
because they are the sort of exports that keep South Africa’s much need industrial and 
manufacturing industries growing. Furthermore, because this sort of manufactured good tends to 
involve value adding in South Africa, if managed, these exports contribute disproportionately to a 








South Africa’s top export partners (Table 2.4.5) in sub-Saharan Africa are mostly its neighbours. 
The other export partners are fast growing commodity rich nations with expanding middle classes, 
national infrastructure projects and South African investors.  
 
Table 2.4.5: Top sub-Saharan Africa Export Partners 2012 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
 
South Africa’s top import partners (Table 2.4.6) are mostly neighbours, six of the top ten. The top 
three, Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique, are all oil and gas producers. All the import partners in the 
top ten barring Lesotho are major natural resource producers. Lesotho is a garments producer and 
able to export to South Africa free of duties through the Southern African Currency Union (SACU). 
  
Table 2.4.6: Top sub-Saharan Africa Import Partners 2012 
Rank Nation Trade Value (Billion U.S. 
dollars) 
Percentage of sub-Saharan Africa Imports 
1 Nigeria 3.72 31.47% 
2 Angola 2.80 23.70% 
3 Mozambique 1.27 10.74% 
4 Swaziland 1.16 9.77% 
5 Namibia 0.65 5.50% 
6 Zambia 0.41 3.44% 
7 Botswana 0.40 3.41% 
Ran
k 
Nation Trade Value (Billion U.S. 
dollars) 
Percentage of  sub-
Saharan Africa  Exports 
1 Botswana 5.07 18.54% 
2 Namibia 4.08 14.92% 
3 Zambia 2.65 9.70% 
4 Zimbabwe 2.42 8.84% 
5 Mozambique 2.35 8.60% 
6 Swaziland 1.86 6.79% 
7 Lesotho 1.61 5.87% 
8 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1.48 5.41% 
9 Angola 1.00 3.66% 







8 Zimbabwe 0.38 3.21% 
9 Lesotho 0.26 2.20% 
10 Ghana 0.23 1.97% 








2.5 Selecting Beneficiary Countries   
South Africa’s selection of partner countries to invest development resources in seems to have been 
driven primarily by the opportunity to support or contribute to peace-building and stabilisation 
activities. In many ways the desire to reduce conflict on the continent should be lauded from a 
purely moral perspective. Furthermore, there is considerable literature that argues that South 
Africa has a unique skill set and comparative advantage in these activities. This is attributable to the 
combination of South Africa’s regional military prowess, the ANC’s struggle history, links to former 
African liberation movements and the experience of negotiating a relatively peaceful end to 
apartheid. At the same time, it is important to recognise that providing an African alternative to 
Northern peace-building and conflict resolution initiatives resonates strongly with the ANC’s 
political vision and that of many other South African’s too. 
 
However, focusing its limited international developmental resources on conflict or post-conflict 
countries does not appear to be consistent with the government’s stated policy priorities, nor does 
it respond to the criteria commonly associated to how donors and development partners select 
partner countries.  
 
Table 8.1 below compares the relative importance of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and South Sudan (where South Africa currently finances international development projects) with 
Mozambique (where South Africa appears to have little interest as a development partner) using 
what the literature review (see 1.1) found to be the most commonly identified justifications that 
donors used to allocate aid. Mozambique was selected after reviewing and comparing countries in 
the region. Zambia, Namibia and Botswana were ruled out as some potential comparators because 
of current international trends to reduce funding to middle income countries, and Botswana and 
Namibia in particular. Swaziland and Lesotho were excluded because South Africa’s financing of 
development there dates back to before the end of apartheid and thus has a continuing and 
complicated legacy. Zimbabwe was considered as an option but it was agreed that there were self-
evident political dynamics that would prevent comparing South Africa’s development programming 
there to other partner countries. Mozambique, on the other hand, proved an ideal comparator both 









Table 8.1: South Africa’s Perceived National Interests 
Poor (-2)  Not Good (-1) Neutral (0) Good (1) Best (2) 
 






2013 GDP per 
capita55 (Lower is 
Better) 
$267 $454 $593 $1,221 
Economic 
Performance  
2013 GDP Growth56 
(higher is better) 
4.5% 8.5% 24% 7.1% 
2012 Governance 
Indicators57 
(Scale -2.5 to +2.5), 
greater is better. 
World Bank Gov. 
2012 – 6 indicators 
ave. 
-2.5 to +2.5 






67 100 67 63 
Bilateral Trade 
Imports+Exports58 



















Number in SA 
Very Low 18,545 Very Low 262,556 
Liberation 
Narrative 
Yes, SA is a 
credible peace 
No, SA fails as 
the peace 




                                                             
55 World Bank: World Development Indicators 
56 World Bank: World Development Indicators 
57 World Bank: Composite of World Governance Indicators, a composite of multiple international barometers 
and indexes. 
58 World Bank WITS database, 2013 series, exchange value set at ZAR11:US$1 
59 In the literature survey links to immigrant populations was an important decider but in the literature was 
combined with cultural and historical ties. In this table migrant population was separated from 
cultural/historical ties because of the mixing of quantifiable and qualitative data. 
60 Population and key labour indicators by 10 most common countries of birth, population 15‐64 years, 2011, 
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Source:  O’Riordan compilation for this research drawing on multiple data sources (see footnotes) 
and using the criteria drawn the literature review. 
 
Leaving aside the 1994 once off debt relief of R1 billion owed to the apartheid government, 
Mozambique has received little attention from South African policy makers in planning SADPA’s 
future interventions. This is despite the fact that Mozambique is arguably South Africa’s most 
important economic, security and political opportunity on the continent and in the neighbourhood. 
Not only does Mozambique border South Africa, but it also has a population three-fifths the size of 
South Africa’s. With 26 million citizens and a GDP growth rate of close to 8% annually (World Bank 
2014a), Mozambique will increasingly be important to South African exporters and service 
providers (e.g. financial sector, consultants, education, etc.). Mozambique currently imports 
R60billion (UN Comtrade 2014) a year over a third of which is from South Africa. South Africa in 
turn imports R10 billion a year (UN Comtrade 2014) of goods and services from Mozambique. 
Furthermore, Mozambique’s growth story is only set to improve. It has the second largest natural 
gas deposits in the world (Financial Times 2014) valued at between R3 and R6 trillion (price is 
volatile) as well as new coal discoveries. The economic opportunities in Mozambique are thus vast 
and there are also easy wins from a developmental stand point, such as in helping Mozambique 
improve its business climate (it currently ranks 139th on the Ease of Doing Business index (World 
Bank 2015)). Yet Mozambique is ignored by South Africa’s formally stated plans for SADPA.  
 
This is counter-intuitive especially since Mozambique is already receiving support from other 
emerging donors including Brazil. Furthermore, the discovery of natural gas and South Africa’s 
growing need for cleaner and more reliable energy sources should make Mozambique an obvious 
strategic choice for energy and security reasons. Similarly, South African and Mozambique share a 
common interest in tourism and environmental protection in managing the trans-frontier national 
park, of which slowing the incursion of Mozambican poachers is a major priority.  
 
Using a real politick lens, however, it is worth considering that there is a significantly higher 
reputational risk to South Africa in working as a development partners in Mozambique. Should 







would likely draw considerably more public attention in South Africa. After all, it is much more 
likely that a failure in Mozambique would end up in the South African press than a comparable 








Section Two – Mozambique as a Potential Beneficiary of South African Aid 
2.6 Mozambique at a Glance   
Mozambique has a population of 26 million people that borders South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania, 
Malawi, Zimbabwe and Swaziland. It is a member of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), making it part of the SADC free trade zone that includes South Africa. Mozambique is 
overwhelmingly rural and coastal, with approximately 68% of the population living in rural areas 
and 60% on the coast (World Development Indicators 2014). Mozambique experienced rapid 
urbanisation in the 1990s this has since slowed and the urbanisation rate has plateaued at around 
3.2% per annum. The population growth rate stands at 2.5% per year (World Development 
Indicators 2014). 
 
Mozambique’s economy has experienced spectacular, if turbulent, growth since the mid-1990s 
(Graph 2.7.1). Post 2005 the growth rate has settled at close to 7 percent annually (World 
Development Indicators 2014). This makes Mozambique one of the fastest growing nations in Sub-
Saharan Africa and is projected to be the sixth fastest growing nation globally for 2013-2015 
(World Bank 2013). Despite starting from an exceptionally low base the trend has been sustained. 
In 1995 the South African GDP per capita was 27 times that of Mozambique, by 2012 this became a 








Graph 2.7.1: Mozambique’s GDP per Capita and GDP Growth 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
The combination of high growth (considerably higher than any other country in the region) and 
steady urbanisation makes Mozambique increasingly important for South African firms, who are 
expanding aggressively in Southern Africa and beyond. This importance is only heightened by the 
increased role of trade for Mozambique. The explosion in trade is shown by the value of trade 
increasing from 44% of GDP in 1990 to over 100% in 2012 (Graph 2.7.2) (World Development 
Indicators 2014).  
 
Graph 2.7.1: Mozambique’s Trade as a Percentage of GDP 
 








While levels of trade have increased import growth has outstripped export growth (Graph 2.7.3). 
This suggests a nation with large opportunities for expansion of South African firms. 
 
Graph 2.7.3: Mozambique’s Trade Flows of Goods and Services 
 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
Mozambique experienced significant structural transformation in the early 1990s with industry’s 
share of GDP rising from 15% in 1991 to 26% by 2001. This was almost entirely a migration of 
production from primary products to industry (Graph 2.7.4). Services account for just below 50% of 









Graph 2.7.4: Mozambique’s Percentage Contributions to GDP 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
There has been a notable increase in foreign investment flows to Mozambique, accompanied by an 
annual economic growth rate of around 7%. Foreign investment has increased from 2% of GDP in 
2005 to 42% of GDP in 2013 (Graph 2.7.5 on following page) (World Development Indicators 
2014). Between 2003 and 2010 South African was the fourth largest contributor of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to Mozambique and funded the largest number of projects. Its investment was 
R2.279 billion into 12 projects (Wesgro 2011) and appears to be, at least partly driven by, a race to 








Graph 2.7.5: Mozambique’s FDI Inflows as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
Mozambique is an appealing market for South African firms. It is a fast growing nation with limited 








2.7 Trade with Mozambique61 
 
South Africa’s trade with Mozambique has increased dramatically in recent years with exports and 
imports generally tracking one another (Graph 2.8.1) higher. Mozambique is now South Africa’s 5th 
largest export destination in sub-Sharan Africa and the 3rd largest source of imports. Among South 
Africa’s global partners Mozambique ranks 14th for exports and 19th for imports but the growth 
rate considerably exceeds that of South Africa’s bigger developed country markets. Imports from 
Mozambique are mostly about energy. Removing these imports (that South Africa would 
presumably need to procure elsewhere anyway), unmasks Mozambique as a particularly valuable 
export market with a growing trade surplus: excluding energy, South Africa exports 10 times what 
it imports from the country.              
 
Graph 2.8.1: South African Trade Flows with Mozambique 
 
Source: UN Comtrade 
                                                             








The composition of imports to South Africa from Mozambique is about a shift from primary product 
imports to resource based imports. The primary product imports from Mozambique were 
historically crustaceans and animal feed. In 2002 these two industries accounted for 67% of 
primary product imports but by 2006 were increasingly replaced by gas as the key primary product 
import. In 2012 gas accounted for 74% of all primary product imports to South Africa, enabled by 
SASOL opening an 865km pipeline from the Tamene gas fields in Mozambique to Secunda in South 
Africa in 2004 (SASOL 2004). Resource based imports was propelled by Mozambique exporting 
increasing amounts of refined fuel to South Africa since 2006, which sharply increased in 2011.  
 
Primary products dominate imports from Mozambique once energy imports have been removed. 
The resource based imports are composed of briquettes and basic metal ores and scrap. Medium 
technology imports are mainly due to a single product: tube, pipes and fittings, of iron or steel. The 
basic export picture shows that the growth in value of trade has meant the export of electricity 
dwarfs all other exports from South Africa to Mozambique. There has also been notable growth in 
export of materials needed for industrialisation and infrastructure development, such as iron rods, 
coal for power, engineering equipment and trucks. Graph 2.10.4 shows the industries that account 
for just over 50% of all non-energy exports, thus showing that that non-energy exports are spread 
over a wide swath of different industries and economic sectors.  
 
Imports to South Africa from Mozambique have shifted radically from garments and foodstuffs that 
were major in the early 2000s to be completely dominated by electricity, gas and refined 
petroleum. While the three energy sectors have grown sharply and increased their relative shares 
the other sectors have not necessarily shrunk absolutely, just relative to the growth in energy 
imports. Fruit and nuts imports have grown from $0.2 million in 2002 to $20.4 million in 2012. 
Amazingly these have been spurred on by just ten farmers, nine of whom are former South Africans, 
who now produce 45 percent of all bananas consumed in South Africa (Bisseker 2014). However, 
others have decreased - for example other fixed vegetable oils contributed $1.8 million of imports 








These shifts are best shown once energy imports have been removed. The key industries included 
without energy imports account for over 70% of non-energy imports in each year. There are far 
fewer industries needed to constitute this share than in exports, implying that imports are 
relatively concentrated in a few key industries. However, much like exports there is still a lot of 
variation in which industries these are over time.  
 
2.8 South African Expansion into Mozambique and the Region 
South Africa has a growing private sector profile in Mozambique in terms of visible South African 
brands as well as large and small corporations. South Africa is also increasing the attention of state 
and non-state organisations on protecting South Africa’s interests and projecting its brand into the 
local economy. The South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has a representative 
office in Maputo and a representative office in Tete. The South African Department of International 
Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO) supports the Mozambique-South Africa Chamber of Commerce 
(CCIMOSA). On the Mozambican side, Centro de Promoção de Investimentos (CPI) and Ministério da 
Indústria e Comércio DASP (Ministry of Industry and Trade - Private Sector Support Unit) provide 
support to a growing South African business community in Mozambique.  
 
There is a growing focus on Mozambique from many groups within South Africa even though South 
Africa has not used its aid in the country to complement its ‘economic diplomacy’. DIRCO (DIRCO 
Official 2014 Interview) maintains that South Africa has a particularly good reputation in 
Mozambique, both with the Mozambicans and other nationalities operating there. South Africa and 
Mozambique hold bi-annual meetings between their respective Heads of State. South Africa’s DTI 
clearly recognises the potential in Mozambique, having produced information packages and a 
general ‘How to do Business in Mozambique’ guide alongside sector specific information. The DTI 
also promotes South Africa’s exports and business interests with ‘outward selling missions’ and 
’inward buying missions’.  
 
Mozambique has a very different legislative framework to South Africa with, for example all land 
owned by the government and leased to firms or individuals rather than freehold like is the case in 
most of South Africa. The Mozambican bureaucracy is notoriously complex and not conducive to 







in the world compared to South Africa at 73 for example. In terms of this business enabling space, it 
is notable that South Africa already has a track record that could be pivoted into aid or 
development cooperation. Petty corruption has been reduced at the border with South Africa and 
there is progress in reducing the costs of moving goods across the border through establishing a 
one stop border post that is now paperless. There is combined law enforcement in the Maputo 
Corridor between South Africa and Mozambique with the South African Police Services having a 
representative at the High Commission in Maputo.                           
 
As the number of consumers grows in Mozambique the lack of a developed formal local retail 
presence has made South African retailers particularly visible in establishing operations across the 
border. Pepkor (Pepkor Interview 17 December 2014), for example, has over 40 stores in 
Mozambique, with 20 in Maputo. These numbers are growing fast with 2014 alone adding 5 of 
these stores - growth of over 14%. Likewise, Checkers, Woolworths and other South African brands 
are planning to expand their existing presence in Mozambique or else enter the market. Even 
Woolworths has Maputo stores. These firms appear to be encouraged by the SADC free trade 
agreement that allows them to import goods into South Africa and then re-export them duty free to 
a SADC nation such as Mozambique. The large South African retailers have a comparative 
advantage in distributing these international goods into Southern African nations and even into 
Mozambique. This is due to the lower import, logistics and distribution costs associated with using 
Durban harbour for the whole Southern African region as opposed to those using Maputo 
exclusively for imports to Mozambique.    
 
The largest barrier to further expansion of South African firms appears to be in the form of non-
tariff barriers such as in onerous red tape, corruption and resentment of perceived South African 
encroachment. In all these issues the retail firms feel like they receive little or no support from the 
South African government. In most cases firms rely only on their own capabilities and influence to 
deal overcome barriers. When retail firms do seek government support it is seldom seen as 
forthcoming and often unsympathetic. Retailers perceive themselves as leading the expansion of 
South African firms into Southern Africa but not having their interests seen as politically important. 
Government is viewed as preferring manufacturers in South African expansion over retailers. 







barriers rather than relying on the government. Information on doing business in African nations 
comes from Rand Merchant Bank (RMB 2014) and negotiations with host country government 
officials are reported as being facilitated by already established South African multinationals in that 
country rather than through diplomatic representatives.  
 
The way ‘brand South Africa’ is viewed in Africa is also seen as an issue with one retailer (Retailer 
Unnamed December 4 2014) reporting (as also acknowledged by the government [SA NPC 2012]) 
that they unofficially work to brand themselves as local rather than South African retailers to avoid 
accruing negative reputational associations that come with being seen as South African. The 
respondent argued that there is a widespread view of South Africa as a hegemonic power, the 
spread of whose influence in Southern Africa and Mozambique in particular is not welcomed. The 
respondent reported in his experience that many South African firms avoid associating themselves 
with other South African firms or government officials. This has also resulted in an unofficial policy 
of employing locals as much as possible with only the top management positions served by 
expatriate South Africans. 
 
As such it would seem that there is an obvious opportunity for South Africa to use its aid both to 
raise its profile in Mozambique and in support of its own economic interests and that is in working 
to improve the business enabling environment through easing cross-border trade (enabling greater 
access by South African retailers) and in reducing the bureaucratic impediments to doing business 
in Mozambique (making it easier for South African entrepreneurs to invest and operate in the 
country). The next section, then, analyses the aid architecture at the national level in Mozambique 








2.9 Mozambique: The Aid Architecture at the National Level62 
 
"South Africa and Mozambique enjoy strong historical ties based on geographical 
proximity and the role played by Mozambique in providing solidarity during the struggle 
against apartheid and colonial oppression,"  
President Zuma’s spokesperson Mac Maharaj, news24.com, 15 January 2015. 
 
Traditional donor countries have an enormous influence in Mozambique spending in the region of 
R20 billion annually63 (about one sixth of GDP) on the assistance development partnership. Since 
discovering enormous gas reserves, graphite, coal and other minerals Mozambique’s international 
development partners talk about trying to transform what was largely seen as a less strategic 
donor-recipient relationship into one built on mutual respect and dialogue. Partly this 
transformation is being driven by the perceived waning of the influence of aid on countries like 
Mozambique. Reading the EU’s 2012 Agenda for Change, it is clear that the EU’s reference to 
programming in “a rapidly changing global environment” is about the need to strengthen global 
strategic relationships to compensate for the increasing anxiety that the influence of traditional 
donors is being supplanted by so-called South-South relations. At the same time, traditional donors 
are clearly embarrassed at being caught flat footed by the rise of the ‘Arab Spring’ (explicitly 
referred to in the EU’s 2012 Agenda for Change) despite their stated policy of promoting 
democratisation across the region. Furthermore, the inability to capitalise on such seismic 
democratic moments to fundamentally democratise countries like Egypt is putting renewed 
pressure on traditional donors to move from partnerships to delivering “results” as the UK has so 
aptly titled their recent policy (OECD 2014). 
 
In Mozambique, Brazil is a notable ‘Southern power’ providing development assistance as part of a 
wider charm offensive emphasising a common colonial history. At the same time, the enormous 
investment, estimated at over half a trillion rand (O’Riordan 2014) is focused on exporting 
Mozambique’s natural gas to India’s ravenous market, despite neighbouring countries having their 
                                                             
62 Between January and June 2014, Mozambique was visited three times and representatives from Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Germany, the EU, France, Ireland, Portugal, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the UK and the USA were interviewed. The analysis in this section, however, is based on publically available 
policy and only draws on the information gleaned from interviews to contextualize the respective policy and 
strategy documents within this research. 







own energy challenges. Furthermore, as is the case in much of sub-Saharan Africa, China64 appears 
to be winning more than its share of lucrative construction contracts and seems to command the 
influence of senior Mozambican policy makers. Few traditional donors are taking this possible 
erosion of influence lying down. Portugal strongly protects its relationships and interests through 
maintaining an effective ’Portuguese’ chamber of commerce. Italy is strongly pushing its industrial 
and related service companies into Mozambique in a bid to capture a share of the resource boom 
and France has recently been criticised for under the table deals of critical ships and possibly even 
armaments to Mozambique. Even the US’s ‘out-grower’ agricultural support schemes in 
Mozambique are seen by some as securing supply chains for American corporations in 
Mozambique. Obama’s 2013 (US Government 2013b) announced ‘energy for Africa’ initiative is 
clearly about supporting American energy corporations, such as General Electric, to gain a stronger 
foothold in Africa. Strangely while other foreign representatives will speak quite openly about their 
head quarter’s anxiety over competing for influence and economic access in Mozambique, they note 
that South Africa largely appears uninterested. Conversations with DIRCO in early 2014 confirmed 
that South Africa is more focused elsewhere in the continent in terms of extending its influence in 
the developmental space. 
 
The official ‘development space’ for international actors to dialogue and influence Mozambique is in 
relation to its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The Plano de Acção para a Redução da 
Pobreza (PARP) (Mozambique Government 2011) was drafted in consultation with development 
partners and non-state actors. The PARP was formally adopted by the Council of Ministers in May 
2011 and covers the period to 2014 with three primary objectives: (1) increase output and 
productivity in the agriculture and fisheries sectors; (2) promote employment; and (3) foster 
                                                             
64 China finances infrastructure loans at a 2% annual interest rate with a twenty year loan period and five 
year grace period (Bangladesh Government Interview, 21 August 2014). While the loans are tied to using 
Chinese (usually state owned) construction firms there is a perception that the services provided are cost 
effective although Mozambique is usually only an observer in the procurement process. While the lending 
rate is higher than the World Bank’s it does not come with cumbersome governance and reform prescriptions 
and is also seen as accruing cost advantages in that the World Bank loans tend to involve extensive and pricey 
use of World Bank teams and consultants for feasibility, technical and other studies. In comparison OECD 
concessional loans can cost as little as 0.01% but tend to be smaller in size and harder to get. Compared to the 








human and social development. This should be supported by fostering good governance, 
macroeconomic stability and sound public financial management.  
 
Mozambique has recently begun work on a long-term 20-year National Development Strategy – the 
Estrategia Nacional de Desenvolvimento (END) (Mozambique Government 2012) was released in 
January 2012 for consultation. Mozambique’s development policy is evolving in recognition that its 
slowing rate of poverty reduction might be mitigated with new natural resource discoveries, 
particularly coal, natural gas and oil. To capitalise on its new resource base, the END focuses on: (1) 
industrialisation and competitiveness (value addition, heavy industry and improved business 
environment); (2) human capital (health, education, social protection) and (3) research and 
development (infrastructure development and territorial planning, also in support to rural 
development). In the near term future there are evident opportunities for policy dialogue both on 
the END and on the expected revisions to the PARP. 
 
The EU, EU Member States and the United States of America cumulatively provide the majority of all 
grant aid (estimated at R12 billion in 201165) to Mozambique that includes extensive technical 
assistance, often playing a critical role in delivery of critical public services. International lenders 
and particularly the Bretton Woods Institutes play an instrumental role in negotiating 
Mozambique’s macro-economic policy. The EU as a block is a bigger trading partner than even 
South Africa being the market for 60% of exports (30% goes to South Africa) and the source of 15% 
of imports as well as 57% of Foreign Direct Investment in 2010. 
 
Narrative, Dialogue and Rhetoric: Entry Points to Influence Policy Making  
Traditional donors in Mozambique emphasise the notion of an effective development partnership 
to gain access to and influence with government decision makers. In this regard, coordination and 
dialogue with government is strongest in the so-called G19 group. The G19 group comprises 
nineteen international representatives and is a working forum to build consensus and negotiating 
positions on public sector reforms and structural adjustment. The G19 is influential because it 
combines the pooling of analytic and negotiating skills of participating traditional donors with the 
financial incentives of budget support programming and conditional lending mainly from the World 
                                                             







Bank. Budget support programming provides grant financing directly into Mozambique’s general 
budget. Without continued budget support Mozambique would be forced to dramatically roll back 
essential services in health and education amongst others whilst also needing to find fresh sources 
to replace the foreign exchange it delivers. Additionally, the international architecture at country 
level has evolved into ‘thematic working groups’ in macro-economic stability/inclusive growth, 
Public Financial Management (PFM), transport, education, health, agriculture and rural 
development amongst others. In most cases these thematic groups act primarily to share and 
collect information, building coalitions and monitoring purposes. These groups are seen as being 
more effective when they are able to attract the attention and participation of senior officials from 
Mozambican line ministries. 
 
The international architecture coalesces around a rhetoric of mutual strategic objectives, in a bid to 
justify speaking to or analysing sovereign issues that would not normally be tolerated in a 
developed country context. The key themes are: 
 Promoting transparency, accountability and rule of law to improve responsiveness and 
protection of citizens as well as to manage, allocate and spend future revenues. 
 Sustained poverty alleviation through inclusive growth, income generation and redistribution, 
rural development, environmental sustainability, infrastructure and promoting social stability. 
 Promoting a conducive business environment (and corporate social responsibility) for both 
local and international companies to thrive. This includes tackling security weaknesses that 
threaten joint interests while promoting companies that respect international commitments on 
anti-bribery and tax transparency (e.g. through peer reviews of reporting systems). Hence 
developing synergies among trade promotion, improved business environment and good 
governance. 
 
The narrative form, then, is grounded in traditional donors presenting their relationship with 
Mozambique as being a development partnership amongst equals, thus combatting Mozambican 
criticism of Northern self-interest. The narrative structure follows the line that traditional donors 
are development partners, only helping Mozambique be more responsive to its citizens’ needs, so as 







structure provides Northern partners the legitimacy and foundation to analyse, question and seek 
to influence the most important structural aspects of Mozambique’s economic and political policies.  
 
Recently, however, concerns that Mozambique is increasingly interested in strengthening its 
relationships with emerging powers such as India, China and Brazil, without consulting the 
traditional donors, has led many to fear that their influence is on the decline. A number of European 
diplomats communicated (in confidence) that there is explicit pressure from their respective 
headquarters to improve the leverage they have in Mozambique. This would be achieved through 
better utilising a combination of aid, trade and private sector investment. In this regard, one of the 
dominant assertions communicated by traditional donors is that Mozambique’s relationship with 
emerging powers will not deliver results and eventually be dismissed as nothing more than bluster. 
To punctuate this narrative, traditional donors in Mozambique are actively trying to shift the nature 
of the ‘development partnership’ to one anchored in ‘results’ reporting that is intended to draw the 
line between the government’s own national statistics and Mozambique’s relationship with 
Northern countries66. The implication is that if traditional donors can recast Mozambique’s national 
successes as being impossible without the ‘development partnership’, then it will be easier to argue 
that Mozambique’s relationship with the developed world is more valuable that what is offered in 
partnership with the developing world. The way in which this is being put forward is in focusing 
criticism on the quality of Mozambique’s own results reporting systems (through the PARP), whilst 
offering better quality results through the promise of donor funded results systems67. 
 
In this regard, traditional donors in Mozambique are getting ready to invest more in strengthening 
their brand as preferred partners by moving to implement the 2011 Busan Partnership (OECD 
2011) commitments to ‘development effectiveness’. The Busan Partnership essentially lays the 
foundation to invest poverty alleviation monies in securing greater influence with non-state actor 
                                                             
66 While the PARP has a strong monitoring and results framework, Northern donors are quick to dismiss the 
quality of the reports and systems in place even though donors’ own reporting is based on qualitative 
information at best and at worst reconfiguring Mozambique’s own national statistical data.  
67 While there is good reason to believe the current focus on results is about improving return on aid 
expenditure, there is also good reason to consider that this is a politically motivated manoeuvre. As the OECD 
reports (2014:7) “DAC members report a lack of institutional demand for results information for decision 
making and learning”  meaning that the results agenda is itself being driven at the political level and is not of 








elites such as in the private sector or in specialised interest groups. In calling for greater 
inclusiveness in the governance of development cooperation, traditional donors now have a much 
stronger basis to directing development resources at building relationships with non-state elites as 
well as government and civil society. The EU (2014f) in particular has further facilitated this by 
building its capacity to do ‘blending’ that essentially uses (blends) aid grants to subsidise loans and 
investments to the private sector. Furthermore, the renewed focus on demonstrating and 
communicating results, gives traditional donors additional ammunition to strengthen their 
reputations and accordant political capital in recipient countries.  
 
Traditional donors acknowledge that the government’s attention is going to be increasingly focused 
away from dialogue with them and towards the genuine developmental and patronage 
opportunities that come with increasing investments in the extractive industries and their 
associated supply and service industries. Given the global financial crisis, it is unlikely that 
Northern donors will increase aid or investment to Mozambique to maintain their current level of 
influence. Instead, the strategy appears to be to engage government about ensuring that new 
revenue and investment contributes to economic diversification, better delivery and more effective 
and transparent governance in a way that ensures traditional donors maintain a ‘seat at the table’. 
The donors interviewed all acknowledged that Mozambique’s changing revenue base and fast rising 
investments from emerging powers Brazil, India and China68 mean development cooperation will 
increasingly be complementary to government’s own resources and spending plans. Aside from the 
effort to ramp up the discourse on equitable development and calling for new resources to benefit 
‘the electorate’, at least European donors hope to shore up their influence through growing their 
subsidised loan programmes such as the European Investment Bank (EIB)69 and EU Member State 
development banks (e.g. France’s Proparco and Germany’s KfW).  
 
                                                             
68 India’s investments reached US$1 billion in 2011; China become the second largest investor in Mozambique 
in 2010 and Brazil announced US$4 billion in investments for 2009-2013. 
69 It is notable that EU’s recently adopted development policy, Agenda for Change, also allows for a new 







At the same time, it is important to note changing approaches to development with South Africa 
(Mozambique’s largest neighbouring and regional economy) adopting what appears to be a 
‘developmental state’ or interventionist approach (in line with China’s) to social and economic 
development. This will likely accelerate the competition between Northern backed development 
cooperation models as being about enabling private sector growth and the Chinese style model of 
state driven development that eschews the role and influence of traditional donors on 
Mozambique’s public policy debates. In this context, it is likely that Northern donors will need to 
transition their funding away from financing recurrent expenditure to investing in opportunities for 
catalytic change thus more visibly demonstrating the value of a Mozambique’s partnership with 
them. It is furthermore likely that Northern donors will increasingly present an integrated and 
unified façade through which their apparent comparative value will be increased by better 
demonstrating what Mozambique can and does draw from cooperation on security, trade, climate 
change and access to investments. The European Union has in any case already made ‘policy 
coherence for development’ a policy priority in an apparent bid to advance common ‘Euro-Atlantic’ 
interests and agendas in the context of development cooperation70. 
 
Where traditional donors in their role of development partners and the Mozambique Government 
have a shared interest that is not easily available to emerging powers is in strengthening 
government capacity to deliver. The government is under increasing pressure to fill the 
‘implementation gap’ particularly in addressing regional divergences, income inequality and 
improving service delivery. Providing strategic technical assistance and capacity development to 
government organisations is an area in which Northern donors have a very strong comparative 
advantage. Particularly when compared to emerging actors such as China that prefer ‘turn-key’ 
infrastructure investments over these types of engagements. Interestingly, this is an area South 
Africa has a particularly strong advantage because it has regionally comparable experience and is 
able to provide advice and strategic inputs, outside of the ‘shackles’ of being seen as a former 
colonial power telling African governments what to do. Furthermore, South Africa, if it had the 
interest to do so, might be able to gain the confidence of both traditional donors and the 
Mozambican government as something of a neutral broker. 
                                                             
70 EU (December, 2013) Council Conclusion on Policy Coherence for Development, Brussels: Council of the 








The International Cooperation Architecture in Mozambique  
Before independence traditional donors have played a very influential role in public decision-
making and still account for more public service related expenditure than the government does. 
Since independence, however, the government has been able to increasingly reclaim authority over 
the public space in the context of phasing out humanitarian assistance (that typically rides rough-
shod over and around government systems) and transitioning to a more traditional development 
cooperation type relationship with traditional donors. Mozambique coordinates its relationships 
with these Northern donors through the Development Partnership Group (DPG), thematic and 
technical working groups and the General Budget Support Group known as the G19. In recent years 
the G19 has become of increasing prominence because it has come to be seen as the main forum in 
which Northern donors can leverage their development assistance in return for their policy 
priorities. However, the G19 is a problematic space because its effectiveness relies on an implied 
threat that Northern donors will withhold general budget support, if Mozambique does not ensure 
the legislative environment Northern donors want to see. The problem is that it is politically much 
more difficult to carry through with the threat of withholding general budget support than 
Northern donors would like Mozambique to believe. In many ways Mozambique called the bluff of 
the G19 group in early 2014 when the government clearly violated principles of sound macro-
economic management and transparent procurement in the purchasing of a fleet of fishing boats 
from France through a government backed bond issue managed by a Swiss bank. The G19 threat71 
to suspend budget support in this context proved to be bluster when only one Northern donor was 
able to follow through with the threat. The problem is that traditional donors answer to their own 
constituencies and many of their constituencies have no appetite for reducing funding to 
Mozambique that is intended for basic health and education services (regardless of where the funds 
really go). What this means, and traditional donors are only too aware of, is that they are on their 
way to losing the influence that pressure mechanisms such as the G19 used to provide.  
 
For this reason, some traditional donors are taking steps to transfer their attention to getting 
influence at the sector level where there are still clear opportunities to use aid, investment and 
technical assistance as a means to strengthen relationships with influential government officials.  








Indeed, the space is ripe for the picking. Influential ministers responsible for important sectors 
ranging from agriculture to setting import and export tariffs are much maligned because traditional 
donors have largely ignored them in favour of brokering deals at a higher level. As such ministers in 
key institutions are more used to traditional donors pressuring them by way of threats to the 
Minister of Finance rather than brokering deals with them directly. What this means is that over the 
medium term future traditional donors will likely invest their resources in restructuring sector 
coordination and dialogue/negotiation structures. This will include public debate on sector 
definitions and organisational mandates so as to convince more open-minded and accessible 
ministers to champion Northern interests. Additionally, traditional donors will likely invest in 
rejigging their interests into multi-sector priorities so as to go around ministers and decision 
makers that are not open to doing business with traditional donors. For example, energy might be 
recast as a climate change or agriculture as nutrition so as to bring Northern allies into the room to 
pressure possibly reluctant ministers. In this regard, traditional donors are in the process of 
organising their limited resources to better focus on shared priorities in a way that allows them a 
comparative advantage. So instead of each embassy covering all priority sectors and policies, there 
will likely be greater concentration in the way that embassies play a lead role in pursuing only a 
portion of shared interests and then report back to the wider group. What this means is that if 
emerging actors such as South Africa want to participate in public debate (and influence), they will 
be confronted with much more specialised and better prepared traditional donors. So if South 
Africa’s embassy officials need to follow public policy debates in everything from migration to 
security and trade, they will have to compete in forums in which traditional donors have 
concentrated their resources on, allowing the twenty odd like-minded traditional donors in 
Mozambique a competitive edge that will be increasingly difficult to assail.   
 
Priority sectors will likely be (or already are) selected by traditional donors where they have both a 
vested interest whether due to trade and investment or in terms of their international 
commitments to soft issues such as poverty alleviation and infant mortality. The focus then will be 
on getting these sectors recognised in the next iteration of the PARP thus formalising and 
legitimising the space for influence and dialogue. Once recognised in the next version of the PARP 
(due for revision in 2015), aid funding will be used to stack the agenda through providing technical 







influence mechanism for the foreseeable future. When it comes to these mechanisms it is 
interesting to note that Brazil and India and even Turkey are paying attention and trying to secure a 
role but South Africa is largely formally absent in Mozambique. 
 
Furthermore, the international consensus on aid and development effectiveness clearly implies that 
traditional donors believe they can improve their influence by building on their perceived 
authoritative superiority in regard to fundamental rights, environment and gender, inclusiveness 
and democratic processes and having a more sophisticated approach to public sector management. 
In this regard, it is likely that traditional donors in Mozambique will position themselves as a 
vanguard in protecting human rights, women’s rights and the environment in the hope of building a 
local constituency and moral authority. This will also build on popular perceptions that traditional 
donors are united with ordinary Mozambicans when it comes to their abhorrence of corruption. 
Traditional donors will also invest considerable resources in convincing Mozambique that they 
have the technological advantage that the government needs to improve public sector performance. 
This investment will focus on ‘evidence based policy making’ and a narrative about results (e.g. the 
UK’s big results now initiative). Notably, Traditional donors are largely uncontested in these spaces, 
with emerging donors such as China typically avoiding dialogue on rights and focusing on ‘turn-key’ 
demonstration projects rather than working directly in support of government bureaucracies. 
Finally, the focus on inclusive economic growth, and by implication, responsible business practices 
is a clear move to improve the branding and standing of Northern investors in Mozambique, in 
comparison to companies from the developing world. This move is timely for European donors 
because it promises to deliver reputational benefits that could be seen to reinforce a narrative that 
investors from countries like China and indeed South Africa have a competitive advantage in that 
they are accused as being more exploitative and less accountable to the needs of locals72. 
                                                             
72 In 2014, South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry, for example, even tried to get South African 
companies to sign up to a ‘code of conduct’ for doing business in Africa to improve South African reputations 
abroad. Even the South African National Development Plan recognizes that South Africa is perceived as a 








Pictorial Representation: The International Architecture Showing How International 
Development Partners Orient Themselves to Government in Mozambique 
 



































































































Donor Spend in Mozambique 
Table 12.1 summarises donor official development assistance (ODA) disbursements to Mozambique 
from 2006 to 2011 in US$ millions. In terms of funding size South Africa will struggle to compete. 
SADPA is projected to have an overall budget of R500 million a year or about $45million at current 
exchange rates. Comparatively speaking even Ireland is disbursing more to Mozambique than 
SADPA will spend globally.  Furthermore, with the global financial crisis fading and growth 
returning to developed economies, it is likely that donor spending will continue to grow. A larger 
proportion of this funding will also likely be allocated to countries like Mozambique in line with 
commitments to divert aid funding from ‘middle income countries’ like India and China towards 
‘least developed countries’ like Mozambique. It is also interesting to note the increased 
disbursements between 2006 and 2011 from Northern countries like Portugal (increased ten-fold), 
Belgium (trebled disbursements), Denmark (doubled disbursements) and the UK (doubled 
disbursements). One notable Northern actor that is likely to reduce its presence in Mozambique is 
Australia because of a change in government.  
 
Table 12.1: Disbursements of ODA to Mozambique (US$ millions)  
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
All Donors Total 3415.12 1697.60 1942.26 1999.82 1960.61 2093.95 
Australia 1.71 2.83 2.92 4.56 20.88 6.68 
Austria 6.95 3.89 12.69 8.86 8.75 9.98 
Belgium 12.82 23.41 25.88 23.15 34.09 33.50 
Canada 47.04 51.82 68.53 75.15 82.01 129.81 
Denmark 56.68 70.94 62.75 86.50 87.56 115.35 
Finland 27.23 32.88 40.24 42.77 47.25 36.52 
France 18.74 35.20 23.13 24.64 20.76 19.06 
Germany 65.30 64.55 79.62 118.32 81.21 96.46 
Ireland 53.61 68.10 70.65 63.54 56.92 58.57 
Italy 30.24 42.58 34.55 24.81 35.32 26.73 
Japan 106.83 27.78 23.72 60.67 62.85 48.49 
Korea 0.13 0.21 0.98 0.43 0.95 6.48 
Luxembourg 1.52 0.73 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Netherlands 59.66 80.66 105.69 99.31 81.84 73.00 
Norway 64.25 80.13 96.67 80.41 73.69 84.14 
Portugal 21.67 21.63 25.58 69.89 116.00 224.23 







Sweden 87.66 103.57 119.60 98.86 84.54 108.97 
Switzerland 22.43 24.23 23.85 24.16 27.63 30.91 
United Kingdom 90.63 115.72 198.04 54.90 104.42 191.40 
United States 108.80 153.38 226.65 255.49 277.91 387.01 
EU Institutions 179.29 237.39 163.68 204.68 192.33 128.96 
Kuwait (KFAED) 




2.10 Entry Points for South Africa in the Mozambican Architecture  
Considering the comparatively small financial resources South Africa has available it is clear that 
South Africa will not likely be able to buy influence in the way much larger donors do (e.g. through 
providing critical amounts of budget support). Furthermore, an analysis of South Africa’s 
comparative advantages (see section above) imply that South Africa will be technically ‘out-gunned’ 
by more experienced traditional donors in many sectors such as in health, education or agricultural 
development. South Africa does, however, have a clear comparative advantage in its ability to act as 
trusted partner both to traditional donors and to the Mozambican government because of its 
international standing and status as an Africa democracy. This means that South Africa could have 
an outsized influence in brokering and setting the agenda for dialogue and cooperation in key 
sensitive sectors in which traditional donors have failed to get traction. This analysis of the national 
architecture in Mozambique, combined with the analysis of South Africa’s stated policy priorities, 
leads to the conclusion that South Africa should invest its resources in improving its relevance and 
influence in the energy and private sector development sectors. 
 
The research findings are informed by South Africa’s Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation’s (SA DIRCO) 2010-2013 strategic plan that recognises the need to deepen and 
strengthen South-South cooperation, pointing out the value of what it sees as “formidable alliances” 
with other emerging markets. South Africa’s strategy starts with the view that “South Africa shares 
similar positions on political, economic and social issues with other countries of the South and in 
this context relations and cooperation” (SA DIRCO 2010: 13). South Africa also has strong 
relationships and influence with developed groupings such as the EU as affirmed in the 2009 EU-
South Africa summit. Companies from the EU, US and Japan (such as HSBC and Wal-Mart) are also 
attracted to South Africa as a base and launch pad to expand their subsidiary operations into the 







participating in and transforming global systems of governance, of which the architecture described 
above is the manifestation in Mozambique. The emphasis is on building new alliances, taking 
advantage of existing partnerships and positing South Africa as a potential source for positive 
transformation and reconfiguring of the global architecture to better work in African interests. 
 
DIRCO’s Strategic Plan for 2010-2013 lists (2010:7) the following “overarching priorities as outlined 
in the Medium Strategic Framework for 2009-2014”, all of which informed the findings of this 
research: 
 “Continued Prioritisation of the African Continent; 
 Strengthening political and Economic Integration of the SADC; 
 Strengthening South-South Relations; 
 Strengthening relations with Strategic Formations of the North; 
 Strengthening political and economic relations; and 
 Participate in the Global System of Governance” 
 
The findings also focus on addressing one of the most important challenges to South Africa’s 
international relations policy: the extent to which South Africa is (frequently) perceived as an 
economic threat to many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite South Africa’s assertion that it 
shares “similar positions on political, economic and social issues with other countries of the South”, 
there is little evidence to suggest that sub-Saharan Africa sees South Africa as a ‘gentle neighbour’. 
These findings thus focus on the energy and private sector development sectors because they offer 
the promise of delivering measurable benefits for Mozambique as well as South Africa. The 
rationale is thus that SADPA should focus its limited resources on development cooperation that 
delivers mutual benefits to South Africa and Mozambique. 
 
SADPA Entry Point: Private Sector Development  
Considering South Africa’s trade and investment interests in Mozambique and Mozambique’s stated 
priority of promoting greater private sector growth and investment, there is a clear mutual interest 
in South Africa supporting private sector development in Mozambique. Furthermore, the analysis of 
private sector development in Mozambique (below) shows that there is a low cost-high reward 







delivery perspective is coordinating the multitude of donor funded activities in the sector, aligning 
them with government priorities and creating a space for policy dialogue. In essence, the financial 
inputs are very low in that they involve financing and deploying a competent DTI or DIRCO official 
to Mozambique to play a lead role in advocating for and coordinating the sector. 
 
The government and donor community are in agreement at a policy level on the importance of 
promoting private sector development in Mozambique. In Mozambique, Private Sector 
Development (PSD) is a strategically important area and focus in which the majority of traditional 
donors are already active. Mozambique’s consistently high levels of economic growth over the past 
decade are not seen by the wider population or government as delivering the jobs and quality of life 
improvements the statistics would imply. Through observation in participating in donor meetings, 
it became apparent that in 2013 and 2014 the donor community appeared to have growing 
concerns about concentrations of wealth and inequality, aggravating rural-urban disparities while 
fuelling political discontent that is increasingly seen as contributing to security and stability risks. 
The response appeared to be a shared narrative that is repeated by traditional donors in 
Mozambique that calls on the government to do more to promote inclusive economic development, 
job creation and the development of local small and medium sized enterprises. In this space, there 
are glaring tensions between how policy makers focus on so-called ‘easy wins’ in the extractive 
industries and dire need to invest in what is a long term priority of building local supply chains 
both for services and in manufacturing value adding. The government could also do a lot more to 
improve the enabling environment and invest in the productivity of small and medium size 
enterprises. Here there is also a glaringly obvious opportunity to improve cooperation with South 
Africa in that there is a severe shortage of skilled professionals (e.g. in the mining sectors) and the 
training needed is largely in South Africa and available at a comparatively affordable cost. At the 
same time, the Mozambique development corridor and the sort of large scale developmental 
projects engineered between South Africa and its Industrial Development Corporation could be 
examples to be showcased in the context of Mozambique’s expected and ongoing investment boom 
related to its resource extraction industries.        
 
The Mozambican government’s approach to economic governance is seen by many traditional 







leadership and the rent-seeking opportunities afforded them through largely unfettered control of 
national resources. These accountability concerns were given voice in 2014 when the government 
side-tracked national over-sight to launch a bond issue through a state owned entity that was then 
rolled over into the murky procurement of a fleet of naval vessels (see above) thus resulting in 
pointed criticism by international lenders. Clearly there is an opportunity in the private sector 
development space for a ‘neutral actor’, such as the South African Development Partnership Agency, 
to invest in coordinating and ensuring dialogue between Mozambique’s economic policy makers 
and traditional donors, a structured and productive dialogue that is largely absent at present.  
 
This would mean participating in and raising South Africa’s visibility in the monthly meetings of the 
“Private Sector Working Group” (PSWG) and complementing this with regular dialogue with 
government. In the working group South Africa could advocate for greater inclusion of government 
or even transforming the coordination and dialogue group into a government controlled and led 
mechanism, something participating donors also want. In this regard, a SADPA investment in the 
sector could be focused on providing the necessary capacity support to the government (more 
particularly the Ministry for Industry and Commerce) of Mozambique to coordinate and lead 
private sector development. This would be plainly in line with the government’s stated policy goals: 
the PARP calls for greater promoting employment through multi-sector actions that will improve 
the business climate, attract investments, stimulate micro and small enterprises. As well as 
ensuring comprehensive access to credit and to services for the development of small and micro 
enterprises are key priorities for their policies and poverty production. The Strategy for Improving 
the Business Climate (EMAN I; now: EMAN II) and the Strategy for Development of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises are key reference documents by the Government of Mozambique for 
private sector development. An industrial policy is also purportedly being developed. 
 
In this regard, it is important to note that participating in private sector development as a ‘donor’ 
should be inter-twined with South Africa’s own investment and economic interests (as is the case 
with traditional donors in the sector). There are enormous opportunities for South Africa and 
Mozambique to mutually benefit from a shared plan to invest in deepening and broadening the 
financial sector, strengthening national capacities to benefit from the resource boom, supporting 







essential services (e.g. specialised health) that, more often than not, draw on South Africa’s business 
community. 
 
SADPA Entry Point: Energy Sector (and Climate Change) 
The energy sector presents another opportunity for South Africa to strengthen its developmental 
partnership with Mozambique that is also directly connected to South Africa’s own economic 
interests. The South African corporation closely tied to government, Sasol Gas Holdings, for 
example is investing R2billion in its gas pipeline with Mozambique.  Whilst the sector is in many 
ways more complex than private sector development, it is also potentially of greater importance. 
This is because the control and governance in the sector has direct security and economic 
implications as well as regional political implications for South Africa’s role in the region. After all, 
where Mozambique sells its vast natural gas, coal and oil resources to will have a very strong 
influence on how Mozambique works within SADC and with neighbouring countries like South 
Africa. Certainly, if the current intentions to sell gas to India come to fruition, the more India 
depends on Mozambique for its energy supplies, the greater the incentive for India to secure and 
protect its access, meaning a potential dilution of South Africa’s influence in Southern Africa. 
Similarly, neighbouring countries like Zimbabwe and Malawi will naturally look to diversify their 
access to energy as Mozambique becomes a more viable supplier.  
 
Furthermore there are related and potentially even greater international developments afoot in 
that Mozambique has the world’s largest reserves of graphite73, an essential ingredient in 
manufacturing the lithium-ion batteries that power everything from cellular phones to the current 
generation of electric cars. The more the world needs these batteries and this need is only projected 
to grow, the more international attention Mozambique will get.  
 
In Mozambique, the energy sector, as defined in the PARP, is seen as including liquid and solid fuels 
and well as power generation. From a developmental perspective, household and rural 
electrification are the stated priorities of policy makers with the most contentious issue being how 
to liberalise and open up production and supply to competition (a challenge South Africa shares). 
The key interlocutor is the Ministry of Energy but, as with the private sector development, there is 
                                                             







limited capacity with a persistent tension between traditional donors’ calls for structured dialogue 
and the government’s capacity and incentives to enable this. At present dialogue and coordination 
is informal meaning that SADPA could get a foothold in the sector should it decide to invest in it. 
South Africa might also consider taking advantage of its related capacities in climate change both in 
terms of negotiating climate financing and of shared experiences in balancing the need for low cost 
energy driven development with the clear need to transition to a low carbon economy, while 
protecting against environmental degradation. As discussed in section 5 (above), South Africa could 
summon its technical and organisational capacities to demonstrate a comparative advantage in this 
space.  
 
2.11 Conclusion and Implications for the Research Question / Analytical Framework 
This research speaks to South Africa’s policy making particularly in relation to how South Africa 
strategizes on how to improve its influence and leverage abroad. Foreign policy is still clearly a 
priority for the government, with Jacob Zuma (Zuma 2015) referring in the 2015 State of the Nation 
Address to the government’s success in expanding the reach and number of South African embassies 
abroad. South Africa has also continued its intention of maintaining a high profile in the African 
Union. Globally, South Africa’s ambitious foreign policy is evidenced by its taking on the 
chairmanship of the G-77 in 2015. In 2014 South Africa also committed itself to considerable 
investments in the development financing space as a core contributor to the New Bank for 
International Development, colloquially referred to as the BRICS bank. 
 
What remains a looming question, however, is the level of South Africa’s commitment to 
formalising the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), which still remains a 
stated intention more than anything constituting an identifiable reality (even though funding for 
development through the ARF continues). At the same time, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 
reported worrying signs that South Africa is under-investing in maintaining and/or strengthening 
its influence in the Southern African region. In February 2015, the ISS hosted a discussion on 
SADPA at an international conference on African Peacebuilding. Participants discussed various 
studies and interactions with Government with the consensus being that South Africa’s engagement 
with the Southern African Development Community remains lack-lustre at best: DIRCO has failed to 







Pretoria in recent years. The findings of this chapter also reinforce this perception in that it 
concludes that South Africa should be investing more in its immediate neighbourhood of Southern 
Africa than anywhere else in the world. Nonetheless, it is also recognised that the government is 
sensitive to perpetuating its reputation as a “self-interested hegemon” (SA NPC 2012) in the region 
and that this sensitivity could be leading to an unofficial policy of disengaging. That being said, it 
still appears as a notable research finding that South Africa’s apparent disinterest in Mozambique 
runs contrary to the government’s stated policies and ambitions to be an international 
donor/development partner. 
 
A secondary focus of this case study was on identifying how the international architecture 
perpetuates itself at country level and what South Africa could do to participate in and influence 
this architecture. The findings clearly show that the architecture is a real and tangible institution 
with powerful norm setting capacities. These norm setting functions are only further enabled by 
access to enormous financial, organisational and technical resources. Contrary to the possible 
concern that the architecture works to exclude South Africa, the findings suggest that South Africa’s 
participation would be feasible. In this regard, South Africa’s policy makers appear to be missing an 
opportunity to influence and shape dialogue and development cooperation by not analysing these 
architectures in the countries in which they work and thus failing to get South Africa a seat at the 
table. Participating in these architectures would benefit South Africa both in terms of intelligence 
gathering and to take advantage of any strategic opportunities that may arise such as on calling for 
a better business enabling environment.  
 
Whilst the study only focused on Mozambique, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the global 
architecture is considerably stronger and more influential in SADC countries of Malawi, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe as well as being present in one shape or form in the remaining SADC countries too. 
Considering the comparatively small size of South Africa’s developmental resources, the research 
also suggests that an investment in supporting coordination and/or dialogue between the 
international architectures and beneficiary governments would give South Africa significantly 
better return than many of its current projects (e.g. financing UNDP to build an HIV/AIDS clinic in 
Burundi). South Africa’s international spending is about R500 million a year through the African 







alone. To be effective as a development partner South Africa needs to be realistic about how much 
influence the actual size of its expenditure can procure: to put South Africa in context, Western 
donors spend double what South Africa has allocated internationally simply to secure their 
interests in Swaziland. Another option for South Africa could be to increase the volume of its 
development spending such as in redirecting the R30 billion it currently spends on SACU subsidies 
towards development cooperation.  
 
The research uncovered an interesting disconnect between South Africa’s foreign services and 
South African private sector investors abroad. This disconnect appears despite the DIRCO and DTI 
doing what appears to be good work to promote South African trade and investment in 
Mozambique. The problem is that government’s work, the value of it and the services it is providing, 
becomes largely under-appreciated and unrecognised by larger swathes of South Africa’s private 
sector implying the need for the South African government to invest considerably more in 
communicating what it is doing abroad to its population at home. Coincidentally, this is also the 
conclusion of the OECD in regards to so called traditional donors: in November 2014, the OECD 
(2014) recommended that traditional donors also allocate more attention to communicating74 with 
their respective electorates in explaining what development cooperation and international 
relations deliver. Put together this implies that there is some evidence to suggest that South Africa’s 
motivation as a donor are not being primarily informed by its identifiable national economic and 
self-interests. 
 
That being said, the analysis of the ISS findings on South Africa’s donor activities in Burundi, South 
Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo do not give much credence to the notion that the 
primary driver of South Africa’s aid policy is the desire to be a more effective of benevolent donor 
(rising above its own economic and political interests). South Africa’s apparent lack of impact, 
financing of ‘white elephant’ projects and resistance to participating in beneficiary government led 
aid effectiveness initiatives implies that South Africa’s motivation lies elsewhere than meeting the 
needs of the beneficiaries. Furthermore, with South Africa appearing largely disconnected and 
disinterested in global initiatives on how to improve the effectiveness of aid (sections 2 and 3) 
there is no compelling evidence that South Africa is focusing its aid on reforming or improving the 
                                                             







global system either. Most difficult to unpack, however, is the apparent unwillingness or disinterest 
from South Africa to tailor aid to the beneficiary’s political and economic context. Whilst South 
Africa’s flagship civil service capacity building project appeared to respond to real needs and 
incentives, the ISS findings demonstrated that most projects financed appeared disconnected from 
local systems with no evidence that South Africa made any efforts to use its aid in support of the 
partner country’s development plans. 
 
What does emerge from the study is that whilst there is a public assertion that South Africa is 
different and sees its beneficiaries as equal development partners, in fact, South Africa’s decision 
makers are no more immune from a projecting sense of superiority than ‘traditional donors’ are. 
The study demonstrates clear evidence suggesting that South Africa’s policy makers accompany aid 
with a narrative of both a moral technological superiority over both beneficiary governments and 
traditional donors. The moral imperative is clustered around the notion that beneficiary 
government officials are more corrupt and less interested in helping their own citizens than South 
African officials are. Furthermore, there is evidence that this moral imperative seems to build on a 
notion of a moral crusade with South Africa needing to save Africans from their own ineffective and 
corrupted leaders (ANC 2012) who have been hoodwinked into submission by post-colonial 
imperialists. This sense of moral superiority is also accompanied with a sophisticated assertion of 
technological superiority in which South Africa presents itself across the board as being both more 
advanced than its beneficiaries as well as of traditional donors (see 2.3). What is most interesting 
about this finding, however, is that it presents itself as coming from within South Africa rather than 
from experience working with beneficiaries and with other donors. This is evidenced by the 
disconnect between the ISS findings on the poor efficacy of South Africa as a donor and the 
statements made by officials in public, to parliament and in policy regarding South Africa’s 
comparative advantage as a development partner.  
 
Most striking of all, however, is South Africa’s apparent lack of ambition to extract reputational 
benefits from its aid. South Africa’s financing UNDP to provide an HIV/AIDS clinic, for example, 
does not illustrate an ambition to show-case South Africa as a donor or even to achieve some sort of 
ambitious result. The ISS found in this regard, that the government was disinterested in the project 







Similarly, with the other projects reviewed by the ISS, South Africa appears as less than ambitious 
about what its aid can achieve nor having a clear vision on how it intends to distinguish itself. 
 
Put together, the South Africa case-study illustrates the possibility that at least in this circumstance, 
the purpose of giving aid may not actually be about obvious self-interest nor about wanting to help 
the beneficiary, at least not in line with stated policy intentions. South Africa appears as apparently 
unwilling to adjust its programming to the partner country’s political economy and resistance to 
participating in national aid architectures which would assist in contextualising its aid. From this 
case study, the evidence suggests that what aid has generated for South Africa is sense of moral and 
technological superiority that enables and justifies its future interventions in Africa whatever the 
particular context may be. South Africa’s spending on aid also acts to augment South Africa’s role 
and justification as a leader in Africa and the African Union. Interestingly, the ANC’s (2012) linking 
aid to a continuing struggle North of the border means that aid has value in giving voice to a 
narrative that reconstitutes the ANC as a (still) relevant leader in the continued fight against 
colonial interests (and apartheid) in Africa.  
 
In reference to the original research questions, South Africa is consistent at a policy level in terms of 
its commitment to use country programmable aid in direct support of the beneficiary country 
development plans. However, South Africa does not have in place instructions on how to draft a 
country strategy which is not inconsistent with other emerging donors (see O’Riordan, Benfield and 
Dewitte 2010). South Africa does, however, make express policy commitments to contextualising 
aid to the country context and even goes so far as to argue that they will do so better than 
traditional donors (see 2.3 above). In practice, however, there is little evidence to suggest that 
South Africa has credibly contextualised their aid nor to show that South Africa has aligned their 
programming to allow ownership/control by the partner governments. South Africa, like other 
traditional donors, invokes a narrative of technological and moral superiority both over other 
donors and beneficiary government officials. This narrative is not called for in the procedures or 
policies analysed and appears to originate prior (e.g. in parliamentary discussions and the ANC 
conferences, see 2.2 and 2.3 above) to the establishment of South Africa’s aid actions and prior to 







of South Africa, the moral and technological imperative relate to South Africa’s own ambitions in 








3. USAID and the HIV/AIDS ‘Pandemic’ in Namibia 
 
3.1 Introduction 
An important question that comes out of the previous case study on South Africa as a donor is on 
how the difference between the donor’s perspective and that of the beneficiary government’s is 
identifiable in the design and implementation of specific projects. As was evidenced in the case-
study on South Africa as a donor, the donor perspective tends to drive a donor narrative that works 
to differentiate the donor’s approach from that of the government’s even when the donor in 
question makes explicit commitments to support the government’s approach. This donor 
differentiation has so far been identified as generating or being driven by a narrative of moral and 
technological superiority to beneficiary country decision makers. In selecting a case-study, then, 
attention was paid to avoiding programming that necessarily involved a focus on what could be 
readily presented as donors being morally or technologically superior to the beneficiary country’s 
government. Programming in governance, human rights or democratisation, for example, was 
excluded because by its very nature it involves projects intended to raise beneficiary countries to 
what are perceived to be Western and morally superior governance practices. At the same time, 
programming that explicitly involves delivering Western technologies such as in improving 
agricultural productivity or public financial management reform were also excluded. Accordingly, 
the criteria for selecting this case study focussed on the following: 
 A beneficiary country that is not considered a least developed country or fragile state and is 
recognised as having a competent administration, 
 A project that explicitly states its intention to support the beneficiary country’s legislated policy 
and to work through government systems and that essentially only becomes feasible when it 
directly supports the government’s own plans, 
 A project primarily technical in nature that cannot easily be dismissed as purely a donor driven 
priority. 
 
These criteria combined with the intention to look at the workings of another major international 
donor led to the identification of a USAID funded institutional strengthening project in Namibia. 
The project in question directly aims to support government delivery of HIV/AIDS services based 







Accordingly, the Namibia case study was selected because at least on paper, the donors approach 
(and stated intention) is for the project to not deviate from the government’s approach at all. 
Combatting HIV/AIDS does have a moral and technological component but this was not considered 
to be a detractor because the Government of Namibia has taken ownership of the pandemic 
response for well over a decade and, in fact, spends more on HIV/AIDS than donors do. The purpose 
of the Namibia case study, then is to examine how the programming of aid leads to a different donor 
approach to that of the government’s even when the donor in question (in this case USAID) 
categorically states its intention to wholeheartedly support the government’s approach and 
systems. 
 
The methodology involved textual analysis primarily of documents in the public realm such as the 
USAID strategy documents for Namibia, government documents on the HIV/AIDS response and 
related analysis such as that conducted by academics and development partners. The methodology 
also included face to face interviews conducted during a two-week period in Windhoek, Namibia in 
July 2014 and by telephone. Twenty nine respondents75 were interviewed including 
representatives from all international donors supporting the HIV/AIDS response in Namibia, 
interviews with representatives of national and international NGOs in the sector as well as in-depth 
interviews with ‘technical experts’ involved in strengthening Namibia’s institutional capacities (e.g. 
in data analysis, epidemiology, human resource systems, etc.). Notably government representatives 
were also interviewed from the responsible line ministries as well as two interviews with elected 
representatives, one of which was a former chair of a powerful caucus in parliament. Academics 
were also interviewed from both the University of Namibia and the Namibian University of Science 
and Technology (formerly Technikon of Namibia) as well as the managing editorial team of one of 
Namibia’s biggest daily newspapers and media representatives from smaller publications. 
Interviewees were promised confidentiality in the hope of preventing answers being biased by the 
potential/hope of benefiting from donor funding in Namibia. 
 
                                                             







The structure of this chapter is to first explain USAID’s approach to addressing the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic in Namibia and to demonstrate how it is presented as being about supporting the 
government’s own initiatives and the need for USAID activities to be contextualised to the local 
political economy. USAID’s approach is then compared to the political economic context in Namibia 
with reference to the government’s policy approaches and the apparent interest of Namibia’s 
political leaders. The chapter goes on to explore how HIV/AIDS fits within the wider donor-
government development cooperation environment. The chapter demonstrates that the USAID 
approach is not entirely explained in regards to trying to respond to the local context in Namibia. In 
short, USAID still puts forward HIV/AIDS as a national pandemic or scourge that needs more 
attention than other communicable diseases. This narrative, in fact, proves to be entirely 
decontextualized from Namibia’s existing political interests, clearly preferencing the donor’s 
perspective over that of the beneficiary government’s. The Namibian government on the other 
hand, sees HIV/AIDS as just one amongst many social challenges.  To illustrate how USAID’s 
approach is disconnected from that of the local context, a pictorial representation is included (end 
of section 3.5) comparing the USAID approach to HIV/AIDS to the perceived political priorities of 
the elected leadership. The chapter then goes on to demonstrate how USAID’s approach is based on 
inherently false assumptions about the policy and political context in Namibia. The last part of the 
analysis of the chapter is to ‘read’ USAID’s approach in Namibia through the lens of a local systems 
approach; the local systems approach is USAID’s own guidelines on how to contextualise projects 
within the local political economy. Finally, the chapter concludes that USAID’s approach to 
combatting HIV/AIDS in Namibia is not accounted for by any other factors than USAID’s own 
internal political economy at an institutional level. As such, the approach is not likely to deliver on 
the stated goals of the project. However, USAID’s approach demonstrably contributes to it 
maintaining and investing in a narrative that posits the Namibian government as being less ethical 
than that of Western donors whilst also having insufficient skills or technical capacities to deliver to 








3.2 USAID’s Focus on HIV/AIDS in Namibia 
The United States of America is the world’s largest bilateral donor (OECD 2013) and also the 
biggest funder of HIV/AIDS programming globally. US funding for HIV/AIDS largely comes through 
Pepfar (the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) which started as an emergency response, 
that tended towards implementing activities through networks of American and local contractors 
that are either embedded in government or operate in parallel to the government. American 
intervention in combatting the HIV/AIDS pandemic is widely recognized as being instrumental to 
increasing longevity and reducing the cost of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. Recently, however, 
there are signs of growing signs of fatigue in that the American government (as communicated in 
key informant interviews) wants to see these essential services taken over by and eventually 
financed by partner governments. This shifting focus from financing HIV/AIDS services directly to 
wanting governments to take ownership provides an invaluable backdrop to explore the different 
approaches and assumptions of USAID in comparison to the countries in which they work. As the 
US puts it (US Government 2009: Executive Summary), “Sustainable programs must be country-
owned and country-driven. Given that the AIDS epidemic represents a shared global burden among 
nations, the next phase of PEPFAR represents an opportunity for the United States to support 
shared responsibility with partner countries. To seize this opportunity, PEPFAR is supporting 
countries in taking leadership of the responses to their epidemics.” 
 
In this regard, Namibia was identified as an ideal case study because based on the desk analysis 
there is little reason to argue that the US government should adopt a different approach to that of 
the Namibian Government’s in terms of how they address the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Namibia is a 
‘middle income’, stable country with a comparatively strong public sector that shares the same 
policy priorities as USAID when it comes to HIV/AIDS. Furthermore, with the Namibia government 
financing an estimated 60% (Namibia Government 2010) of HIV/AIDS services there is 
demonstrable government commitment to combatting the pandemic. Furthermore, at the policy 
level there is strong evidence to suggest that the Government of the Republic of Namibia and the 
international donor community agree how best to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In 2010, after 
extensive consultations with government departments, donors and civil society, Namibia formally 







2015/16 (NSF) as the official government strategy document for the sector. The NSF is also referred 
to by development partners as the basis for their programming support to the sector. 
 
3.3 Political Context 
Of the many health concerns in Namibia, HIV/AIDS is arguably the most threatening to the nation’s 
social, political and economic future. The risk of early mortality from AIDS remains high and the 
costs of chronic care of the disease is a major economic and financial burden currently absorbing 
27% of national health expenditure (Pepfar 2014: 3). Infection rates, whilst lower than at their 
peak, mean that almost one in five Namibians is born to an HIV+ mother (Namibia Government 
2012b). However, there is a notable disconnect between how USAID and the government talk about 
HIV/AIDS in Namibia. USAID’s stated policy is of supporting the Namibian government’s approach 
to HIV/AIDS (see section above) but USAID also accuses the government of not taking HIV/AIDS 
seriously enough saying that “despite the strength of Namibia’s formal economy….maternal 
mortality rates and under-five mortality rates are high. Lack of clinical staff limits health care 
service delivery…. particularly in rural areas. Same-sex sexual activities between consenting adults 
are illegal…. outreach to key populations a challenge….Gender-based violence is widespread and 
appears to be on the upswing.” (Pepfar 2014: 2/3) The overt implication is that the Namibian 
government has a lesser moral commitment to its own people, thus the implementation challenges.  
 
“People who remain poor, e.g. in Kunene are poor because they reject and resist 
governments development efforts. HIV/AIDS is increasing in poor communities 
because they [the poor] are resisting keeping up with modern society. For 
Namibians, HIV/AIDS is no longer an emergency… the elections are now about 
bringing development that you can see and touch. The average voter does not 
care about HIV/AIDS; they want visible signs of progress. Young people don’t 
even believe you can die of AIDS anymore…. even business does not worry about 
it anymore.” 








When shared with the project and donor staff in Namibia, they were generally surprised and 
shocked by the statement above. However, even though the statement above was clearly 
uncomfortable for USAID’s staff and contractors there was also evidence that USAID itself is 
complicit in generating a moral imperative that simultaneously justifies the urgency of its action 
whilst undermining the authority of stakeholders and beneficiaries. The poster below, for example, 
puts forward the notion that many HIV+ Namibians are spreading HIV because they are unable to 
identify destructive social behaviours. In the USAID awareness poster below, for example, 
Namibians are encouraged to educate themselves on the about the ill effects of alcohol so that they 
can make better decisions for their families. After completing all the modules in an HIV/AIDS 
sensitisation workshop, the poster heralds Mary’s success: “Now I don’t drink anymore. I don’t go 











Whilst USAID and other international donors still invoke a narrative of urgency, essentially 
accusing the government of not being sufficiently committed to containing and combating the 
pandemic, the government’s decision makers have a more sanguine, if not actually more mature 
approach. Namibia’s policy makers, rightly, see HIV/AIDS as just one amongst a host of other 
chronic health challenges. As one senior government official put it, the HIV/AIDS pandemic is 
“yesterday’s news” (MoHSS 2014 Respondent 1, 26 June 2014). The official explained that 
popular perception in Namibia is that due to the introduction of Anti-Retroviral Treatments 
(ARTs) and improved awareness, few Namibians are bed-ridden much less dying from this 
epidemic. And, in fact, there is good basis for this perception with the prevalence rate amongst 
pregnant women reducing from 22% in 2002 to 18.2% in the 2012 (Namibia Government: 
2012b). There are now fewer than 10,000 new HIV/AIDS infections in Namibia annually. The 
dominant discourse has shifted to see HIV/AIDS as no longer a priority problem even though it 
still qualifies as an epidemic with more than 3% of the population infected. 
 
This perception is reflected in the Namibian government’s current National Development Plan 4 
(NDP 4) and its Vision 2030 documents, HIV/AIDS does not feature prominently. In fact, 
HIV/AIDS is referred to in the NDP 4 only a handful of times and when so, it only features as one 
amongst a number of chronic illnesses to be managed. In terms of the NDP 4, HIV/AIDS is a high 
priority but not any more so than cancer or diabetes. To understand why HIV AIDS is no longer 
a hot topic, it is essential to pay closer attention to the status of democratic institutions and 
societal issues that animate political and economic discourse in today’s Namibia. For health and 
HIV/AIDS stakeholders this means recognizing that for HIV/AIDS to remain a policy priority it 
needs to be relevant to Namibia’s decision makers. The political reality is that decision makers 
in Namibia, like anywhere in the world, are unlikely to pay more than lip-service to HIV/AIDS 
unless there are clear incentives to do so. HIV/AIDS in Namibia increasingly competes with 
other health, economic and social priorities for the attention of decision makers whilst being 
curtailed by the limited financial and technical resources government controls. If it is to remain 
a priority, HIV/AIDS needs a constituency that creates political incentives for Namibia’s decision 
makers to act. An aging electorate and leadership combined with one party rule since 
independence has led to very strong political incentives for the government to focus on 
longevity (SWAPO 2014) as part of its manifesto. In terms of HIV/AIDS, however, the incentive 
for politicians to make it an overarching priority is undermined by a combination of the fact that 
foreign donors pay for it, the pandemics association with unwanted publicity both at the 
personal and national level and the its preponderance to increasingly be seen as a disease of the 





2014 Party Election Manifesto first talks of the parties successes with “spinal surgery, hip and 
knee replacement, maxillo-facial surgery, blindness prevention, nuclear medicine and cardiac 
surgery” before mentioning reducing mortality from “rates from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria” (SWAPO 2014: 32). 
 
As in many African nations extremely high levels of unemployment or underemployment are 
seen as the most pressing issues that governments need to tackle in order to maintain their hold 
on power. Having a healthy, educated and motivated work force that can compete in a 
globalized world is essential to economic growth and peace and security of any nation as well as 
to a sense of national pride and standing in the international community. By African standards, 
Namibia, with its small population and significant natural resources, is well positioned to 
respond to its national challenges. In fact, international donor assistance to Namibia is relatively 
small as a percentage of its GDP. By comparison donors spent N$ 3 billion in 2012 which would 
only amount to about 5% of Namibia’s 2013/2014 N$ 60 billion national budget (OECD QWIDS 
2014 and Namibia Government 2013). Accordingly, the most effective approach to addressing 
HIV/AIDS is not likely to be a donor driven or parallel response but rather working within and 
in support of government priorities as committed to in international aid effectiveness 
commitments such as the Paris Declaration (OECD 2005) and even US Government’s (2009) 
own policy statements. 
 
3.4 National Political Priorities, Longevity and Wealth Creation  
 
“Why do they always want to talk about sick Namibians? Are there not healthy 
bodies with HIV…. you are HIV positive but you are also still a CEO or miner or 
teacher…. we need to talk about how stay healthy with HIV/AIDS rather than 
just talking about Namibia as another African failure.” 
Head of a Namibian Gender Rights NGO, Windhoek, 1 July 2014 
 
“AIDS is imported by foreigners and at the same time the US is telling Namibia to 
let more foreigners in.” 
Namibian Journalist, Windhoek, 3 July 2014 
 
Addressing HIV/AIDS through the government’s own priorities and systems would mean that 
USAID would be directing its attention to HIV/AIDS within the broader government system 
rather than just on HIV/AIDS as a stand-alone issue. In this regard, the most important entry 
point is to look at Namibia’s medium term planning and political priorities which are clearly 
focused on growing the economy, creating wealth and employment opportunities. This means 
attracting needed capital as well as growing local enterprises. However, the government 





compete within a global marketplace: the National Development Plan 4 (Namibia Government 
2012a) refers to significant work needing to be done in improving local competitiveness and 
evident opportunities to expand and deepen needed skills. Both Namibia’s public and private 
sector depend on foreign labour particularly when it comes to jobs that require specialised 
skills. This translates into a public sector that lacks sufficient technocratic capacity to fully 
deliver on its developmental ambitions which is portrayed in the National Development Plan 4 
as undermining the capacity of the government to attract foreign direct investment (FDI).  
 
When comparing the Namibian government’s policy objectives with USAID’s approach to 
addressing HIV/AIDS, one is immediately confronted with the notable lack of a consensus or 
public policy vision on what a well-skilled, healthy, HIV+ worker looks like and how 
Government should support such workers’ participation and leadership in the economy. The 
concept of healthy and skilled workers, managers, public and private sector leaders that is a 
national priority hardly reflects the fact that as many as one in five of Namibia’s leaders and 
elites are HIV+ too. Interviews with government officials (MoHSS 2014) revealed the fact that 
many health policy decision makers expect HIV+ Namibians to remain in the workforce as long 
as and with comparable career ambitions to any other Namibians. What this means is that 
HIV/AIDS needs to be main-streamed in all aspects of public policy and particularly those that 
go beyond that of health. An aging HIV+ population means a growing proportion of Namibia’s 
wealth and decisions are controlled by HIV+ Namibians. HIV/AIDS is thus of greater importance 
to Namibia’s Vision 2030 economic growth ambitions because it has a major impact on economic 
growth modelling, skills development, family planning, agriculture and succession amongst 
other issues. Whilst this observation is obvious, USAID continues to invoke a narrative of 
HIV/AIDS as a pandemic or scourge which largely misses the point that Namibia’s policy makers 
do not see the country in the same way and are not focusing public resources in this direction. 
This has resulted in the somewhat embarrassing fact that the National Development Plan 4 of 
Namibia only refers to HIV/AIDS four times in its 187 pages despite USAID’s continued 






At present the Namibian government spends 10% of its budget76 on health with over a quarter 
of that going to HIV/AIDS. However, Government is expected to increase its expenditure on 
HIV/AIDS as it absorbs the one third of HIV/AIDS funding that currently comes from 
international development partners, mainly because USAID has communicated its intention to 
wind down financing. This means that when Government takes over all current HIV/AIDS 
spending, the proportion of Namibia’s health budget allocated to HIV/AIDS will increase from 
one fifth to one third of the budget. External funding and technical assistance for HIV/AIDS is 
expected to continue declining leaving the Namibian government with the responsibility for 
managing the epidemic on its own. This will create increasing tensions between HIV/AIDS 
needs and that of other illnesses. It would be naïve to presume that there will be no competition, 
resistance or resentment to such a large increase in the Government’s health spending on 
HIV/AIDS particularly when so many other health care gaps (e.g. cancer, diabetes, heart disease, 
etc.) compete for public attention. Despite this more than obvious challenge, however, there is 
little evidence that USAID or its HIV/AIDS implementation partners are paying much attention 
to making sure that HIV/AIDS is central to national policy making.  
 
High HIV/AIDS infection rates tend to occur in poorer and/or rural communities (Namibian 
Government 2012b). The disparity in service delivery across the nation is sufficient to rank 
Namibia as one of the most unequal countries in terms of wealth distribution in the world 
(World Bank 2014), only marginally less unequal than South Africa. If this trend continues, 
there is a real risk that HIV/AIDS programming will replicate current disparities in service 
delivery meaning a possible situation where HIV/AIDS remains or grows as a problem in poor 
communities while being better managed in rich ones. This scenario could prove particularly 
toxic for HIV/AIDS programming because if it ceases to be seen as a priority for Namibia’s elite, 
it will increasingly fade from Namibia’s national policy planning framework thus receiving less 
resources and attention. 
 
Parliament, Oversight and Civil Society: International development partners (EU 2014b, 
Germany 2013, NEPAD 2006, Totemeyer 2014) tend to concur that Namibia has insufficient 
                                                             
76 Namibia’s 2013/2014 national budget (Namibia Government 2013) is N$ 60 billion of which N$ 6 
billion (or 10% of the national budget is spent on health).According to the Namibia National AIDS 
Spending Assessment report, the total spend on HIV/AIDS in Namibia in 2013/2014 will be US$ 213 
million (around N$ 2.3 billion) of which Government spends US$ 136 million (around N$ 1.5 billion). This 
means that of the current Government health budget just over 20% is spent on HIV/AIDS. If international 
donors are to phase out and Government is to cover the entire HIV/AIDS cost the remaining N$ 800 
million (N$ 2.3 billion overall spend less N$ 1.5 billion currently paid by Government) covered by donors 
will need to be financed by Government. This will bring the national health budget to around N$ 6.9 





institutionalised watchdog and oversight capacities meaning that good governance very much 
depends on the benevolence of the ruling party. Namibia’s democratic institutions and civil 
society very much operate in the shadow of the dominant ruling party. SWAPO, the political 
party that has governed the country since its independence in 1990, is widely popular and so 
well supported that it effectively has a monopoly over public policy.  While officially a multi-
party democracy, Namibia is in many ways more comparable to a one party state. Namibia’s 
national parliament is composed of a 72 member national assembly77 of which approximately 
50 members are either part of the executive branch or were appointed by the president. The 
opposition parties are unorganized and pose no real threat to SWAPO dominance in law-making 
or in providing adequate oversight of the performance of line ministries, agencies or state own 
enterprises.  
 
The National Assembly’s standing committees do not appear sufficiently resourced to ensure 
effective and comprehensive oversight. A 2014 interview with a senior member of parliament 
that chaired a key caucus revealed the fact that parliamentarians are largely over-whelmed and 
under-resourced, with little in the way of research capacity and relying on the same executive 
they are supposed to over-see for legal opinions. The parliamentarian interviewed confessed 
that parliamentary discussions are largely dominated by the executive and that 
parliamentarians are rarely prepared or able to keep up with the workload. Nothing illustrates 
this lack of oversight more than the standing committees which too often have significantly too 
large a mandate and workload while being under-resourced with parliamentary staffers in short 
supply. For instance, the standing committee with responsibility for HIV/AIDS and other Health 
matters is also responsible for Human Resources, Social and Community Development. This 
Committee (www.parliament.na) has the duty to consider any matter it deems relevant with 
regard to Offices, Ministries, Agencies and State-owned and Parastatal Enterprises responsible 
for the following category of affairs which shall, inter alia, include the following: Education, 
Training, Sport and Culture, Employment Creation, Health and Social Services, Housing, Women 
Affairs and Child Welfare. Because Members of Parliament (MPs) that serve the executive are 
barred from sitting on any standing committees, few elected and even fewer paid staff service 
them. Furthermore, drafting of legislation is done by the Ministry of Justice and not the 
legislature meaning there is a significant disincentive to draft legislation that is not already 
endorsed by the executive. This significantly impacts the ability of the standing committees 
from playing their law making, representation and oversight roles and responsibilities. 
                                                             







The Upper House/National Council’s primary responsibility is to consider bills passed and 
referred to it by the National Assembly. This is in addition to ensuring that issues of regional 
concerns are incorporated into legislation and policies. Its capabilities in terms of human 
resources are even less robust than that of the National Assembly; with less technical capacity 
and fewer support functions the National Assembly is occasionally seen as only a ‘rubber stamp’ 
for the executive drafted legislation. Nonetheless, the National Assembly has a considerably 
closer link to constituencies because its membership is drawn from regional representation 
rather than party lists (proportional representation).  
 
Namibian civil society and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), comprising myriad, social, 
political, community, religious, labour organizations has steadily lost its voice and influence as 
SWAPO and its private sector supporters have consolidated power and influence (Totemeyer 
2014). International donors have decreased their funding (Germany 2013) support for 
traditional civil society, citing the county’s middle income status. Religious organizations and 
labour unions have been largely quiescent in the face of SWAPO’s and government’s monopoly 
over national resources, and decision making. At a structural level, a pressing national skills 
deficit has proven a significant impediment to retaining skilled staff. This is particularly 
problematic when it comes to oversight functions requiring analysts with a wide range of high 
level technical expertise in understanding legislative, judicial and related sophisticated 
processes. This problem is only exacerbated by the lack of domestic financial resources 
available to civil society. Similarly with only a handful of international donors supporting civil 
society and an apparent reluctance to finance more expensive ‘professionalized NGOs’ and/or 
core costs, the environment is not conducive to civil society watchdog functions. Furthermore, 
there is no robust parliamentary monitoring project meaning that even when there is the will to 
provide oversight, civil society is too often unaware of relevant upcoming legislation. 
 
The Namibian media is diversified and active and plays a watchdog role on government and 
private sector dealings (Totemeyer 2014). However, there have been few serious consequences 
for government officials and private sector actors who have been accused of grand corruption. 
This is because the government’s anticorruption commission and its court system, while 
functional in ensuring basic rule of law and transparency, has little power to enforce penalties 
on officials that are part of the ruling party’s power structure. This high level impunity is 
creating resentment in society and fuelling a perception (correct or incorrect) that there is a 






Decentralisation and Recentralisation: Despite the decentralisation act passed in 2000, 
decentralised governance in Namibia appears to be more policy than practice. While many line 
ministries have relegated more resources to the regions it is unclear the extent to which 
decision making has been decentralised. Government has at best de-concentrated some aspects 
of governance and service delivery but not devolved powers. This is because there are serious 
concerns within the ruling party (echoed in the SWAPO 2015 manifesto) that doing so would 
result in destabilization of the country and as a result threaten its hold on political and 
economic power.  As a result, SWAPO has effectively undercut the power of regional councils by 
appointing regional governors making them accountable to the executive and not regional 
council or the people of the region. Some observers have pointed out that it is more likely that 
Government will transform its commitments to decentralisation into a practice of 
‘recentralisation’ (i.e. further extending central government’s reach to the regions rather than 
decentralizing decision making to the lower level). 
 
The government’s actual approach to decentralisation is of vital importance because USAID’s 
approach to the HIV/AIDS epidemic is all based on strengthening Regional AIDS Coordination 
Committees (RACOCs). USAID’s approach (see assumptions analysis later in this chapter) is 
entirely dependent on the assumption that the RACOCs are empowered to lead the HIV/AIDS 
response at the local level. The fact that decentralisation appears to be more about 
recentralising power means that USAID’s approach of strengthening local level capacity to lead 
is not aligned with government mandates, authority and line management structures: put 
simply a centralised top down approach is about instructing the RACOCs rather than responding 
to and supporting them. 
 
Contextualising USAID’s Approach to Institutional Strengthening: 
The core of USAID’s approach to institutional strengthening in responding to the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic is working with regional and local councils at the sub-national level. However, 
progress is slow because regional and local authorities take instructions directly from national 
line ministries, many of which USAID does not necessarily have an ongoing working 
relationship with. What this means for USAID’s approach to institutional strengthening, is that 
its presumption is wrong in the notion that institutional strengthening can safely be conducted 
at local level whilst bypassing national authorities. This finding came as no surprise to the 
implementing partners working on the institutional strengthening project but did not appear to 






Of particular interest was that at the time of conducting the field work in July of 2014 Namibia 
was gearing up for its national and parliamentary elections are scheduled for November 2014.  
While most respondents expected that Government policy would remain largely unchanged 
with the expected re-election of SWAPO, elections likely lead to a shuffle in responsibilities 
meaning the leadership of ministries that USAID was struggling to have a working relationship 
with were set to change. Furthermore, it was equally likely that new policy initiatives currently 
on hold would receive renewed attention after the elections thus providing USAID new 
opportunities for dialogue and possibly programming. What was interesting, however, was that 
despite the widely acknowledged need to forge partnerships and build strategic relationships 
with the upcoming elected leadership, very little was being done to contextualise the institution 
building programme into the political environment. When pushed to explain why, the common 
refrain was that USAID would ‘deliver numbers’ regardless who is in charge.  
 
This finding is particularly interesting because it clearly contradicts the US Government’s stated 
approach (2009: Executive Summary) of ensuring that “programs…be country-owned and 
country-driven…. the next phase of PEPFAR represents an opportunity for the United States to 
support …. countries in taking leadership of the responses to their epidemics.” In some cases, 
donors do purposefully work around government particularly when government policy is 
contrary to the objective of the particular programme. However, in this case, Namibia’s policy is 
entirely supported by the donor community. At the highest level, Namibia’s elected leadership 
also appears to be improving representation in political leadership positions: at the time of the 
fieldwork SWAPO had already promised to ensure a 50-50 ‘Zebra system’ whereby women hold 
50% of all senior positions in an alternating manner such that if the President is a man, then the 
Deputy President is a woman and in the subsequent election these roles are reversed on a 
gender basis thus ensuring absolute gender equality the like of which is unheard of globally. 
What this means is that the woman’s caucus and the female elected representatives are set to 
play a greater role in decision making at various levels of government.  As a result, over time 
policy agendas that are of importance to women’s issues are expected to get greater attention. 
For USAID this should be particularly interesting because HIV/AIDS is intimately connected to 
issues that female representatives in Namibia tend to be associated with: for example, gender 
based violence, equal pay, land ownership and marital laws are all prominent ‘women’s’ issues 
but also causally connected to HIV/AIDS. The influence of influential women’s groups is not 





NGO Forum78, amongst others, see “women’s groups have been the most successful [amongst 
other groups and lobbies in Namibia] at bringing about change.” 
 
At the same time, the field work in Namibia illustrated that policy makers are increasingly 
responding to the voices of young, educated urban elites rather than rural and poor 
constituencies.  When asked, many HIV/AIDS advocates linked the government’s attention on 
urban elites to greater neglect of poor and marginalized as well as rural populations particularly 
when it comes to services vital to combatting HIV/AIDS. Less educated youth in urban, peri-
urban or rural areas may also suffer disproportionately from HIV AIDS and related illness unless 
their voices are taken into consideration by emerging political elites. 
 
Finally, it would be prudent to invest some resources in analysing the likely political scenarios 
in the medium term future to identify the risks and opportunities to HIV/AIDS programming. 
From a purely demographic perspective, many of liberation stalwarts that are currently the 
bedrock of Namibia’s political establishment will retire and/or exit politics in the near term 
future. This will result in a seismic shift in who controls the country’s political and economic 
agenda with resultant considerations for existing and future potential dialogue and 
partnerships. 
 
3.5 The Donor Politics of Financing HIV/AIDS  
Namibia is on the verge of the biggest structural change in how it manages HIV/AIDS since the 
epidemic first garnered national and international support. Concerns about international 
funding commitments are translating into a growing sense of urgency that HIV/AIDS 
programming will only be sustainable to the extent it is led by and inevitably financed by the 
government. This means an added burden to the Government of the Republic of Namibia 
(GRN)’s current workload, particularly worrying since there is already a notable 
implementation gap between what Government is committed to and what it is able and willing 
to deliver. Fortunately, GRN has already demonstrated notable commitment to HIV/AIDS by 
financing two thirds of the cost of combatting HIV/AIDS in Namibia. More recently, GRN has 
absorbed the large number of HIV/AIDS specialist doctors, nurses and pharmacists into GRN 
structures and onto GRN payrolls. Going forward, Government will absorb the bulk of HIV/AIDS 
services into line ministries and Government owned implementation mechanisms. The scale of 
this change should not be underestimated: current spending on HIV/AIDS is estimated at one 
dollars for every three dollars spent on health, with two thirds coming from Government and 
                                                             





the other third of HIV/AIDS spending still being provided by international development 
partners.   
 
The Government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN) has supported a productive partnership with 
international development partners that has provided a decisive proportion of funding and/or 
technical know-how and access to important knowledge networks. This support, however, has 
served to mask a growing disconnect between how international development partners see the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic and how GRN does. For a start, while GRN is clearly taking ownership of 
HIV/AIDS, there continue to be fears cited by international donors in interviews of discontinued 
and insufficient service delivery or ‘backsliding’. These fears that dominate the literature on 
HIV/AIDS in Namibia are directly attributable to the fact that ownership was not transferred 
earlier. The dominant concern is thus that there has been insufficient use of government 
systems to ensure all concerned that the transfer of HIV/AIDS services to GRN will proceed 
without interruptions.  
 
While international development partners still talk about HIV/AIDS as a pandemic requiring 
urgent and specialist attention, the government sees HIV/AIDS as just one of a large number of 
other chronic conditions. Namibia’s current medium term National Development Plan 4, only 
refers to HIV/Aids four times in 152 pages, preferring to roll it into other chronic diseases. For 
Government, the priority is not to keep HIV/AIDS as a distinct health response, but as part of the 
health system as a whole, by (table 23) “increasing the size, allocation and use of funding…. 
Retaining, attracting and training staff, revising the regulatory framework…coordination 
between all stakeholders…for improved access to health facilities….to reduce the prevalence of 
disease”. Similarly, HIV/AIDS is taking a back seat to other social issues for civil society and the 
private sector. A GIZ funded 2013 survey of Namibian leaders found that two thirds of private 
sector leaders see HIV/AIDS as less of a threat; two thirds of businesses surveys featured 
HIV/AIDS in their planning in 2007 by 2013 it was only two in five business plans.   
 
There is a bias in GRN and development partner strategies for presenting and supporting 
cooperation as a purely technical or organizational function. Coordination is thus presented as 
something that is achieved primarily through holding coordination meetings and providing 
support to secretariat services. While these aspects are the most visible aspects of coordination, 
there is not sufficient recognition of the fact that coordination requires an enabling environment 
of its own. The key features of this environment include a shared sense of what is at stake in 





champions the cause and why. This wider sense of a shared priority enables coordination 
meetings to be held and agendas to be set that attract the relevant decision makers. In the case 
of Namibia, it is quite clear that the decision makers in the sector do not have a shared sense of 
what is needed in the sector. The signs of this are that HIV/AIDS does not feature as a priority in 
the parliamentary standing committees (political coordination structures) nor in Government’s 
executive coordination mechanisms (the NDP 4, cabinet meetings, Permanent Secretary 
Meetings, etc.). Furthermore, even in the international development partners’ coordination 
structures, while HIV/AIDS comprised 40% of all official donor disbursements in 2012, it is not 
coordinated through a stand-alone HIV/AIDS group79 but rather through a group with a 
considerably wider mandate: the Health Partnership Group chaired by the World Health 
Organization. In terms of donor coordination, HIV/AIDS is addressed as a component of health, 
discussed in this wider working group80 even though donors spent $121 million on HIV/AIDS 
and only $7 million cumulatively on all other health issues in 2012. Finally, there are already 
signs that even in the civil society sector, HIV/AIDS is no longer seen as a stand-alone priority, 
with many civil society leaders opting to incorporate HIV/AIDS into other programming and 
coordination priorities such as decentralisation, health, education, development etc. This means 
that there is a real risk that decision makers will not pay significant attention to HIV/AIDS 
unless it is mainstreamed and linked to Namibia’s existing priorities that dominate the agendas 
in what are already functional coordination mechanisms (e.g. Government’s monthly Permanent 
Secretary meetings). Interestingly, coordinating over 90% of donor spending in the sector 
requires the involvement of only three donors (USAID, The Global Fund and Germany) and no 
more than thirty projects. 
 
The conclusion is that for HIV/AIDS to be a government priority, it will need to successfully 
compete for the attention of decision makers and ensure that it is on the agenda when decisions 
are made. In a context where HIV/AIDS is no longer seen as the ‘most pressing’ priority or 
election issue, this means recognizing that HIV/AIDS needs to be connected to issues that are of 
political importance and can be related to by the electorate. Accordingly, the data from the 
interviews was ‘work-shopped’ with some of the respondents in the context of mapping out the 
political perceived political importance of HIV/AIDS within the political context in Namibia.  
                                                             
79 The United Nations country team maintains an HIV/AIDS coordination mechanism but this is aimed at 
coordinating amongst UN agencies and thus does not inform the financing decisions made by the key 
donors in the sector. 
80 The health working group is chaired by the World Health Organization and includes representatives of 
donor organizations and other international development partners active in the health sector. While the 
group speaks to government it is not chaired or co-chaired by government thus being parallel to 






The graphic presented below illustrates the conclusion of this workshop: issues that appear of 
political importance in Namibia at present. The higher up the vertical line the issue appears the 
more it has potential to be linked to meaningful ownership of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The 
further along the vertical line the issue appears, the more it is seen as a priority to Government. 















The first conclusion, then, is that the donor driven narrative of HIV/AIDS as a pandemic does 
not have currency in the Namibian political context nor does it meet USAID’s stated intentions 
of incorporating programming into government priorities. However, this finding in itself is not 
that interesting because it is possible that USAID will continue to be the dominant external 
financier of HIV/AIDS programming in Namibia thus rendering the need to work with the 
government to a lower level priority. Accordingly, the field work continued with interviews and 
analysis focused on whether USAID’s approach to institutional strengthening in Namibia could 
constitute a viable approach even if it is not well contextualised in the local political context. The 
table below, therefore, compares the assumptions embedded in the project design with the 
findings presented above. The purpose of the table is to uncover the project’s implementation 
logic and assess to what extent USAID’s stated policy of working within the local context could 
improve the effectiveness of the project approach. The table clearly shows that USAID’s 







3.6  Assumptions Analysis 
 
What assumptions 
does USAID have?  
What does the 








What would  the 
implications mean in 
terms of what USAID’s 
approach should focus 
on? 
Country Context 
HIV/AIDS is a political 
priority 
 
HIV/AIDS is not a 
dominant political priority 
although it does feature in 
related political priorities. 
Yes Ensure that HIV/AIDS 
features prominently in all 
related political priorities. 
 
HIV/AIDS is a national 
policy priority. 
 
NDP 4 does not treat 
HIV/AIDS as a stand-alone 
or priority; NDP 4 refers to 
HIV/AIDS 4 times in 152 
pages; 
Vision 2030 is focused on 
longevity and quality of 
life.  
Yes Focus on getting HIV/AIDS 
incorporated into 
government dialogue, 
monitoring and oversight 
and dialogue with civil 
society and development 
partners. 
Organize and lobby for 
HIV/AIDS to feature in NDP 
5. 
Sector Policy supports 
HIV/AIDS as a priority. 
 
NSF strong medium-term 
policy (although HIV/AIDS 
is seen as donor driven), 
Good evidence of 
productive policy dialogue 
but delayed coordination 
structures. 
No Continue emphasizing and 
drawing attention to NSF as 
a good practice. Use positive 
reinforcement to associate 
HIV/AIDS to good public 
administration practices. 
Mandates and 
Authority in Place to 




Clear mandates for 
HIV/AIDS at the sector 





The government’s National 
AIDS Executive Committee 
(NAEC) seems like a good 
move but may be 
structurally unfeasible 
and/or unable to yield 
results, meeting every 6 







(RACOCs) fall under the 
Ministry of Regional and 
Yes Concentrate on raising the 
profile of HIV/AIDS to 
government managers, 
especially to other line 
ministries and parliament. 
 
Combat the perception that 
NAEC is the silver bullet to 
the coordination challenge. 
Focus on drawing attention 
to information that justifies 
the need for the NAEC and 
draws attention to specific 
coordination priorities.  
 
Focus on and support the 6 
RACOCs in priority regions 
for HIV/AIDS, draw 
attention to the value of 
information sharing and 
prioritizing actions.    
Address mandate and 





Local Government, Housing 
and Rural Development 
(RLGHRD) which is not 
focused on combatting 
HIV/AIDS. RACOCS do not 
have the authority to direct 
implementation. 
provide thorough and 
sustained information 
dissemination at regional 
level and that the RACOCs 
actually are not mandated to 
do more. 
Monitoring and 
Analytic Capacities are 
not in place and 
strategic information 
on HIV/AIDS is not 
available. 
Data collection is in place, 
there are good databases 
but there is no leadership 
or champion of sharing and 
drawing attention to 
strategic information.  
 
Reports are submitted to 
the National Planning 
Commission (NPC) but not 
publically released, MoHSS 
has monthly data but not 




Yes Ensure dashboards for the 
priority RACOCs, lobby for 
all data systems to have 
open data features including 
to the public, strengthen 
leadership (civil society, 
faith base, government and 
parliament) to call for an 
evidence base and to use 
strategic information in 
lobbying, meeting agendas, 
communications. 
 
Draw attention to 
Government’s commitments 
to monitoring in NDP 4 and 
NSF in the context of arguing 
that positive results and gov. 
successes are not sufficiently 
communicated. 
Government has 
capacity to coordinate 
the HIV/AIDS response. 
 
 
Not sufficient capacity in 
MoHSS/DSP both at a 
technical level and because 
of staff turnover. Lack of 
senior management 
support also undermines 
capacity to coordinate. 
Yes Build coordination capacity 
outside of Government with 






No evidence performing on 
HIV/AIDS is a key 
performance criteria of 
senior government officers. 
Yes Strengthen civil society 
leadership to lobby 
parliament to ask targeted 
questions about HIV/AIDS 
when PSs report. 
There is support for 
bottom-up 
accountability 
Support is not strong but 
neither is there opposition; 
Government’s commitment 
to decentralisation should 
be questioned. Decreasing 
donor funding will 
undermine civil society. 
Yes Through partnership with 
local organisations, hold 
“collaboratives” introduce 
strengthening leadership 
and capacity of civil society 
and faith based 
organizations as key to 
widening the focus and 
getting HIV/AIDS as a 








Clear Message to 
Decision Makers on 
Perceived Priorities 
Message on coordination is 
confused, message on 
HIV/AIDS appears out of 
context and donor driven.  
Message on civil society 
support for government’s 
good work is absent and 
message on 
decentralisation is 
politically risky.  
Yes Coordination should focus 
on common understandings 
and introducing strategic 
information to inform 
agendas, 
HIV/AIDS should only be 
talked about in the context 
of other gov. priorities, 
Encourage recognition of 
government successes, 
Highlight which aspects of 
the RACOCs work and focus 
only on the 6 priority 
regions for HIV/AIDS. 
Local champions and 
allies. 
The relationship with local 
champions is compromised 
by the impression that 
HIV/AIDS is donor driven. 
Yes USAID team to actively 
identify and build 
partnerships with 
champions in related 
priority areas, e.g. GBV, 
youth, etc.  
Local 
Narrative/Descriptors 
“HIV/AIDS pandemic” does 
not sit with Vision 2030’s 




Yes Leadership activities with 
civil society to be combined 
with strategic information to 
build a shared understanding 
amongst all stakeholders 
(and particularly including 
donors) on how HIV/AIDS 
should get traction in being 
mainstreamed in 
government priorities. 
Contextualized to Local 
Norms 
No clear or vitriolic 
opposition to HIV/AIDS as 
a priority; Lutheran and 
Catholic churches support. 
No, but…… Invest in partnership with 
faith based organizations 
that are clear allies in 




There is no obvious 
‘grouping’ of like-minded 
actors that we can appeal 
to for support when we 
have challenges. 
Yes Work towards building a 
cohort through building 
leadership in civil society 
and in lobbying parliament 
and government. 
Donors focus on 
HIV/AIDS as a 
subsector vs. Gov’t’s 
focus on health system 
of which HIV/AIDS is a 
part 
There is a disconnect 
between international 
donors and the desire of 
Gov’t to integrate (or 
mainstream) health 
services 
Yes intervention support would 
ensure HIV in integrated 
into the national HIS system, 
and support for human 
resources needs around HIV 










3.7 The Local Systems Approach 
The research thus concludes that in this case the project designed is not contextualised and does 
not live up to USAID’s own policies of supporting government policies and implementation 
plans. While interesting, this finding is not unusual on its own because the possibility still 
remains that a simple lack of technical knowhow or methodology prevented USAID to 
contextualise its institutional strengthening response in Namibia. This possibility, however, is 
unlikely since USAID is an enormous, deep pocketed and well-resourced donor. It is thus 
unlikely that USAID does not have the technical knowhow to analyse the political and economic 
environment with the view of contextualising their programming. Coincidentally, two months 
before conducting the fieldwork USAID (US Government 2014) collated the organisation’s 
collective experience into a policy guideline on how best to use a ‘local systems’ approach (i.e. 
contextualise programming to the local political and economic context). In this regard, the 
research findings are compared below to the criteria put forward in USAID’s Local Systems 
Approach.  The analysis below demonstrates both that it is feasible for USAID to adjust its 
approach to local systems and that it has not done so despite it being feasible and despite it 
being instructed in USAID’s own guidelines. The ten principles (US Government 2014) of a local 
systems approach are: 
 
4.1. Recognize There is Always a System 
GRN’s system is coordinated through national and sector policies but the policies on their own 
are not an indication of GRN priorities. Public sector actors bemoan the ‘implementation gap’ 
implying that government lacks the capacity to implement policy but this critique only partly 
explains the link between the government’s policy focus and its implementation record. 
Government actually has good implementation capacity but it directs its resources only at a 
subset of priorities within the existing policy frameworks. In other words, the political economy 
does not rank all policy priorities equally: the system of allocating government resources is not 
to implement all of the policy but rather to ensure that priorities are embedded in the wider 
policy framework. Government’s priorities are thus usually both those referred in the policy 
frameworks and those to which the government allocates its limited and necessary resources 
(i.e. policy priorities that enjoy high-level political support are more likely to get resourced). 
This is partly explained by the tendency towards a non-confrontational politics in Namibia. In a 





rather than risking a public conflict over excluding them. It is easier to include them and not 
implement rather than incur the costs of a confrontation.  
 
In Namibia’s political culture it is particularly important to acknowledge that much of the policy 
around HIV/AIDS (including aspects of the National Strategic Framework and National 
Coordination Framework) are commonly seen by government officials as donor driven 
priorities and not really owned by GRN81. The conclusion is that if HIV/AIDS is to feature 
prominently in local systems, it either needs a national level champion at the highest political 
level or HIV/AIDS will need to feature as components of related government priorities that will 
be resourced and implemented. In this regard, working to the local political economy, USAID 
should have rather followed and integrated their priorities into related government priorities 
that address HIV/AIDS indirectly (e.g. supporting the NDP4 goal of strengthening human 
resources) rather than lobbying government to change its priorities to meet HIV/AIDS above all 
else.  
 
4.2 Engage Local Systems Everywhere 
Respondents widely reported thinking that HIV/AIDS is very much seen as ‘yesterday’s news’ 
even though almost one in five pregnant women still test HIV positive. The most commonly 
referred to constellations in which public policy appears to be formulated in Namibia include: 
local constituencies, the churches, elites, SWAPO and other political parties, civil society, 
parliament and particularly the relevant standing committees, the media, Cabinet and line 
ministries. HIV/AIDS does not appear to be an overwhelming priority in any of these 
constellations although it does still feature as a major priority for the churches (e.g. Lutheran 
Evangelical), some parliamentarians and a portion of civil society. Furthermore, even in the 
donor community, the perception that HIV/AIDS is slipping as a donor priority does not provide 
a convincing picture of how international donors and development partners can champion 
HIV/AIDS. 
 
What this means is that the attention of decision makers in any of these mentioned 
constellations is likely not focused on HIV/AIDS as a stand-alone issue. To raise the profile of 
HIV/AIDS to these constellations in the local system, USAID could have approached institutional 
strengthening from a wider purview trying to get the attention of decision makers in all 
                                                             
81 Some government officials and civil society respondents referred to the NSF as a UNAIDS document 
more so than a Government document. Others referred to the NSF as a document designed to appease 
major donors in the sector rather than as a document at the core of Government’s planning, 





constellations and to change their approach to their existing priorities. The context thus called 
for a focus on illustrating the importance and added value of including HIV/AIDS within related 
social and economic issues in Namibia.  
 
Accordingly, in line with the local systems approach, USAID should have seen that leadership on 
HIV/AIDS as an issue relates to how Government is accountable to wider stakeholders and that 
there is something of a revolving door between Government and non-state actors. Here it would 
have been worthwhile for USAID to investigate how best focus to build the leadership (and 
strengthening the accountability links) in Government as well as in all related constellations of 
the local system. In particular, this could have meant support to civil society, churches and local 
constituencies as well as speaking to members of parliament and political systems, the media 
and private sector elites, the latter of which is largely absent from USAID’s approach in Namibia.  
 
4.3. Capitalize on our Convening Authority 
USAID has significant convening ‘capacity’ in Namibia because of its reputation as a credible 
partner to Government, international development partners/donors, civil society, local actors, 
NGOs and, less so, the private sector. On its own USAID does not have a ‘convening authority’ 
per se but it is able to take advantage of its reputation as a credible partner to bring together 
decision makers from different constellations. What is at stake, however, is convening meetings 
to work towards a shared vision for how Government can take ownership of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic and how different actors can advocate for this lead. One option could have been to use 
strategic information to convene meetings and work towards a shared vision and common 
narrative. However, to make meaningful progress, more attention needs to be paid to the fact 
that Government complains of receiving fragmented, competing and occasionally contradictory 
messages82 from HIV/AIDS advocates (donors, civil society and international development 
                                                             
82 For example, there is an inherent contradiction in some international development partners insisting 
that Government creates a separate coordination structure for HIV/AIDS while other development 
partners say that HIV/AIDs needs to be mainstreamed in existing government systems (which clearly 
think HIV/AIDS should be coordinated as part of a wider health mandate. Similarly the call for 
Government to continue maintaining and analysing separately resourced HIV/AIDS information networks 
seems to contradict with the goal of improving Government’s heath systems as a whole. A similar 
dynamic occurs in relation to civil society where some development partners insist civil society in 
HIV/AIDS is separate and different to civil society’s role in provision of wider or integrated social and 
health services. Most notably contradictory messaging undermines management of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic when it comes to different development partners calling for different organs of Government to 
play a leadership role such as between the MoHSS, OPM, Office of the President and National Planning 
Commission. By creating the impression that international development partners disagree on who is 
most responsible for managing the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Namibia, they are actively creating incentives 
for possibly unrelated actors to overstep their mandates in the sector only increasing the disincentive for 





partners). This is partly due to the fact that the market based way in which USAID makes 
funding available, means that HIV/AIDS advocates are as much in competition with each other 
as they are pursuing a common cause. This means that USAID’s approach to financing the sector 
is at least partly responsible for undermining the very ‘convening authority’ USAID’s guidelines 
say it should make use of.  
 
4.4. Tap into Local Knowledge 
USAID has strong local knowledge networks through its partnerships with Government 
ministries, civil society and faith-based groups, NGOs and international development partners. 
Collection and analysis of local knowledge, however, appeared to be poorly analysed with 
different service providers in the HIV/AIDS sector routinely  criticising the quality of data and 
know-how of each other in interviews referenced above.  
 
4.5  Map Local Systems. 
Local systems appear to have been partly mapped in USAID directing its attention at local level 
RACOC committees. However, USAID’s approach relies on the RACOCs to have capacity, 
resources and most importantly authority, all of which, interviewees reported them not having. 
Part of the issue is that USAID appears to have presumed that the RACOCs have more authority 
than they do; in practice RACOCs have no authority to instruct line ministries to improve their 
response to HIV/AIDS. This means that all the capacity development and resources USAID 
directs at the RACOCs are only useful to fighting the pandemic should the RACOCs be afforded a 
gracious reception from line ministries. In practice the core of the problem is that USAID has 
strengthened the RACOCs’ capacity to complain to line ministries but actually invested 
insufficiently in the line ministries themselves. At best the approach of advocating change at the 
RACOC level is optimistic, at worse interviewees called it misguided and an apparent 
misconception of how local systems work. 
 
4.6. Design Holistically 
USAID is using an integrated/ cross-sectoral approach already but this is only to respond to 
HIV/AIDS in a holistic manner. In reality, USAID should have designed its approach to HIV/AIDS 
in the context of supporting the Government’s own holistic approaches rather than demanding a 
holistic response to HIV/AIDS. This failure to design holistically is no more apparent than when 
perusing the National Development Plan 4 (NDP 4), Namibia’s most important medium term 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
government to play a role, the less MoHSS has an incentive to lead for fear of being criticized by these 





holistic policy framework. NDP 4 largely sidesteps HIV/AIDS as a priority only referring to it 
four times in almost two hundred pages. Interestingly, when interviewed (Namibia Consultant 
July 8, 2014), one of the consultants that drafted much of the NDP 4 explained, “health was not 
meant to be included in NDP 4 and nobody particularly fought for it [meaning HIV/AIDS] 
either”. 
 
4.7. Ensure Accountability. 
As a foreign government agency, USAID has no mandate to demand accountability from 
Government or other donors. However, if USAID is to meet its goal of strengthening Namibia’s 
institutional capacity to lead the HIV/AIDS response, there is a pressing need to promote 
greater accountability amongst all actors in the sector on ensuring consistent messaging on how 
best Government can and why it should take the lead. Fragmented and competing messages83 
from civil society and international development partners combined with ineffective dialogue 
only increases the risk that the transfer of HIV/AIDS programming to the government could 
result in interrupted service delivery or backsliding. A unified call to Government from non-
State actors, interested elected officials, senior government officials and international donors 
effectively creates the impression of a constituency that can be won over. Creating such a 
constituency is instrumental to putting in place incentives and disincentives for decision makers 
to make HIV/AIDS programming a priority. 
 
While USAID cannot or should not hold other actors to account, it could go a long way to 
demonstrating the importance of providing a support role to government to take the lead rather 
than playing a critical oversight role. In this regard, accountability in the medium term future 
(in which donor funding to the sector is set to decline) should be about promoting dialogue 
between Government and its international development partners on their respective 
commitments. On the side of actors in the HIV/AIDS sector this commitment is about supporting 
and recognizing Government’s authority in the sector and on the side of Government this is 
about living up to and recognizing its commitment to taking ownership of HIV/AIDS 
programming while preventing interruptions. In terms of accountability, USAID should advocate 
for an environment in which HIV/AIDS advocates are accountable to the needs of the sector as a 
whole in how they craft their messages and communicate with Government: in this regard, 
positive reinforcement should be used to demonstrate the value of non-confrontational, 
                                                             
83 Some government respondents, for example, when questioned about the priorities in the NSF, 
explained different priorities as being included because of the agendas of different international 
development partners. Unfortunately, this implies that international development partners have not 





appreciative enquiry techniques to avoid critical engagement in a public sphere that risks 
alienating Namibian decision makers.    
 
4.8. Embed Flexibility 
The National Development Plan 4 (NDP 4) currently covers the period to 2016/17 meaning that 
in all likelihood Government started reviewing and preparing for NDP 5 by the end of 2015. At 
the stage of the fieldwork (2014) there was no consensus amongst USAID financed HIV/AIDS 
advocates on how to ensure that HIV/AIDS features strongly in NDP 5. USAID appeared to have 
taken no action and put no remedial plan in place to respond to the fact that national 
development planning was not focusing on HIV/AIDS as a high level priority.  Ironically, instead 
of USAID demonstrating flexibility by adjusting its approach to the new Namibian policy and 
political reality, it appeared inflexible to the changing reality. When questioned, one USAID 
Official (4 July 2014) quipped about USAID’s management decisions: “they don’t really care 
about the systems here; they just want to report numbers” (meaning numbers of Namibian’s 
treated, transmission prevented, etc.) 
 
4.9. Embrace Facilitation 
Because of the dynamics of providing institution building support to a sector as a whole rather 
than a specific organization, USAID actually had no option but to take a facilitation based 
approach to institution building. What this means is looking for strategic opportunities and 
using strategic information to bring together leaders in the sector so as to facilitate their taking 
a lead. It is fundamentally important to recognize that HIV/AIDS in Namibia is going to be 
addressed through inter-sectoral coordination; top down decision making by Government will 
likely be avoided because it would mean putting coordination of HIV/AIDS above the authority 
of standing ministers and permanent secretaries. The need to facilitate coordination rather than 
instruct is clearly demonstrated by much of the analysis done to date which well documents the 
difficulty and resistance to instructing line ministries to deliver (e.g. at RACOC level). However, 
despite being the largest donor in the sector, USAID had invested very little in strengthening 
government coordination and ability to facilitate an integrated response to the epidemic. In fact, 
when interviewed, USAID and its implementing partners tended to be dismissive of government 
efforts to facilitate a coordinated response but more problematically, none of those interviewed 
saw USAID as needing to take responsibility for supporting facilitation. Instead government was 







4.10. Monitor and Evaluate for Sustainability 
There is a significant gap in the way that actors in the HIV/AIDS sector program in Namibia in 
that there are evident information gaps and a lack of comprehensive, evidence based 
monitoring and evaluation. HIV/AIDS advocates need to forgo the current tendency to cherry 
pick strategic information in advocating for their respective organizational mandates in favour 
of pooling existing data and calling for sector based joint monitoring and evaluation. In this 
space, it is apparently vital to identify and share strategic information that is of importance to a 
wide set of actors in the sector to promote a shared understanding of the challenges at hand and 
what is at stake in backsliding in the sector. Furthermore, more attention needs to be paid to 
collating lessons learned to inform better policy making and to attract the attention of decision 
makers so as to ensure a better implementation record.  
 
“The only time I get asked for data is from [the department of] special programmes 
and that is only when they are trying to get a donor to give more money…. I am not 
sure they [the senior management] read the data [meaning understand then 
numbers].” 
MoHSS Official/Information Directorate responsible for Government’s health 
databases, interview July 3 2014. 
 
Here it was particularly glaring how USAID financed research and analysis and monitoring in 
the HIV/AIDS response but instead of this information being widely shared and used in 
government policy making, it was rather being used by HIV/AIDS advocates to demonstrate 
failures. Nothing demonstrated this more than a visit to the monitoring and evaluation unit in 
the MoHSS. When asked about collecting and analysing HIV/AIDS data, the government official 
responsible explained that data was collected by USAID HIV/AIDS monitoring officers who then 
fed the data into a national database that can only be accessed by written authorisation from the 
Permanent Secretary of MoHSS. When asked, how the data was used, the government official 
laughed saying that there are dozens of databases being maintained but in his experience rarely 
being used to produce statistical reports. In another interview a USAID contractor pointed to a 
recent high level meeting in which UNAIDS reported on HIV/AIDS statistics. The senior 
management of MoHSS responded with surprise and questioned where the data came from with 
UNAIDS shame facedly explaining that they found the information on the MoHSS’s own database 







Funding Context: HIV/AIDS 
Although the government covers an estimated two thirds of the cost of HIV/AIDS programming 
in Namibia, HIV/AIDS is still a bigger priority to international donors and development partner 
than it is to the government. With an estimated two fifths of official aid disbursements to 
Namibia comprising funding for HIV/AIDS there is a lot at stake for donor organizations, in how 
effectively Namibia institutionalizes HIV/AIDS programming. 
 
Official Disbursements to Namibia in $US 




88.40  120.19  142.93  106.05  151.23  208.79  209.74  288.41  269.93  307.62  300.89  
Germany 12.44  32.38  34.66  22.61  15.87  22.96  27.85  41.19  28.76  74.11  51.18  
United 
Kingdom 
1.77  2.15  2.40  1.23  1.49  0.88  1.01  0.68  0.56  0.15  0.44  
United 
States 
17.03  29.20  34.29  28.83  50.53  58.83  70.95  90.28  117.20  112.95  148.89  
EU 
Institutions 
19.02  16.27  23.04  17.19  15.49  28.11  26.60  32.59  10.81  31.64  26.93  
Source: OECD.org (OECD QWIDS  
 
In 2012 official disbursements of development assistance (ODA) to Namibia amounted to $305 
million. The United States provided half of all aid disbursed in 2012. More than 40% of the total 
$305 million in ODA or $128 million of aid to Namibia was spent on health. However, 94% or 
$120 million of the total donor health expenditure is on HIV/AIDS. The remaining 6% of health 
spending largely went on malaria, monitoring systems, maternal health, etc. The US provides 
three quarters ($ 84 million in 2012) of disbursements on HIV/AIDS in Namibia. The remaining 
disbursements to HIV/AIDS come from the Global Fund for $35 million and Germany $2 million. 
In other words, by working with only three donors the vast majority ($121 million of the $128 
million) of donor funds spent in the health sector can be coordinated. Furthermore, there are 
actually only 30 projects in the health sector that disbursed more than $500,000 in 2012 and 
together they account for more than 90% ($117 million of $128 million) of all disbursement to 
health. Accordingly, the majority of donor support to the sector could be coordinated by three 






Namibia’s national budget was around N$ 60 billion (US$ 6 billion) in 2014/2015 with N$ 52 
billion coming from revenue. Education receives the largest allocation with over a fifth of the 
national budget, N$13 billion. The second biggest allocation is N$7 billion, which goes to the 
Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Health and Social Services receive N$6 billion or around 
10% of national budget. Other significant allocations include N$ 4 billion for the police and N$ 2 
billion for veterans. The largest project expenditure is for the Targeted Intervention Programme 
for Employment and Economic Growth (TIPEEG) that receives just under N$15 billion for three 
years or just under $5 billion a year only marginally lower than Government’s budget for 
MoHSS. 
 
3.8 Implications for USAID 
Successful multi-sector coordination of the national, regional and district response to HIV/AIDS 
should be forward looking, using strategic information to bring together key stakeholders in the 
context of existing local systems and policies. Here USAID should pay attention translating the 
‘HIV/AIDS crisis’ into concepts and themes that have relevance within Namibia’s current 
political context. Realistically, the strongest incentive USAID can provide is in drawing attention 
to and helping Namibian’s lobby for HIV/AIDS related issues. Past experience shows that 
coordination is largely unsuccessful unless it is grounded in strategic information that affects 
the implementation plans of all involved. Furthermore, criticism and drawing attention to 
failure is commonly ineffective because it inevitably shames the decision makers USAID needs 
for effective implementation. Accordingly, if USAID had followed its own guidelines and 
contextualised programming within the Namibian political context, it would have supported 
coordination and implementation that is focused on the future, emphasising Namibia’s 
successes in trying to build constructive partnerships in combatting the pandemic. 
 
The GRN communicates through policy processes but only select parts of national and sector 
policies are actual priorities. As pointed out earlier, a non-confrontational political style means 
officials are more inclined to include a policy priority and not implement it than risk a 
confrontation with civil society or international donors in excluding priorities. To be relevant to 
Government, then, it is imperative to both ground all support within national and sector policies 
and to focus attention on where there is momentum in implementing policies. Fragmentation 
and competing narratives between donors, implementing partners and civil society is 
undermining dialogue with Government and results in a convoluted if not contradictory 
message. This fragmentation is a significant disincentive for government decision makers to 





shared vision and common narrative with government decision makers instead of pushing for its 
own narrative. USAID could, for example, look closely at how best to keep HIV/AIDS in the 
media especially since it is currently considered not newsworthy. USAID could proactively 
analyse and identify potential allies and partners. In the technical space, this means more 
attention on the lower level technical government officials that are important to the HIV/AIDS 
response regardless the minister or permanent secretary. One of the most important incentives 
USAID could have provided to government officials is public recognition of the good work they 
do combined with assistance to officials so that they perform ‘on the job’. More importantly 
USAID’s own stated policies and guidelines would imply they pay more attention to identifying 
potential alliances with power brokers in the larger society, e.g. with like-minded members of 
parliament, elites and/or the private sector.  
 
All of these considerations are even recognised by USAID officials in the country. One official, for 
example, expressed exasperation that without focusing more on strengthening the 
government’s systems as a whole, there would be “back sliding” (US Gov Official – interview 11 
July 2014) in containing the pandemic. Nonetheless, an apparent acknowledgement of a 
problematic approach that runs contrary to USAID’s own policies and guidelines as well as 
common sense is not sufficient to effect change.  
 
3.9 Conclusions and Implications for the Research Question / Analytical Framework 
USAID’s approach to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Namibia does not appear to take into 
consideration the local political and economic context. This decontextualized approach is seen 
even by the project’s own principles as increasing the risk of failing and likely to prove costlier 
to deliver whilst also maintaining Namibia’s dependency on USAID to continue HIV/AIDS 
service delivery.  
 
More interesting for this research, however, is that USAID continues its approach despite clearly 
conflicting with its own stated policy objectives and guidelines. At the same time, there is no 
apparent justification for this decontextualized approach with USAID’s own officials and 
partners decrying it and nobody in particular seeming to benefit. One possible explanation 
could be that the government is too corrupt or the operating environment too complex to make 
feasible the preferred approach of aligning with the government’s approach. This explanation, 
however, does not make sense in Namibia where the country is stable and enjoys a 
comparatively rich fiscus, well-functioning administration, good democratic practices and the 





way it does, is not in any way related to the context, exposing most problematically, what one 
NGO84 decried as a practice of “donors and international donors [enter] the space incorrectly: 
they [do] not come to help but came to fix some problem.”  
 
USAID clearly plays a vital role in continued treatment and containment of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic and the government’s response whilst bigger than that of donors is also subject to 
criticism. The problem, however, is that USAID’s approach is not really seen as being any better 
than that of the government’s with some respondents commenting that USAID’s approach is 
more about showcasing that USAID knows best rather than anything else. USAID’s support for 
HIV/AIDS programming is thus difficult to divorce form a narrative of criticism the government 
and accusing it of caring less about HIV/AIDS than donors do. One USAID contractor summed up 
this perspective well by explaining “health information is key to getting individuals to take 
ownership of their own health”85 but in the context meaning that Namibians don’t take 
ownership of their own health problems because the government denies them information. As 
the respondent went on to explain, “USAID focus has been on data rather than institution 
building. It has not been very successful at listening to the system and trying to fix it. Rather 
USAID has placed a strong layer on top of a poorly functioning system.”  
 
Possibly the most significant finding is the apparent aversion of USAID to work with elites, 
agenda setters and high level leadership in addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Whilst USAID 
talks about enabling ownership, it in fact focuses most of its attention on building relationships 
with actors that clearly do not have ownership or particularly care about the pandemic. Nothing 
illustrates this more starkly than the fact that USAID is not engaging parliamentarians when the 
women’s caucus itself, expressed the need for very basic support (research and legislative 
drafting) to push for greater oversight of and attention to HIV/AIDS. Put plainly the approach 
USAID is adopting is not grounded in the actual political economy of combatting HIV/AIDS in 
Namibia. As interestingly, there is no indication that USAID finds this of sufficient concern to 
want to change it: the Namibian government is set to go through a seismic generational shift as 
the current cadre of managers is replaced with a younger group, more familiar with new 
technologies and less shaped by a struggle politics constantly on the guard against potential 
‘spies and infiltrators’. Instead of USAID focusing its attention on building relationships with this 
                                                             
84 Interview with Namibian HIV/AIDS NGO, July 7 2014. 





new cadre it has rather created a self-justifying narrative about how the current cadre is corrupt 
and disinterested and thus beyond reproach86.  
 
Part of the problem with engaging the emerging cadre of leadership appeared to be a resistance 
to working with ‘elites’. The narrative surrounding the HIV/AIDS response in Namibia appears 
to lend itself to a logic that implies the role of donors is to help the disenfranchised not those 
already empowered. The problem is that by its very nature, the government has ownership only 
where there is some form of elite interest in the particular issue. Regardless of the fairness of 
the situation, when it comes to getting a national government to take ownership, it is impossible 
to conceive of a response that does not enjoy the support of the government leadership itself. 
And, with Namibia being ruled by the same party since independence, the very leadership of 
government are firmly members of the country’s elites. In other words, USAID has preferred an 
approach of bemoaning exclusion by the disenfranchised rather than one of working with elites 
to ensure ownership at the highest level. Furthermore, the more USAID focuses on 
disproportionately supporting the disenfranchised, the more it puts HIV/AIDS on the wrong 
side of a politics of exclusion and disenfranchisement that seeks to strengthen the hand of the 
elites whilst better justifying ignoring the voices of the disenfranchised. A Namibian journalist87 
summed up this dynamic in explaining “AIDS is imported by foreigners and at the same time the 
US is telling Namibia to let more foreigners in.” This dynamic is certainly not helped by 
HIV/AIDS infection rates, being concentrated in six regional hot spots in poorer, rural 
communities that are perceived by some elites as part of a backward Namibia that will never be 
integral to the Namibian economic success story.  
 
Accompanying USAID’s apparent reluctance to partner with and engage elites is the problematic 
finding that its engagement in the HIV/AIDS space appears to rely on a confrontational form of 
communication. This confrontational communication essentially calls out the government for 
not caring enough about its citizens by ignoring the urgency of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and, in 
any case, not being competent enough to respond to the pandemic even if it wants to. The 
communication continues that USAID is an essential partner because it brings a more 
sophisticated approach to addressing HIV/AIDS. However, the approach proffered by USAID, 
when unpacked, is not particularly sophisticated and in fact does not convincingly deliver new 
                                                             
86 In every interview with US, other donor officials and USAID contractors, reference was made to the 
leadership of MoHSS having a history of corruption. When pushed as to why the dialogue with MoHSS 
appeared to be so weak, a recurring explanation was the assertion that senior management was only 
interested in “tender opportunities” (as one respondent put it).  





methods or approaches or sophisticated responses. When examined a little closer, the promise 
of ‘strategic information’ is nothing more than communicating data already in the government’s 
database and the collection and analysis of HIV/AIDS data is just deploying numerate (often 
foreign) monitoring offices to local offices so they can capture data on computers procured by 
USAID. When unpacked the new technologies USAID promises in the fight against HIV/AIDS, are 
nothing more than repackaged government data that draws specific/special attention to 
HIV/AIDS over and above the gamut of health challenges Namibia’s government faces on a day 
to day basis. 
 
In line with the research question, this chapter has shown that USAID is committed at a policy 
level to directly supporting the beneficiary country development plan and has both issued clear 
instructions on how to do this at the strategy level and on how to contextualise programming to 
the local context. The case of USAID in Namibia, interestingly, demonstrates that even when the 
context allows, there is notable resistance to contextualising development cooperation within 
the local political economy. At the same time, the Namibia example illustrates that even when a 
government is demonstrably committed to addressing the particular developmental challenge88, 
it does not prevent development cooperation creating a narrative that posits the government as 
morally and technologically lacking. Further, even when it is clearly within the interest and 
stated policy of USAID to adopt the government’s broader definition of the problem at hand (as 
being about health systems and not exclusively HIV/AIDS), there is little evidence that donors 
are willing to do so. Unlike with South Africa, there are clear benefits to key actors in invoking a 
narrative of moral and technological superiority over the beneficiary government. Whilst the 
analysis suggests this narrative is detrimental to USAID’s stated goals, it does align with the 
interests of senior managers in headquarters whose performance is measured by what they 
directly deliver and control. In this regard, forgoing the narrative could be seen as a threat to 
command control of senior USAID officials (particularly the senior management of PEPFAR) 
over USAID funded projects because by implication it would imply that USAID would be best 
suited to directly support the Namibian government and in doing so relinquish control over 
running project activities in parallel. The analysis thus concludes that the invoking of a moral 




                                                             






4. South Sudan Case Study 
 
The European Union’s (EU) approach to allocating funds in South Sudan is a key case study in this 
doctoral research because, unlike with the previous two case studies, it allows for easy comparison 
to other beneficiary country contexts. This chapter then should be read as being especially 
connected to the comparator country chapter that follow. The case study is used to test the 
hypothesis that the EU’s allocation of development resources does not follow its stated policy of 
supporting ‘partner government’ development plans89. The chapter then explores the hypothesis 
that the EU’s allocation of development resources is an extension of a narrative of moral 
superiority. The case study is used to explore whether there is evidence to suggest that the EU’s 




This chapter first explains that the EU has a stated policy commitment to allocate development 
resources directly in support of beneficiary country development plans. The chapter then 
explains why South Sudan has been selected as a case study and how it will be used to 
demonstrate to what extent the EU’s funding allocations deviate from those of the South Sudan 
Development Plan (SSDP). The chapter shows that South Sudan was not selected or intended by 
the EU to be an exception to the stated EU policy of supporting government development plans. 
The chapter details policy commitments that show that in the specific case of South Sudan the 
EU remained committed to support South Sudan’s development plan: the EU claims it directly 
supports the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) and the government reciprocally called for 
donors to directly support its development plan. South Sudan’s government also emphasised 
the commonly agreed 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and calls for donors to respect 
government systems, terminologies and sector definitions.  
 
The case study then shows that the EU Single Country Strategy for South Sudan side-steps and 
avoids addressing the most pressing development challenges in South Sudan. Instead the EU 
allocated its development resources in a way that did not meet government requests to respect 
                                                             
89 The policy of allocating funds according to the beneficiary country’s national development plan is 
clearly stated in the introduction to the EU Single Strategy for South Sudan (EU 2011b: para. 2) but has 
subsequently been incorporated in the EU’s global programming guidelines (EU 2012c: para. 2.2) in 
which EU Delegations are instructed “wherever possible, of existing national or regional policy 





its sector definitions thus creating a means for the EU to fund activities that fall outside of 
government decision making structures. The case study then demonstrates that in each of the 
five priority sectors that the EU allocates funds to, the EU justifies its resource allocation by 
invoking a moral superiority (moral imperative) combined with a call for a new technique or 
method (technology) to be funded by EU resources. The case study is analysed to explain the 
rationale behind my hypothesis that the ‘moral imperative’ and new technique or method 
(‘technology’) is a symptom of an internal donor logic rather than real development challenges. 
Finally, this chapter proposes how to measure whether this patterns recurs in other country 
cases (next chapter) in an effort to verify whether this is the result of the specific country (South 
Sudan) context or better explained by the way the EU itself allocates development resources.  
 
4.2 The Case of South Sudan and the Role of the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) 
In 2009 following many years of trying to work better together and to make aid more effective, 
the Council of the European Union approved an “Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness” 
(EU 2009). Part of this framework was a renewed commitment to joint “multi-annual 
programming” (EU 2009: Para. 3g) meaning that instead of the EU and EU Member States (MS) 
each designing their own programmes in beneficiary countries, the EU and EU MS agreed to one 
common programme for supporting beneficiary countries. The conclusions of the operational 
framework also and repeatedly noted that such programmes should be based on the beneficiary 
country’s national development plan.  
 
None of this rhetoric was new to the EU but in 2011 South Sudan’s declaration of independence 
offered a unique opportunity to put these principles in practice. On the one hand, South Sudan’s 
development plan had already been endorsed by donors who had also financed its 
development90. On the other hand, the EU and many of the EU MS had never previously 
designed bilateral or a joint country strategy explicitly for South Sudan before (largely because 
it was not independent and because humanitarian needs were so severe). Because South Sudan 
was a new country and the EU’s involvement in it had previously focused on humanitarian or 
emergency support rather than development cooperation, this makes South Sudan an 
invaluable case study in that it is as close to a blank slate (with no legacy development type 
country programmable aid) as a researcher is likely to find. Whilst the EU has funded 
programming in South Sudan for decades, the partnership with the government in terms of a 
strategy for development cooperation based on the South Sudan Development Plan, is entirely 
                                                             
90 Interview: 2011 South Sudan Ministry of Finance: “The SSDP was written by the donors so how can 





new and is less influenced by a long history of previous and legacy development programming 
(as is the case in most other countries). In late 2011, the EU and eleven EU MS, as a show of 
support to newly independent South Sudan, developed a joint multi-annual strategy for 
development cooperation in South Sudan. The strategy (‘joint programme’) committed €830.71 
million in support “to the 2011 to 2013 South Sudan Development Plan”. (EU 2011: Para. 1)  
 
The purpose of this case study is to compare the EU’s Single Country Strategy (Response 
Strategy) for South Sudan 2011-2013 with the South Sudan Development Plan to identify 
commonalities and, more importantly, divergences. My hypothesis is that the differences 
between the EU’s and Government’s plans will provide an insight to the implicit rules that shape 
how the EU allocates its development resources. The EU’s explicit rules and policy clearly call 
for development resources to be allocated in support of the beneficiary country’s development 
plans: for South Sudan the European Union’s financial allocation is made in a complementary 
legal document titled the Support Programme for the South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013. 
Thus, what emerges as diverging from the government’s own plan must be due to implicit rules 
or incentives that shape EU decision making. Insofar as implicit rules and incentives account for 
the EU deviating from its own explicit policies they give an insight into the political economy 
that informs EU decision making in development cooperation. 
 
This chapter starts by reviewing the sectors in which the EU and EU Member States are 
investing their aid with the aim of identifying where the EU’s approach differs from that of the 
government’s. The sector analysis looks at what is omitted by the EU in its strategy as well as 
what constitutes a ‘priority sector’ in which the EU intends to have an outsized influence. The 
comparison of the EU’s with the government’s strategy is further detailed to uncover a bias in 
the EU’s approach towards invoking a moral imperative and technological superiority that is not 
explained by the particular country context and development challenges at hand. Further 
analysis shows that invoking a moral imperative and technological superiority is productive in 
the sense that it forms the foundation of a narrative by which the EU justifies its spending on 
development cooperation and mobilises support for programming. However, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the moral and technological advantage presumed in the EU’s narrative 
is justified by the context. The chapter then concludes by asking whether this manufacturing a 
sense of moral and technological superiority is a necessary condition of the way the EU does 







4.3 Sector Interventions - Differences 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD91) classifies donor 
interventions into different sectors based on a detailed coding system in order to differentiate 
projects and collect data. Donors, on the other hand, often define sectors based on policy and 
thus with the 2012 Council of the EU Conclusions on the Agenda for Change, the EU introduces a 
focus on (EU 2012: Para. 8) “sustainable agriculture and energy, including natural resources 
management” sectors. ‘Sustainable agriculture and energy, including natural resource 
management’ is a sector specifically created to promote EU policy towards renewable energies. 
With governments, however, the definition of a sector is both a policy and administrative act. 
Defining a sector is accompanied with a sector development policy that allocates and mandates 
responsibilities to government ministries to implement the said policy. When the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness sets its first two priorities as ownership and alignment, it is full 
recognition that development assistance must be programmed in line with government sector 
definitions92 and mandates  (EU 2011: Annex 2). This approach is adopted to ease management 
of development assistance and ownership thereof; otherwise, it represents an externally 
imposed definition of how government and service delivery should be organised. For example, if 
the EU were to finance a large project in the ‘sustainable agriculture and energy, including 
natural resources management’ sector it would struggle to transfer ownership simply because 
the project crosses so many departmental and policy mandates: Department of Energy, Eskom, 
Department of Environmental Affairs, Department of Forestry, etc. South Sudan’s own 
government recognises these challenges and called for “development assistance [to] therefore 
be provided in line with government priorities as set out in SSDP” (GRSS 2011:137). 
 
In the case of South Sudan, programming that crosses multiple ministries is even more 
dangerous because it creates potential conflict and turf wars between government ministries in 
a context where state building is the primary priority. The EU joint programme (EU 2011b:9) 
mitigates this threat by allocating “EU Joint Programing Support for South Sudan’s 2011-2013 
Development Plan”.  
 
4.4 Major EU Omissions  
While the EU claims (EU 2011b: Para. 2) to support South Sudan’s own development plan 
(SSDP), a close reading of the SSDP illustrates two major omissions in the EU’s programme that 
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92 “Joint programming is led by the partner country wherever possible, is based on a partner country’s 






on the face of it could render all other development assistance futile. On the one hand, 
development in South Sudan is linked to demobilisation of the military93. The likelihood of 
comprehensive demobilisation going ahead never quite seemed achievable when recognising 
that South Sudan is still in an active dispute with its northern neighbour and recognising that a 
demobilised military becomes a clear security or threat to stability in South Sudan where there 
are few jobs or livelihood opportunities to absorb demobilised soldiers. The EU itself recognises 
the high risk of conflict but dismisses it as something that is mitigated by taking an inclusive 
approach to service delivery: 
 
“Stability will depend on institutions that combat marginalisation and build citizen 
confidence in a healthy state-society relationship. Security and stability will be 
strengthened through continued services delivery, stimulating economic growth 
institution building and sustainable use of natural resources.” (EU 2011b:8)  
 
While inclusiveness is a key feature of stability it seems far-fetched to presume a newly created 
country emerging from “decades of civil war” reference will make meaningful progress in 
reducing its defensive capabilities while the “risk of future violence remains high; over half the 
population is below the age of 18 with limited economic opportunities, growing wealth 
disparities, proliferation of light arms and unresolved conflicts. Analysts cite the need to resolve 
contested national and local conflicts, manage returnees and inter-tribal tensions. Competition 
for resources, chronic food insecurity, susceptibility to environmental shocks and the presence 
of the Lord’s Resistance Army create opportunities for spoilers and maintain the risk of 
conflict.” (EU 2011b:8) 
 
More problematically, South Sudan derives 98% of its revenue from oil but the Government of 
the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) estimates this oil revenue will halve by 2020 and be 
insignificant by 2035 (see table below GRSS 2011:123). This raises a crucial and obvious 
question about how the government will sustain service delivery when it projects to lose 98% of 
its current revenue within a quarter century. Furthermore, South Sudan has been in a 
protracted state of conflict (see quote above EU 2011b:8) for almost fifty years: it is difficult to 
rationally understand what incentives government officials emerging from a protracted conflict 
like this have to make medium to long term development plans. Without a realistic long term 
plan and hope for revenue to finance the necessary expansion of services, it is difficult to 
                                                             
93 “Specifically, there will be a comprehensive national programme to transform the uniformed security 
services; one which addresses demobilisation needs holistically, including Disarmament, Demobilisation 
and Reintegration (DDR), and provides security and dignity to all ex-combatants. The target is to have 
completed DDR for almost 78,000 ex-combatants by the end of this plan period. A new civilian-led 
National Security Architecture (NSA) will (a) transfer local security from military to a civilian police force, 





conceive why government officials would not do as anybody would on a sinking ship: use up the 
resources available and make sure to be long gone when the waters reach the upper deck. The 
EU recognises this dynamic (EU 2011b:6) but allocates resources to other sectors without 





Source: South Sudan Development Plan (GRSS 2011:123) 
 
4.5 Priority Sectors, Funding and Active Donors 
The EU commits to using South Sudan’s sector definitions in allocating aid resources. This 
commitment is intended to make aid relevant to government decision makers and 
communicates that development projects will be aligned with government policy and decision 
making structures to encourage ownership (Paris Declaration 2003 and EU 2011b: Para. 494). 
The table below compares the EU sector definitions with that of government and shows that 
while a cursory glance indicates some alignment, in fact three of the five sectors are not aligned 
with government sector definitions, providing the EU and other donors in the sector no clear 
government interlocutor to work with and transfer ownership to. Where a project falls under 
the remit of multiple line ministries ownership is more of a challenge because ministries need to 
decide amongst themselves who is most responsible for engaging with the donor: with the 
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donor’s promise of extra resources it is reasonable to assume that where a donor sector 
definition covers multiple ministries it could create competition amongst government 
departments in relation to donor activities.  
 
“The natural resources sector covers activities implemented by: Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry, Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries, Ministry of Co-operatives and 
Rural Development, Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism, Ministries of Irrigation and Water 
Resources, Roads and Bridges (worked with through the WASH sector) and Commerce, 
Industry and Investment, Southern Sudan Land Commission and the Ministry of 
Environment.” 
EU 2011b: Natural Resources Annex 
 
At this stage it is also worth pointing out that in the earlier drafts95 of the joint programming 
document the EU also included civil society/human rights/governance and urban development 
as sectors. Civil society/human rights/governance were pushed as a priority sector by Sweden 
that eventually agreed to incorporate this sector as a cross-cutting issue (EU 2011b: section 3). 
The primary motivation for Sweden to drop its insistence on a separate sector to cover its 
programming appeared largely to be because Sweden did not have sufficient staff in South 
Sudan to actually coordinate or implement programming in the sector96. The sector of urban 
development (2010: participant observation and earlier iterations of the EU joint programming 
document) was initially insisted on by Italy as a priority sector. However, (2010: participant 
observation), Italy was unable to allocate the budget necessary for its urban development 
experts to visit South Sudan. Once it became apparent that there was no apparent government 
interlocutor and that no other donors expressed an interest in the sector, Italy agreed to remove 
“urban development” from the joint programme. A similar dynamic occurred with the civil 
aviation sector but with France having staff in Juba, the sector was kept in the joint programme 
as a “coordinated priority” albeit with no allocation made in the financing table (EU 2011b:18).  
 
In the case of the sectors mentioned above, they were almost exclusively motivated by having 
existing humanitarian programming in the sector, headquarter policy priorities and/or the need 
by the donor to be seen to be ‘leading’ or particularly active in a recognisable sector. None of 
these sectors was motivated by donor officials in reference to an identifiable needs analysis. 
Whilst the sectors had merit, they were inevitably abandoned because the particular donors 
involved did not have staff in post to champion them. These observations on their own imply 
that sectors initially chosen by donors are motivated by donor’s own interests rather than based 
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on an objective assessment of needs on the ground. The implication is that the sector definition, 
its influence on how funding is structured and what activities are financed is typically and 
primarily determined by donor and donor staff interests unless challenged by government or 
other actors at country level. 
 
The final EU sector allocations compared to government’s sector definitions and divisions was 
as follows. 
 
GRSS Sector (GRSS 2011) EU Sector (EU 2011b) Comments 
Rule of Law  Rule of Law Same sector but no clear 
government interlocutor or 
lead. 
Health Health Aligned sector and 
interlocutor (Ministry of 
Health) 
Infrastructure Infrastructure (Water, 
Sanitation, Hygiene, WASH) 
Not directly aligned; WASH is 
a humanitarian donor sector 
definition. Interlocutors 
include multiple ministries. 
Economic Functions AND 
Natural Resources AND 
Infrastructure 
Natural Resources (Food 
Security) 
Not directly aligned; Food 
Security is a donor sector 
definition. Multiple 
interlocutors. 
Infrastructure “Civil Aviation” Civil aviation was kept as a 
priority sector because France 
trained air traffic controllers 
and supports the Juba airport. 
 
For each of the sectors, the EU allocated a lead donor that was responsible for coordinating with 
other donors in the sector to elaborate a common vision for programming in the particular 
sector. The sector “vision” was intended to provide a common entry point for donors active in 
the sector to work towards sector wide priorities in a coordinated manner. This coordinated 
approach is widely seen as a means to reduce fragmentation and duplication amongst donors so 
as to improve impact on common programming priorities (Paris Declaration 2003). 
 
My approach here was to review and compare the sector annexes in the EU Joint Programme for 
South Sudan with the South Sudan Development Plan to identify recurring patterns that appear 
in the EU’s programming document but not in the government’s. My initial analysis uncovers 
repeated suggestions that the EU document invokes a moral imperative or superiority that 
implies South Sudan government officials are less interested in the needs of their citizens than 
they should be or that they are corrupted or motivated purely by internal political ambitions. 





to be linked to explaining how the EU will improve delivery in the sector. This latter pattern I 
refer to as a new technology to distinguish it from a new technique or method. A new 
technology can be a new technique or method but I am invoking the concept of a new 
technology to emphasise that a new technology is often pursued for the promise of something 
new or different rather than because there is demonstrable evidence that the new technology is 
actually an improvement. In essence I am using the terminology ‘new technology’ to imply a 
level of faith or non-rational belief in the value of the new technology. The concept is not 
original and in some ways speaks to Latour’s (1996) analysis of how the ‘love of technology’ 
drove decision makers to continue investing in a failed scheme to improve a French Transit 
System. A not dissimilar theme also appears prominently in Li’s (2007) The Will to Improve, a 
source I drew heavily on in the literature review and in establishing the hypothesis for this 
research.  
 
4.6 The Moral Imperative; Funding Directed to ‘New Technologies’ 
After analysing and comparing the EU’s strategy paper for South Sudan with the government’s 
own national development plan, it is possible to identify a recurring logic in the EU’s strategy 
that is not in the government’s development plan. Plainly speaking the logic implied in the EU’s 
strategies is that EU and other like-minded donors have a moral imperative to support and/or 
change the government and its officials to effectively implement South Sudan’s national 
development plan. The EU’s analysis of development challenges and South Sudan’s proposed 
plans and interventions positions government decision makers as both less committed (than 
donors) at a moral level to be serving and protecting citizens as well as lacking a good 
understanding of the need to be inclusive and protecting the vulnerable. At the whole of 
government level, the EU’s strategy implies that government does not have a sufficient 
commitment or understanding of the need to protect the vulnerable, that government officials 
are not committed to combatting corruption and that government at the highest level is not 
interested in being accountable to citizens and to democratic processes. On occasion, this moral 
imperative translates into assertions that state building or stability is impossible without 
beneficiary governments becoming more inclusive, transparent and accountable, all criteria 
difficult to objectively measure. This, combined with the fact that these assertions of moral 
failure97 by beneficiary countries almost never results in aid being cut by the EU calls attention 
to the possibility that the EU asserts a moral imperative for reasons other than to improve the 
quality of development cooperation. In other words, the narrative that positions beneficiary 
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governments as corrupt or morally lacking appears to play no function except to contribute to 
the narrative in the first place. 
 
Nothing illustrates better how these dynamics play out than in 2013 when the EU revised its 
joint programme for South Sudan. The EU officials in Juba were under increasing pressure from 
their own headquarters due to slow disbursement of funding as projected in the original 
strategy. The EU’s solution was to redirect a large proportion of funding from the health sector 
towards general budget support98 in the form of a ‘State Building Contract’. A state building 
contract effectively allows the EU to transfer non-earmarked funds (EU 2012e) directly into the 
treasury thus making aid money indistinguishable from the general budget. In practice what 
this means is that the EU’s financing pays as much for the proportional cost of social services as 
it does for the security services. In 2013, however, the human rights situation had eroded so 
badly in South Sudan that Human Rights Watch (2013) was alleging that the government was 
actively promoting and complicit in ethnic cleansing in Jonglei Province. Despite this and the 
fact that South Sudan failed almost every indicator of policy coherence or having sufficient 
controls to contain corruption, the EU proceeded to sign the State Building Contract whilst 
simultaneously acknowledging ethical violations. By way of administrative justification, the EU 
argued that South Sudan’s failure to meet the requirements for budget support could not be 
“reasonably measured” or “complied with” in the unique “context” of South Sudan (source 
withheld). What this example shows is that the moral imperative invoked by the EU is not 
sincere, at least not in terms of the EU stated distaste for unethical government practices. After 
all the implicit incentives for the EU officials to disburse funding easily outweighed the explicit 
incentives not to use aid to co-finance (or be seen to be co-financing) corruption and genocide. 
 
In this context, then, good development is framed as being based on a protection of fundamental 
rights as if state building will fail if citizens are not protected and democratic institutions 
established:  
 
Stability “is strengthened when democratic institutions and the protection of human 
rights are incorporated in national planning as enabling factors. The EU shares civil 
society and humanitarian actors’ concerns that on-going attention needs to be focussed 
on inclusion of minorities, women and particularly the youth both in democratic 
processes and livelihood opportunities. An inclusive approach will contribute to South 
Sudan’s stability and security.” (EU 2011b: Para. 13)  
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The EU’s strategy pointedly repeats the need for government to protect human rights and 
ensure gender equality at a rights level but also in the political space:  
 
“Protection of human rights and ensuring gender equality should be incorporated in all 
political processes and socio-economic development. This includes: women’s political 
and economic rights, protection from gender based violence, promoting women’s 
community voice and better access to education, health, clean water and sanitation.” (EU 
2011b: Para.29). 
 
At the same time, the EU emphasises its concern that the government may be corrupt and not 
accountable as if senior South Sudanese policy makers do not care about combatting graft and 
ensuring accountability. Government is called on to “strengthen accountability, public 
administration, decentralization, parliamentary development, political participation as well as 
initiatives to strengthen women’s political and economic empowerment.” (2011b: Para.30)  
 
In the EU’s strategy the moral imperative is broadly speaking typified by the following five 
themes: 
  
4.6.1 South Sudan will expand service delivery but if not for the EU, government would 
use delivery to exclude parts of the population and advantage others. 
 
When it comes to service delivery, the EU’s strategy implies (across all sectors of intervention) 
that government officials are not interested in or committed to service delivery and that even 
when there is delivery it will be, if not mitigated, to the exclusion of portions of the population. 
For example, the strategy states that education “should specifically reduce inequity both at 
enrolment, retention and completion as well as in terms of teacher recruitment and 
deployment”. In a rare sign of how non-reflexive donor thinking is, the EU’s text is followed with 
a statement implying that donors set the agenda and not Government: “sector decisions are too 
often made without Government participation.” (2011b: Education Annex).  
 
Government officials and legislatures are thus positioned as being self-serving and disinterested 
in delivery. While they may indeed be so, putting Government into such a space is an important 
narrative manoeuvre that allows EU officials greater authority to take decisions that could be 
disputed or challenged by Government. For example, if Government does not express an opinion 
on a proposed new project, by invoking the notion that government officials are uninterested, 
donor officials afford themselves the moral authority to take a decision and/or allocate funding 





the presumption that government is disinterested in the needs of its own citizens, EU officials 
might be pressed to ask the more pertinent questions of whether their specific programmes are 
relevant or not and in whose interests are decisions being implemented? Conversely, if donors 
believed Government was interested in the needs of its citizens but did not express an opinion 
about the relevance of a particular donor programme, then Government’s silence likely implies 
that donors need to check the relevance of what they are funding rather than proceed as is. In 
other words, in the context where a Government cares about its citizens and does not explicitly 
endorse or approve a donor activity, the donor’s own agency to act unilaterally is undermined. 
 
This point was illustrated again when reviewing the EU strategy in 2013: one donor said, with 
nods of approval from others, that: “government understands donors as managing instruments 
but what [the donors] are really monitoring is government’s delivery of services to the people” 
(NL 190613). The donor in question means that Government thinks aid and public expenditure 
is about managing money and contracts but the donors are different in that their officials are 
more serious about monitoring delivery and acting in the interest of ‘the people’. The comment 
made was used in an attempt to deflect Government criticism that donors continue to spend the 
bulk of their resources on independently managed projects rather than in support of 
Government delivery. As recognised by donors and recipient governments in the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Government delivery (e.g. in running schools and clinics) is 
both more sustainable and considerably more cost effective than donor systems which rely on 
outsourcing typically to international implementing partners such as the UN systems or 
international NGOs. Invoking a narrative that Government uses delivery to exclude portions of 
the population, allows donors to justify more expensive delivery to fewer rather than cheaper 
delivery to many. This speaks to a global trend: the monitoring report on the Paris Declaration 
(OECD 2010: 16) reports that “donors are not systematically making greater use of country 






4.6.2 Government is inherently corrupt and given the opportunity officials will 
reallocate or extract public resources for their own good. 
 
“This [EU Single Country Strategy] support will help South Sudan build strong 
institutions with check and balances against corruption and promote transparent 
and accountable governance.” 
EU Press Release 20 November 2012 (EU 2012b) 
 
Unsurprisingly there is a constant and continued thread throughout the EU’s strategy that 
implies that Government officials are potentially corruptible or corrupt already. In the 
Government’s own development plan, corruption is identified as a threat but the way it is 
presented in the EU’s strategy is loaded in that corruption is used in a moral sense: not to stop 
funding but rather to assert an authority on what Government-Donor “on-going dialogue” (EU 
2011b: 4) should focus on. Accordingly, there is little evidence that the EU’s repeated reference 
to corruption is backed up by any action: of the almost €1 billion allocated to development 
activities none is explicitly ear-marked for anti-corruption work. Although the EU does mention 
support to public financial management, there is no funding for support to the South Sudan 
Anti-Corruption Commission or for associated anti-corruption activities such as in supporting 
whistle-blowers or forensic audit functions. In fact, the only significant mention of the South 
Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission is as an “interlocutor” (EU 2011b: Rule of Law Annex) 
notably not as a recipient of EU financial or capacity building support. Furthermore, throughout 
the strategy the EU reiterates its commitments to “greater use of Government systems” (EU 
2011b: 3) along-side expressing concerns about corruption while also repeatedly noting that 
“Government procurement systems and processes have not yet been sufficiently established” 
(EU 2011b: WASH Annex). It is also notable that in an interesting twist of fate, since agreeing 
the strategy in 2011, the EU has been slow to spend funds allocated partly due to the low 
absorption capacity of South Sudan’s Government institutions. The EU’s response, despite its 
continued official concern about corruption, has been to reallocate unspent funds to a ‘state 
building contract’ (EU 2012e) that essentially will divert €80 million directly to the South Sudan 
treasury in non-earmarked funding (that is budgetary support funding to be used at the 
discretion of the South Sudan Government). 
 
Accordingly, the EU talks about corruption in the context of “[reducing] fiduciary risk and 
allow[ing] donors to support front line health services using the Government’s state conditional 
transfer system whilst improving financial oversight systems. Support is dependent on fiduciary 
risk assessments.”  (EU 2011b: Health Annex) or in calling for Government to “ensure 
accountability and enhanced transparency regarding the flow and use of funds.” (EU 2011b: 





in fact mean anything more than the Government’s own commitment to approve an “anti-
corruption strategy” and establish the “South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission” (GRSS 2011). 
 
The threat of corruption is routinely used by EU and other donor officials to exert authority. A 
commonly used expression was for donor officials to invoke ‘European taxpayers’ as if the 
donor official concerned had a privileged relationship to these taxpayers and that their 
perceived concerns had primacy over the needs and interests of the beneficiaries. Saying “we 
need to think about the European taxpayer” was typically followed with an explanation for why 
funding was going to projects that were not cost-effective, seemingly of little impact or clearly 
operating outside the bounds or accountability relationships that apply to government projects.  
 
Strangely the same donor officials that would invoke corruption and the ‘European taxpayer’ to 
justify their funding decisions viewed Government efforts to combat corruption sceptically. One 
senior official, for example dismissed Government’s efforts by saying that “corruption can be 
seen as a tool to finalising the exclusion of an undesirable” (UK 19/06/2013). Another official 
said “identifying corruption is not about the tip of the iceberg because it is everywhere; it is 
about using a definitive mechanism to remove somebody.” (DE 19/06/2013) 
 
The concept of corruption thus appears to not be meaningfully invoked to address corruption at 
all99 but rather to justify the authority of donor decisions or as a cynical means to judge or 
distance donors from having to support reforms the Government is undertaking. In both cases 
the concept of corruption appears to be used by donors primarily for their own internal 
institutional needs. In fact, there is no evidence that the concept of corruption was ever used to 
make any meaningful investments in anti-corruption programming or activities. This 
observation is borne out of the 2013 revision to the EU joint programme in South Sudan in 
which corruption again appeared prominently as a priority but with no substantive change by 
EU donors to how they fund or combat corruption.  
 
Johnson, Tazell and Zaum (2012) reported complementary findings in a study measuring the 
evidence for operationally relevant donor decisions on anti-corruption. The study clearly shows 
that wide-spread donor preferences to tackle corruption through political and policy dialogue 
or “conditionalities” (Johnson, Tazell and Zaum 2012:36) are demonstrably ineffective even 
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though they persist as an on-going theme in donor programming. The study demonstrates that 
(Johnson, Tazell and Zaum 2012:43) procurement, tax reform and public financial management 
are the most effective and well-evidenced donor funded anti-corruption tools. In South Sudan, 
the EU refers to public financial management but provides little significant funding for these 
activities and there is almost no significant programming on procurement and tax reform. 
Furthermore, the EU’s 2013 decision to reallocate €85 million of programmable aid to general 
budget support in South Sudan represents a step towards ineffective action on corruption in 
that the State Building Contract proposed by the EU relies largely on these same 
‘conditionalities’ for anti-corruption programming. In fact, Johnson, Tazell and Zaum (2012:31) 
even summon evidence that suggests that budget support can actually undermine 
accountability and oversight by legislature by “strengthen[ing] the executive100 (at whom much 
of this assistance is targeted) vis-à-vis accountability institutions like parliaments”.  
 
Johnson, Tazell and Zaum’s 2012 findings should not be surprising. Programming in support of 
public financial management, procurement and tax reform tends to be technical in nature and in 
dialogue with civil servants whose job descriptions require delivery in these areas. This means 
that when donors choose to support civil servants already tasked with combatting corruption 
there is already ownership and donor programming is relevant. However, conditionalities and 
political or policy dialogue tend to happen at a ministerial level with elected officials. While an 
elected official may have a stated interest in combatting corruption, it is often questionable 
whether allowing or combatting corruption is most in an elected official’s interests, political 
incentives and disincentives.  
 
4.6.3 Government officials are unconcerned by human costs of conflict, they are not 
sufficiently sophisticated and are not really interesting in governing. 
 
Conflict mitigation is a human and security priority likely even more so for citizens and elected 
officials of South Sudan even who are directly affected by it even though it is not presented as 
such in the EU strategy substantively. Conflict is rather invoked in the EU strategy as a 
commentary on Government’s commitment to resolving conflict and attempting to demonstrate 
that conflict has negative developmental impacts. The underlying presumption is that 
Government is unaware or disinterested in the human costs of conflict on its own population 
thus allowing EU officials a moral superiority over Government.  
                                                             
100 This is the same executive and civil servants that the EU analysis repeatedly cites as lacking capacity 






In reference to rural development, the EU, for example, does not comment on the vast human 
costs of conflict but rather draws Government’s attention to “increasing prices resulting from 
disruptions to North-South trade. Risks are further aggravated because of increasing demand 
from returnees and potential escalation of inter-tribal tensions and conflicts in border areas.” 
(EU 2011b: Rural Development Annex). In this space, then, the EU asserts that internal conflict 
in South Sudan is because Government has not recognised the “need for a gender sensitive and 
inclusive approach” and that Government has not done its part to mitigate conflict as witnessed 
by “progress in reconstruction of the country has been insufficient during the transitional post-
CPA period (2005-2011).” The EU strategy then places the burden of internal conflict firmly on 
the government by saying that conflict results from Government’s failure to deliver “more 
equitable and more [secure] access to land for the rural poor; and (4) build more effective, 
accountable, decentralised and participatory Government institutions able to lead the 
development and delivery of services relevant for the sector” (EU 2011b: Natural Resources 
Annex). 
 
The tone of the EU’s assertions is that South Sudan is not anxiously trying to get beyond the 
reach of internal conflict and violence but rather as a country with a leadership that does not 
really grasp the barbarism of South Sudan’s violence. The implication is of a less developed 
people not quite aware of how backward they are: “a high proportion of the population [is] not 
practicing good hygienic practices. Improper disposal of human wastes and poor personal 
hygiene is the cause for a range of diseases including acute watery diarrhoea, polio and cholera.” 
(EU 2011b: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Annex) 
 
However, it is important not to conclude that the EU’s descriptions of South Sudan are 
necessarily the result of a racism or cultural elitism. In fact, this close analysis of the EU’s 
strategy is not able to summon compelling evidence in support of the racist or elitist argument. 
Instead, what is a clear and recurring theme throughout the EU’s strategy is that when South 
Sudan is presented as a country governed by a ‘backward people’ it is invariably accompanied 
by an explanation or justification as to why the EU’s fund decision making trumps that of the 
Government. The EU’s assertion is not that South Sudan is backward; the EU’s assertion is that 
South Sudanese officials cannot or do not want to govern and therefore the EU must step in and 
make decisions about appropriate allocations of funds. This assertion is deep and held in an 
entirely non-reflexive manner: instead of asking how the EU can make itself and its funding 





leadership: “[s]ector decisions are too often made without Government participation” (EU 
2011b: Education Annex) reports the education sector lead. The health sector lead argues the 
need for “advocacy for establishment of a Government chaired overall health sector 
coordination structure.” (EU 2011b: Health Annex) Probably most non-reflexively, in the rule of 
law and security sectors where Government is routinely accused of over-politicising the use of 
the security services, the EU reports that in terms of “useful coordination structures; 
unfortunately, none have ensured sustained Government-led sector coordination.” (EU 2011b: 
Rule of Law Annex) 
 
4.7 ‘New Technologies’ and Delaying Government Ownership  
The analysis focused on how the EU routinely invokes a moral superiority (imperative) thus 
allows its officials greater agency in allocating funding differently to that called for by the 
Government of South Sudan. The use of moral imperative, however, only implies that the EU 
wants to maintain agency in deciding how funds are allocated; on its own, it does not go very far 
in detailing how or whether this shapes how funds are allocated. The EU’s strategy is 
fundamentally a policy document meaning that it does not describe activities in detail. As such, 
the use of the moral imperative could easily be dismissed as being inconsequential were it not 
for the fact that it appears to be causally connected to the EU’s proffering a new approach 
and/or technique in allocating its development resources. The recurring narrative structure 
deployed by the EU in its strategy for South Sudan appears to be as follows: 
 
Government is morally compromised + Government does not want to govern = The EU must decide 
how to allocate funds in this instance BUT do so in a way that fixes Government so that in the 
future Government can have ownership and the EU can exit with no fears of creating dependency. 
 
The problem is, as I show below, that this ‘new technology’ rarely means actually doing 
anything new or different. Instead, I propose that a close reading of the EU’s call for new 
technology is hollow because it is largely just ‘business as usual’ continuing what the EU or 
other donors have done in the past. 
 
In the education sector, the EU strategy argues that “A [government] process for developing a 
sector strategy is underway albeit marked by poor coordination and delays.” The EU is thus 
investigating “to what extent specific studies can contribute more detailed indicators” and that 
these new studies will “form the basis for the design of a new sector approach for the education 





launching sector technical studies are common features in public sector management. These 
activities do not, in themselves, constitute the formulation of a new and necessary knowledge 
that will legitimise Government’s lead, as the EU implies101. 
 
For the health sector, the EU predicates the move to allocating funds based on Government 
plans on the “roll out of the MoH Health Management Information System” (EU 2011b: Health 
Annex). The Health Management Information System (MIS) is about establishing targets, 
indicators and benchmarks more so than just reporting and is invoked in the sector strategy as 
a future justification for the EU to allocate funds to a government-led approach. While the use of 
information technologies could be considered as a new technology, the actual approach of 
managing information in health sectors is an old and well established practice. Furthermore, 
there is an inherent contradiction in that Government information systems will always be 
perceived as lacking by donors so long as it does not accurately record donor project 
information. There is a circular logic in the EU’s assertion that sound information systems will 
allow the EU to transfer projects to Government. Because the vast majority of health services in 
South Sudan are provided by donors, the quality of Government information systems is almost 
entirely dependent on donor willingness to adopt Government definitions, meet Government’s 
data collection and reporting deadlines and to transfer information as needed. Effectively this 
means recognising the authority of Government over donor decision making.” 
 
In the agriculture sector the ‘new technology’ appears to be nothing more than donors 
recognising Government’s lead. The EU has transformed Government leadership and ownership 
in this sector into a technical issue that requires a technique to solve it. “The EU will support an 
improved sector architecture” for the rural and agricultural development sector and “calls for 
programmes to be linked to key drivers of conflict and promoting the use of contractors over 
that of multilaterals.” The “development of an Agriculture Master Plan” “and information 
systems to link humanitarian and development information needs to aid planning, improve 
practise and inform policy choices which will enable the Government to reduce hunger.” The EU 
will avoid an “overestimation of GRSS capacities” and hold off on funding Government priorities 
until “better food security policies and regulations in place and better coordination of projects 
run by non-state actors”. In the meantime, the EU will allocate funds to “promoting agricultural 
practices and technologies that are environmentally sustainable” (EU 2011b: Natural Resources 
Annex)  
                                                             







In the rule of law and security sectors the EU funding will be used to “improve[e] Government’s 
planning, monitoring and evaluation capacity at the sector level.” The EU will support the 
“review and prioritisation of 134 customary and statutory laws, 15 bills transmitted to the 
legislature and between 86 and 194 (depending on the final number of counties established) 
functioning/capacitated legal affairs offices at County Level” and “organisational and strategic 
plans, training maps, etc. should be developed”. EU funding will “include budgetary planning 
and management and also drafting/completing a relevant legislative framework and 
implementing regulations for enabling the body to fulfil its role in the sector. It should be about 
a comprehensive approach of building a functioning and efficient administration.”  (EU 2011b: 
Rule of Law Annex) 
 
In the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector the EU emphasises that there is a “lack of 
technical expertise throughout the WASH sector at various levels of Government and in the 
private sector.” The EU will support “productive use of water, water harvesting and improving 
the capacity for integrated water resources management. Those activities will complement a 
comprehensive water strategy and, match the new policy priorities of the Netherlands bilateral 
program.” The priority is for the EU to “increase the efficiency of the South Sudanese sector 
development by focusing on sustainability of all future investments” and for “increased 
forecasting, planning and management and through infrastructure development such as river 
training techniques, river diversion works and flood control embankments.” (EU 2011b: Water, 






In the agriculture sector as is the case throughout the EU’s strategy for South Sudan, ownership 
is problematically defined as something that can be created or a capacity that can be developed. 
The problem is that this definition is more political than technical: where Government wants to 
lead there is ownership. The problem is that the EU donors are not respecting Government 
authority nor prepared to identify where ownership actually is situated. The agriculture sector 
is a good example of this donor imperative in that the sector itself does not exist in terms of 
Government planning. The annex to the South Sudan Development Plan (GRSS 2011: 408) 
approaches agriculture through other sectors and line ministries according to a completely 
different approach to that being insisted on by the EU: 
 
A similar dynamic occurs in the WASH sector and while the rule of law sector retains some 
respect for Government authority it muddies the water by involving security services and the 
judiciary (that is independent of the Ministry of Justice). When the EU argues that South Sudan 
needs new technologies to coordinate and lead in these sectors what is actually happening is the 
manufacture of a whole new sector that falls outside of Government’s authority thus directly 
contradicting the stated policy of supporting Government’s in their right to manage their own 
national development processes. The EU invokes the need for these new technologies to 
indicate something is lacking; this only serves to mask the real purpose of keeping decision 
making out of the hands of designated Government officials.  
  
The EU’s strategy for South Sudan refers to the deploying of new techniques and methods to 
improve effectiveness and give Government the capacity to lead. However, when these ‘new 
techniques and methods’ are closely interrogated they do not appear to be as new as presented. 
For example, the recurring call for effective sector coordination echoes the same calls made by 
humanitarian actors for decades in South Sudan. In fact, the WASH sector is not even a 
Government sector but rather a humanitarian cluster put forward by the UN systems to 
coordinate the work of organisations like the World Food Programme (that also drills boreholes 






This dynamic is echoed in a recent Time magazine interview with Ertharin Cousin, the head of 
the World Food Programme. When asked about new advances Ms. Cousin refers to her 
excitement for “drip irrigation and RUSF102 [Ready to Use Supplementary Foods]” (Time 
Magazine 2013:92) both of which are decades old and in wide-spread use in developing 
countries and developed countries alike. 
                                                             





4.8 Conclusions and Implications for the Research Question / Analytical Framework 
This chapter has closely compared the EU’s development strategy in South Sudan with the 
Government’s national development plan. Despite the EU’s stated intention of directly 
supporting the South Sudan Development Plan, the EU’s strategy differs significantly. The EU 
uses different sector definitions to those used by the Government. These different sector 
definitions undermine Government ownership by crossing multiple line ministries often with 
competing mandates. The EU strategy also does little to respond to or mitigate South Sudan’s 
most pressing needs or risks. South Sudan’s own development strategy clearly details how the 
Government’s own short to medium term financial projections make stability and state building 
highly unlikely due to South Sudan’s projected and sustained decline in national revenue. The 
EU strategy does nothing to address or even engage with this fiscal challenge nor any of the 
other systemic risks identified in its own strategy. The EU identified eight systemic risks (EU 
2011b:17) in its strategy that on their own represented sufficient reason to stop funding should 
they come to fruition. These risks included an outbreak of conflict with Sudan (the North), 
internal conflict or violations of human rights. Seven out of eight of these risks came to fruition 
between 2011 and 2013 but the EU continued funding activities as if nothing had changed even 
though continued funding to Government could be interpreted as direct support for gross rights 
violations. For example, South Sudan’s alleged on-going project of ethnic cleansing in Jonglei 
(Human Rights Watch 2013 and 2013b) continues while the EU is finalising a general budget 
support programme (EU 2012e) that would indirectly make EU funds (through South Sudan’s 
Treasury) available to the same military responsible for these violations. 
 
The EU strategy justifies departing from the Government development plan by systematically 
invoking a moral superiority that positions South Sudan’s government officials as backward, 
corrupt or simply not interested in governing. Instead of questioning whether such a perception 
could be the result of cultural or organisational bias, the EU strategy takes this moral 
superiority as an indubitable fact. The perception of corruption is so invasive that in a meeting 
between the EU and international NGOs in 2011 (Participant Observation Notes: 2011), the EU, 
international NGOs and UN agencies present went so far as to propose a formal dialogue with 
Government on reducing its excessive salaries.  This perception was motivated by the 
observation that South Sudanese staff were leaving their jobs to work for Government. 
However, it was entirely incorrect: in fact, the highest salary paid by Government (GoSS: 2008) 
was in the region of $1,000 a month while most international NGOs and UN agencies pay 





wanted to work for their first government out of loyalty, idealism or a sense of national pride 
but there was no apparent space for this consideration.  
 
At the programming level, this positioning of Government as morally inferior translates into 
funds allocated to activities outside of Government’s control but almost always with reference 
to a supposed new approach or technique that will address the problem at hand and ensure that 
future allocations are for activities Government wants. However, when reviewed closely these 
new approaches or techniques do not appear to be substantially or in any way different to 
activities financed in the distant past. This leads to the hypothesis that the call for a new 
technology is not genuine; that the EU invokes the use of new technologies as a mask for the 
practice of diverting funds in other directions. Where these funds are diverted does not appear 
to be in the direct or vested interest of the EU except insofar as it is part and parcel of a 
narrative of moral superiority. It would thus appear that the emphasis on ‘new technologies’ is 
not genuine but only a narrative manoeuvre designed to avoid criticism that the EU is funding 
activities that are not wanted by Government. By invoking a ‘new technology’ the EU implies 
that once Government has developed the necessary capacity this practice of allocating funds to 
priorities outside of the national development plan will end. 
 
When it comes to allocation of resources the elephant in the room is the notion that allocations 
are driven by self-interest and in the case of South Sudan there is evidence to suggest this but 
not in the way that is commonly presumed. The participating donors did not appear (Participant 
Observation: Notes 2011) to be allocating funds because of potential opportunities for 
patronage nor to benefit donor officials on a personal level. At an organisational level, there was 
no evidence to suggest that the choice of sectors and subsequent allocation of funding would 
materially benefit any related donor organisation. The only sector in which an organisational 
benefit could be demonstrated is in the WASH sector where Germany is the lead donor and the 
German owned development agency (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit/ German Corporation for International Cooperation) is the recipient of a 
proportion of German funding. However, even in this case interviews with the German 
representatives in South Sudan found that even if Germany were to strictly adopt Government 
sector definitions and transfer ownership GIZ would benefit in a comparable manner. The only 
motivation that could be identified was the need for EU representatives to be seen to lead; 
sectors were selected based on where EU donors where already active and had a presence. For 
example, civil aviation was included in the EU strategy as a sector due to the insistence of 





posted to Juba and civil aviation does not appear as a sector in the SSDP. The primary 
motivation in allocating funding to South Sudan appeared to be the desire of donor officials to 
be able to fulfil their representational functions and to distinguish themselves and their ‘value 
added’ from other donors in South Sudan. 
 
The South Sudan case study shows that the EU is committed at a policy level to directly 
supporting the beneficiary country’s development plan (which was at least in part written by 
the EU itself) and to contextualise aid to the local context. Unlike the case studies of South Africa 
and USAID (above) there is a strong basis to conclude that as least some aspects of the 
beneficiary government are morally and technologically lacking. However, instead of this 
narrative leading to the design of what might appear to be better quality development projects, 
the narrative appears to be more focused on generating a consensus perspective than actually 
influencing how programming should be changed. In this regard, the EU’s decision to proceed 
with general budget support in the face of evidence of ethnic cleansing and the analysis that 
shows that programming is wildly overly ambitious undermines the likelihood that this 
narrative serves to improve programming. As the comparator chapter (following) shows, the 
narrative of moral and technological superiority appears to be deployed by the EU regardless if 
the beneficiary government has clear moral and technological failings like South Sudan’s does, 
implying that the narrative is donor not contextually driven. 
 
The chapter following explores whether the findings in South Sudan are case specific. In this 
regard, unrelated EU country cases are analysed to measure: 
 whether the EU uses the beneficiary government’s sector definitions, 
 the extent to which the EU strategy supports government priorities as stipulated in the 
respective national development plan, 
 whether the use of a moral imperative recurs and, if so, if it is accompanied with a similar 









5. Comparative Country Cases 
 
This chapter explores whether the findings regarding the European Union’s development 
cooperation in South Sudan are context specific or apply in other countries too. In this regard, 
unrelated country cases are analysed to measure: 
 Whether the EU uses the beneficiary government’s sector definitions, 
 The extent to which the EU strategy support government priorities as stipulated in the 
respective national development plan, 
 The use of the moral imperative and/or a call for ‘new technologies’. 
 
The South Sudan case was based on an EU joint programming document. Fortunately, it was 
feasible to review other country cases in which comparable programming documents existed. 
Because EU joint programming is a relatively recent practice103 there are only a few country 
cases that can be used for comparative analysis. The advantage of using a joint document for 
comparison in this research, is that it allows extrapolation beyond just one donor whilst still 
keeping the focus on EU joint programming and grant making donors at the country 
programming level. Conversely, there are a number of other cases such as in Zambia and Kenya 
where joint strategy documents exist that include donors outside of the EU family.  These 
documents, however, were ruled out as suitable comparators because they include inputs from 
UN agencies many of which are not donors but rather implementing partners themselves trying 
to raise funds from donors. Furthermore, lenders such as the World Bank also feature 
prominently in these cases bringing into play a different dynamic and focus in the document 
than when embodying exclusively the strategy of grant makers. 
 
Another criterion that became apparent was the need to distinguish a developmental rather 
than humanitarian or emergency approach (such as in Haiti where the majority of programming 
was intended to happen outside of government systems and would not be repeated because it 
involved largely responding to an earthquake and not to implementing a medium term 
development plan). While the South Sudan case emerged out of humanitarian programming, the 
focus is entirely developmental. In this regard, the other country cases were selected to the 
extent they were developmental in nature but with the influencing presence of humanitarian 
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programming as well. Bolivia, for example, was excluded because humanitarian programming 
largely did not feature at all in donor country strategies and plans.  
 
In this regard, the South Sudan case has a number of features that need to apply in other cases 
in order for them to be viable comparators. These included a:  
 Functioning national aid architecture and history of coordination so as to avoid comparing 
to a case where the joint strategy might be ‘administrative’ at best (for example, in Myanmar 
where a national aid architecture has only started being formalised in late 2012), 
 Strategy to support an existing and viable medium term national development plan 
(Mozambique, was excluded, for example because the EU and EU Member State strategies 
seemed to be only loosely connected to Mozambique’s Plano de Acção para a Redução da 
Pobreza; similarly, Egypt proved to be unviable in comparing EU plans to the national Five 
Year Plans), 
 Large number of participating donors (Mali and Niger, for example, were excluded because 
aside from France and the European Commission there is limited other donor involvement),  
 Developmental context not obscured by trade or private sector investment interests (Viet 
Nam, for example, was excluded because much of the donor strategies were obscured by a 
focus on identifying and promoting investment and trade partnerships). 
 
When applying these criteria and after considering access to documentary evidence, the number 
of potential comparison cases was substantially reduced. Ethiopia was selected because it was 
the most viable alternative case in sub-Saharan Africa having an EU joint programming process, 
and a strong presence of humanitarian actors even though the primary focus of donors is on 
developmental programming. Bangladesh was selected from Asia having the added advantage 
that it is in its sixth iteration of a five-year national development plan. Palestine proved a viable 
option also being from a totally different region with a different enough context but with the 
right mix of a developmental approach, functioning aid architecture and existing practices of EU 
joint programming. In South America unfortunately, most of the country cases did not prove 
feasible because aid seemed to be crowded out by EU private sector interests. Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet bloc countries were also considered. However, Eastern Europe was ruled 
out because development cooperation largely gave way to EU accession or neighbourhood 
policies which are modelled on accession and trade agreement plans (acquis) rather than 
national development plans. In the former Soviet bloc, as was the case in West Africa, there 
were largely too few donors present to make for comparable experiences with South Sudan. In 





Ukraine, there was insufficient use of joint programming to make for easily comparable 
examples. 
 
Accordingly, the most feasible country cases for comparison with South Sudan were 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Palestine. The chapter below first analyses alignment of sector 
definitions between the EU joint programmes or strategies with the beneficiary government 
national development plan for each of the country cases. An analysis of the sector definitions 
and possible explanation for alignment and/or discrepancies then follows. This section is then 
followed with an analysis of the use of the ‘moral imperative’ and ‘new technologies’ with 
comments on other findings. The chapter also includes an analysis of trending priorities in the 
global narrative on what constitutes effective development cooperation (see 5.3) in an attempt 
to identify whether the current effectiveness debate implies a likely change to the way aid is 
programmed by way of donor rather than beneficiary sector definitions, concepts and 
approaches. This chapter ends with conclusions.  
 
5.1 Sector Definitions; Alignment with Beneficiary Government National Development 
Plans 
 
5.1.1 Ethiopia Case-Study 
The table below shows that the EU Joint Cooperation Strategy (EU: 2012d) has twenty-one 
sectors of intervention. Nine of these sectors are clearly aligned (italicised) with the 
Government’s Growth and Transformation Plan (Ethiopia Government 2010). Four sectors are 
partially aligned and eight are not aligned. However, of the eight EU sectors that are not aligned, 
one is support to a specific Government function (monitoring and evaluation systems) and three 
are actually a means of disbursing funding (two are budget support type mechanisms and one 
sector is for humanitarian responses). Excluding the four exceptions listed above, just over half 
of the EU sectors are aligned with the Government’s sector definitions:  nine of the remaining 







EU Joint Cooperation Strategy for Ethiopia 
(EU 2012d) 
Ethiopia Growth and Transformation Plan 
(Ethiopia Government 2010) 
Capacity building: Economic Governance, Public 
Financial Management, Procurement and Anti-
corruption. 
Aligned: Public Sector Capacity Building 
Democratic governance, human rights, civil 
society, interreligious dialogue, conflict 
prevention 
Democracy and Good Governance 
 
Regional Integration, Peace and Security,  
economic regional integration 
No Corresponding Sector 
 
Private sector, Industrialisation and Trade Industry (Sub-Sector Micro and Small-Scale 
Enterprises Development) 
Infrastructures: energy (renewable energies) Aligned: Energy 
Infrastructures: transport (rural roads) Aligned: Roads 
Infrastructures: ICT Aligned: Communication Information Technology 
Culture and tourism Aligned: Culture and Tourism 
Health and population Aligned: Health 
Education (primary, secondary, tertiary & TVET) Aligned: Education and Training 
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Potable Water Supply and Irrigation 
Protection of Basic Services (Multi-donor 
budget support type mechanism) 
No Corresponding Sector 
Agriculture growth including livestock and agro-
pastoralists 
Agriculture 
Sustainable land management, biodiversity and 
forestry 
No Corresponding Sector 
Productive Safety Net Programme/Disaster Risk 
Management & Social Protection Policy ((Multi-
donor budget support type mechanism) 
No Corresponding Sector 
Humanitarian aid / building resilience Not Developmental Sector 
Gender Women, Children and Youth Affairs 
Environment and Climate change Aligned: Environment and Climate Change 
Climate smart actions No Corresponding Sector 
Balanced urban development No Corresponding Sector 
8- M&E / quality of data Not a Sector but Priority in GTP 
 
5.1.2  Bangladesh Case Study 
Bangladesh was selected as an optimal case in Asia because of the size of the donor and EU 
donor presence and because it has well elaborated national development plans. Bangladesh is 
also interesting because it blends both aid and humanitarian operations and has a strong 
commitment to aid effectiveness principles. The Bangladesh case, however, was complicated by 
the fact that the EU Joint Programming was not completed by 2013 (when this research took 
place). However, it was still selected as a case because Bangladesh has a broader Joint 
Cooperation Strategy that is endorsed by the EU donors as well as those outside the EU family 
(e.g. the World Bank, UN systems, US, etc.). Additionally, data collected through interviews and 





the EU was proposing in 2013 to use in its joint programme (which will likely only be 
formulated in 2015).  
 
An additional complication is that the Bangladesh Joint Cooperation Strategy was published in 
2010 but the Bangladesh Sixth Five Year Development Plan was only published in 2011. This 
forced the question whether to conduct the analysis based on Bangladesh’s Fifth or Sixth Five 
Year Development Plan. After discussions with officials in Dhaka, however, it appeared that the 
Bangladesh Joint Cooperation Strategy was designed based on the Bangladesh Sixth Five Year 
Development Plan. However, because of the delay getting approval from cabinet for the Sixth 
Five Year Development Plan it was only formally published in the subsequent year. The Sixth Five 
Year Development Plan even includes a section introducing the Bangladesh Joint Cooperation 
Strategy and explaining that donor support of the strategy means donor funding will be 
“[focussed and aligned] to the [Government of Bangladesh] priorities and systems” (Bangladesh 
Government 2011: 240). 
 
Bangladesh Joint Cooperation Strategy 
2010-2015 (Bangladesh Government 2010)/ 
EU Proposed Sectors (2013 - Interviews) 
Bangladesh Sixth Five Year Development 
Plan 2011-2015 (Bangladesh Government 
2011) 
Democratic Governance and Human Rights No Sector  
Food Security and Nutrition Agriculture 
Education and Skills Education, Training and Research 
Health Health, Nutrition, Population and Food Safety 
Environmental Mitigation Aligned: Environment and Climate Change 
Water and Sanitation Water Management 
Private Sector Development Aligned: Private Sector, SME Development 
Energy Sector Infrastructure and Communication 
Gender No Sector 
Disaster Risk Reduction No Sector 
 
5.1.3  Palestine 
Palestine was selected as a good case for the middle-east because of the size of the donor and EU 
donor presence and because it has well elaborated national development plans. Like with 
Bangladesh and Ethiopia, Palestine blends both aid and humanitarian operations and has a 
strong commitment to aid effectiveness principles. Whilst the EU had not formally agreed an EU 
joint programme for Palestine by 2013 (when this research took place), the EU and EU Member 
States have agreed an equivalent joint strategy called the EU Local Strategy for Development 
Cooperation 2011. 
 
EU Local Strategy Sector (Lead) 
(EU 2011c) 
National Development Plan 2011-2013 
Sector 





Direct Financial Support Aligned: No Sector – But whole of Government 
Justice  Aligned: Justice  
Security  Aligned: Security 
Municipal Development and Local 
Government  
Local Governance and Administration 
Public Financial Management Aligned: Public Financial Management 
Education Basic and Higher Education  
Health Aligned: Health  
Social Protection  Social Protection and Empowerment 
Private Sector Development No Sector 
Agriculture Aligned: Agriculture 
Electricity Energy 
Environment Aligned: Environment 
Water Water and Waste Management 
Jerusalem  No Sector 
Refugees  No Sector 
Area C No Sector 
 
5.2 Analysis 
On average just over half of EU sector priorities are aligned with the partner country’s sector 
definitions in the four selected country cases (including South Sudan, pervious chapter). In 
South Sudan three out of six sectors were aligned and in Ethiopia that proportion increases 
marginally to nine out of seventeen. This ratio holds in Palestine too. At first glance only seven 
of sixteen sectors are aligned in Palestine but the EU includes Jerusalem, Refugees and Area C as 
sectors which are peculiarities related to the unresolved dispute between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority. Jerusalem and Area C104 are not sectors but rather geographical locations 
and refer to the different powers the Palestinian Authority has in these restricted areas. In 
Jerusalem and Area C, the Palestinian Authority largely has no decision making authority (OCHA 
2011) to speak beyond the provision of health and education services and in many cases these 
are only at a distance (e.g. school children are often bussed out of Area C for education 
purposes). ‘Refugees’ is another unusual sector that features in EU development cooperation in 
Palestine due to the nature of the conflict/occupation. Once these three context specific sectors 
are excluded the ratio in Palestine increase to seven out of fourteen sectors.  
 
The outlier in the analysis is Bangladesh where only two out of the EU’s ten sectors were 
aligned with Government’s. At first glance the difference in the sector definitions in the 
Bangladesh case might look semantic but when investigated more closely (see Bangladesh 
Government 2011 and Bangladesh Government 2010) it became apparent the differences are 
substantive and important for this analysis. The EU’s emphasis on food security and nutrition is a 
                                                             






focus on farming for domestic consumption (food) whereas the Government’s focus is on 
agriculture as a productive (economic) sector. Herein lie fundamentally different political 
priorities (recognisably simplified for this exercise) in that the EU is saying the government 
must focus agricultural policy on nutrition of households first whilst the government is saying 
that agricultural policy must prioritise access to agricultural markets above all else. Similarly, 
the EU’s Education and Skills sector is focused on lobbying for greater attention to vocational 
and technical training (adult education) while Bangladesh’s Education, Training and Research is 
primarily about expanding formal and traditional education systems. Relating back to the food 
security sector as mentioned above, the EU’s health sector focus is in supporting primary health 
systems and leaving nutrition to food security sector. On the other hand, the Bangladesh 
government addresses food security in the Health, Nutrition, Population and Food Safety sector. 
This is a substantive difference and relates to differing approaches to addressing the high level 
of stunting in Bangladesh. The EU sees stunting as a food production problem and thus directs 
its funding to agriculture and related government bodies while Government sees stunting as a 
nutrition problem within the mandate of the Ministry of Health. The political implications of 
these differing approaches must not be underestimated: essentially what the EU is saying is that 
Bangladesh puts revenue and exports before nutrition. The Government on the other hand is 
effectively holding a line which says that nutrition is a health issue and that agriculture related 
economic growth must be protected. The Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (UNICEF 
2104) then compensates by distributing rice and agricultural inputs on a mass scale which only 
partially addresses the nutrition challenges. The remaining sector differences are analysed in 
the context of the other country cases (below). 
 
After analysing the four cases a pattern emerges by which EU sectors are aligned with partner 
government sector definitions. In sectors where the EU both provides comparatively large sizes 
of funding and where implementation requires the active input and participation of 
government, the EU tends to be aligned to government sector definitions. In roads (or 
infrastructure), education and health government sector definitions are used. On the face of it 
this could be explained by the fact that when committing comparatively large resources to a 
sector, it is more apparent the cost and effectiveness advantages of working with or through 
government. For example, when building a single school, the EU might be willing to finance an 
international NGO like Save the Children to provide expatriate teachers. However, when the size 
of the funds means establishing hundreds of schools the comparatively higher cost of paying for 
teachers through an international NGO becomes less palatable as do the questions about other 





requirements in managing a grant contract with an international NGO for a single school are 
more manageable than in establishing hundreds of schools. When interviewed, for example, EU 
procurement officials repeatedly complained that it takes almost as much time to manage a 
small contract as a large one. Accordingly, the actual administrative workload decreases 
proportionately with larger contracts thus creating an inherent incentive towards using larger 
grant contracts than smaller ones. This incentive is only increased by the perception (in all 
country case studies) that staff numbers are being decreases thus increasing workload on those 
staff that remain at country level. Finally, this trend towards larger contracts is also associated 
with the oft cited “disbursement pressures”, by which EU staff mean that, as one interviewee put 
it confidentially, “quality is only a consideration if you meet your disbursement targets.” (Donor 
Official 10 Interview 2014) 
 
The advantages of working with or through government only become more acute in health or 
roads because the donors’ contribution largely depends on coordination and complementarity 
to the partner government’s own systems. For example, with a road to be a feasible investment, 
it requires a decade long maintenance plan; building a hospital is not effective without the 
oversight, licensing and systems that national health services put in place. Failure to secure such 
ownership is a sure recipe for disaster as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) noted (Hendriks 
and Lucy 2013b) about South Africa105 and UNDP’s failure to ensure that a HIV/AIDS clinic they 
built in Rwanda was staffed and resourced.  
 
Sectors that tend to be non-aligned, then, by contrast appear to be those in which donors want 
to maintain control of implementation or at least the narrative. A clear and problematic example 
here is the HIV/AIDS sector (see chapter on USAID support for HIV/AIDS in Namibia) in which 
donor driven sector definitions and accordant narratives are a serious impediment to 
government ownership and integrated service delivery. As illustrated in the chapter on 
HIV/AIDS in Namibia the donor’s insistence on asserting the definition of HIV/AIDS as a 
standalone sector and pandemic puts it at odds with a government approach that sees 
HIV/AIDS as only one amongst a host of national health concerns. In the case of HIV/AIDS, the 
case study shows that these competing sector definitions have created space for a narrative that 
questions the beneficiary government’s moral commitment to its citizens whilst also casting the 
donor as having a monopoly in how to work effectively in the sector. Similarly, when looking at 
the other non-aligned sectors there is evidence of a greater emphasis by the EU on this moral 
imperative and technological superiority. No sector emphasises this disconnect more than that 
                                                             





of governance and human rights as well as in gender in which the EU attempts to puts forward 
that it has a purely technical solution (e.g. public financial management, election monitoring, 
gender based budgeting) to the beneficiary country’s challenges whilst simultaneously calling 
into question the moral standing of the country’s leadership.  
 
The other two sectors that commonly stand out for the EU refusing to use beneficiary 
government sector definitions are in food security and WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene). 
The rationale for the food security sector, whether intentionally or not similarly recasts 
beneficiary government successes in reducing hunger as a failure to address nutritional needs 
of the poor. The not so subtle narrative (literally called Undernutrition in Bangladesh: A Common 
Narrative, UNICEF 2014) plainly casts beneficiary government’s as choosing agricultural rent 
seeking and wealth creation opportunities over the needs of poor families.  
 
The outlier here is the case of the WASH sector. When analysing the different country strategies, 
it is exceptionally rare to find a comparable narrative of moral superiority. In fact, the narrative 
put forward by the EU in the WASH sector tends to be more similar to that put forward in 
aligned sectors such as infrastructure and education whereby the government is cast as 
earnestly wanting to make progress but unable to do so because of financial and capacity 
constraints. Drawing from the South Sudan case study, this is plausibly explained by the fact 
that WASH is actually an outlier sector in development cooperation. WASH, in fact, is not 
commonly adopted as a sector in developing countries but rather draws its origins from 
emergency and/or humanitarian responses. In emergency responses, the UN through the Office 
for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA106) establishes ‘humanitarian clusters’ to 
coordinate a response in a context where the beneficiary government is unable or unwilling to 
do so. In a humanitarian context, the WASH sector is coordinated by the UN’s children fund 
(UNICEF) and the World Food Programme and is designed as such to integrate the hygiene and 
health practices promoted by UNICEF with the physical works (e.g. drilling boreholes and pit 
latrines) by the World Food Programme. 
 
A question that arises, however, is whether this finding is likely to be quickly dated. After all, it 
is possible that donors are simply in a transition phase and that in the future progressively 
greater use of beneficiary government sector definitions will become the norm. In this regard, 
this doctoral research proved well timed because 2015 is also the year that the international 
community replaced the Millennium Development Goals with the Sustainable Development Goals.  
                                                             





This thus provided a good opportunity to review whether the debate in the global architecture 
provides evidence that this trend is likely to be reversed in the medium term future. 
 
5.3 Emerging Development Effectiveness Trends and their Potential Implications on the 
Findings About Donor Alignment with Beneficiary Country Plans  
The international architecture and how it is structured in relation to developing countries and 
development cooperation involves a myriad of different national and international interests all 
shaped by a constantly changing global economic and political environment. This section looks 
at priorities currently trending in the OECD development effectiveness space to identify the 
extent to which these new priorities relate to the findings that donors do not, as promised, allow 
beneficiary countries to define the sectors and form of development cooperation.  
 
The traditional donor driven global consensus on how best to extract value from development 
cooperation is steadily becoming formalised and institutionalised. This formalisation is 
occurring in the OECD and donor literature on both aid and development effectiveness. 
Following the 2011 Busan conference on development effectiveness, a Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was established to work on establishing norms for 
Northern and Southern actors alike (i.e. including beneficiary countries as well as emerging 
donors). This global partnership is comparatively well resourced with full time staff, funding 
and access to research and analytic resources most often provided by and on DAC donors. 
Traditional donors appear to have concluded that it is more strategic to create opportunities to 
partner with emerging powers such as South Africa and China when mutual interests allow. The 
2011 Busan conference represented the formalisation of this conclusion with the stated 
imperative of broadening the aid and development effectiveness debate to reach out to 
emerging donors.  
 
This investment in creating a norm for what constitutes development effectiveness operates on 
two levels that inevitably strengthen the authority of traditional donors. The first is that 
improving the relevance and impact of development cooperation through developing new and 
sophisticated tools tends to work in the favour of those donors that have the human resource 
and organisational capacities to master them. On a second level DAC donors persist with the 
implication that the volume of funding provided is also a determinant of credibility as a donor 
thus reinforcing the notion that traditional donors are more important than non-traditional 





countries to allocate 0.7%107 of Gross National Income (GNI) to development cooperation (UN 
2002). Most DAC donors do not meet the 0.7% target and only giving 0.3%108 of GNI in 2013 
(OECD 2013). In relation to a non-traditional donor like South Africa, if it was to meet the 0.3% 
level, it would have to increase its current spending of R500 million a year more than twenty-
fold. Although not meeting the typical definition of aid, it is worth noting that South Africa 
currently subsidises Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland through its Southern African 
Customs Union to the tune of around R30 billion a year (Fabricius 2015). 
 
In 2011, at the fourth High Level Forum in Busan, the principles of aid effectiveness graduated to 
a broader concept of ‘development effectiveness’. This meant expanding the principle of 
ownership from country ownership to that of national ownership; meaning ownership by 
partner governments as well as non-state actors such as civil society and the private sector. 
More attention is now being paid to how aid only complements other sorts of development 
financing. The OECD’s 2014 Development Cooperation Report109 points out that what it defined 
as fair or Official Development Assistance (ODA) is only one part of the equation: “at nearly US$ 
135 billion in 2012, ODA represented only 28% of all official and private flows from the 29 
member countries of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Overall in 2012, 
developing countries received US$ 474 billion from DAC countries” when combining public 
sector lending at close to market rates, philanthropy, charity and foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Furthermore, ODA increasingly accompanies significant grants, loans and investments 
from developing countries and ‘emerging donors’ such as China, Brazil and India. Recognising 
this as an evolving and increasingly complex environment, a more inclusive and results 
orientated ‘Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation’ (GPEDC) was 
established.  
 
The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) is fast becoming an 
uncontested norm setting institution. In preparation for the 2014 High Level Meeting in Mexico 
City, GPEDC circulated the most recent and definitive report on achieving development 
effectiveness. The 2014 GPEDC focuses its critique on the failures of traditional donors in 
enabling partner-government ownership (including due to poor records of aligning to partner 
country sector definitions, plans and strategies) noting that “…longstanding efforts to change 
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the way development cooperation is delivered are paying off, but much more needs to be done 
to transform cooperation practices and ensure country ownership of all development efforts, as 
well as transparency and accountability among development partners.” (GPEDC 2014b)110 The 
EU (that comprises the majority of the OECD DAC members and funds more than 50% of global 
Official Development Assistance in 2013) also prepared a collaborative report (EU 2014c) citing 
similar failures and the need for “continued investments in the implementation of Busan 
Commitments and [to] address the remaining bottlenecks.” EU (2014c: 4).  
 
In this regard, the following emerging themes and priorities in the post 2015 environment are 
discussed to the extent they have implications in the medium term future on the findings of this 
research: 
 
Transparency and Results 
The April 2014 Mexico High Level Meeting Communique111 raises the stakes around 
demonstrating donor transparency and ensuring means of accountability. This is being 
translated into making donor information publically available, as well as creating space for 
development partners and partner governments to monitor one another and ensure the other is 
implementing their commitments. The 2014 aid transparency index112, however, reports that 
the EU may have bitten off more than it can chew: it is largely off track as a group. The EU is 
unlikely to meet its 2015 goals to “share openly aid information that is timely, comprehensive, 
comparable and accessible.” (IATI 2014) That being said this is largely because of increasing 
divergences between a growing group of EU “transparency champions” and those that have 
struggled to make no “discernible progress to date” (IATI 2014).  
 
On the one hand, transparency is being translated into donor spending on improving their 
image and reputations both in comparison to beneficiary country governments, whose 
budgeting processes can appear opaque and in comparison to emerging donors. In terms of 
alignment, though, the investments in transparency measures such as that managed by IATI 
(2014) are primarily focussed on data using donor’s own measures of transparency and using 
donor rather than beneficiary government sector definitions. There is little indication that this 
greater focus on transparency in the post-2015 environment will deliver better information on 










aid to beneficiary governments thus not making it any easier for beneficiary government 
officials to identify how donor funded projects align to the specific sector definitions and 
division of labour at country level. 
 
At the same time, donors are also increasingly asserting a narrative that donors know best on 
what constitutes effective and desired developmental results. Ban Ki Moon’s December 2014 
Road to Dignity accompanies the EU’s and GPEDC’s repeated calls to improve programming for 
results. Much of the thinking and analysis on the issue of results is captured in the November 
2014 OECD report Measuring and Managing Results in Development Co-operation. It places as the 
core of the problem “a lack of institutional demand for results information for decision making 
and learning” (OECD 2014a) in donor’s own organizations. The result is that there is increasing 
pressure and investment amongst donor organizations to change their organizational cultures 
to focus more on results in decision-making. This is also exported into development cooperation 
at partner country levels as a push for ‘evidence based policy making’. At the same time, the 
results agenda is intertwined with the political imperative to better report to donor’s domestic 
audiences on how aid is being spent. This has led to some donors arguing that development 
financing should be measured against universal indicators (using a ‘common results-based 
approach’) applied in all contexts. Again this implies only greater donor investment in the 
authority of their definitions of sectors, results and policy priorities over that of beneficiary 
governments.  
 
Joint Programming: Banding Together to Communicate Common Messages 
Joint Programming is set to become a more common practice globally. Joint programming is 
‘officially’ synchronised and aligned with the beneficiary country’s own development planning 
process with plans being presented as a commitment to increase the ability to influence 
beneficiary country policy making. It is now the norm for joint programming to be called for by 
the EU and most EU Member States and it is expressly incorporated in EU, and some MS, 
programming instructions. The Council of the European Commission Conclusions of November 
2011113 make joint programming a priority at the highest level. The 2014-2020 programming 
period is identified as the target for its widespread implementation. This means that the EU and 
like-minded donors will have developed a common front in beneficiary countries, pooling their 
resources in support of shared priorities to deliver preferential access to policy dialogue. Joint 
programming is also attracting the attention of ‘like-minded’ donors with Switzerland and/or 
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Norway frequently participating in the EU joint programming initiatives. Joint programming is 
now becoming a global practice: as of December 2014, the EU reported114 that nineteen 
countries have joint programming in place, twenty will finalise their joint programming 
processes by 2016 and sixteen more partner countries are in the analysis phase. This means 
that joint programming processes are either concluded or on-going in a total of fifty-five partner 
countries.  
 
The problem is that despite the stated commitments, in practice joint programming appears to 
create parallel donor controlled and donor defined programming sectors as found in this 
research. Concord (2015: 10), the European NGO advocacy group, also finds in its report on the 
state of EU development financing, that EU and EU joint programming institutionalise power 
imbalances by which “the EU’s aid [asserts] a reform agenda reflecting the EU’s strategic 
interests” rather than prioritising the beneficiary country’s objectives. Further, the June 2014115 
joint EU-African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) declaration on development in the post 2015 
context puts renewed emphasis on the need to differentiate development programming “around 
a single set of goals and targets.” (EU 2014d) What this means in practice is that there is little 
indication that EU donors are any more willing to relinquish their authority to beneficiary 
governments to define what aid should focus on and how it is to be managed. At the same time, 
the move to ‘differentiation’ is already translating into more sophisticated programming raising 
the bar for entry for emerging donors and making it more difficult for beneficiary governments 
to assert their authority and thus set agendas. For example, rural development which typically 
involved supporting agriculture extension services is transforming into building resilience - that 
means everything from complex risk mapping and modelling to supporting local community 
crisis management and security systems. Similarly, food security which, more often than not, 
meant providing food aid and drilling boreholes is evolving into nutrition that blends both the 
need to provide reliable sources of food with health management systems. These evolutions 
mean that to be relevant, donors will increasingly need to demonstrate competence in 
integrated approaches and have access to specialized skills and expertise from agricultural 
development through health, hygiene, local governance, peace and security. In other words, the 
international consensus on what constitutes effective development is being ‘gamed’ to the 
advantage of traditional donors that have the experience and skills base to deliver.  Similarly, 
Concord’s findings validate this research in Reporting that “EU aid is still seen by many as a tool 
                                                             







to drive policy change or liberalization in partner countries – much aid remains directly tied or 
comes with a ‘suggested’ policy agenda” (CONCORD 2015: Executive Summary). 
 
Climate Change 
Mitigating and adapting to climate change is fast becoming a defining feature of development 
cooperation. It signifies a dramatic shift from using development funding to deliver basic rights 
and services for the poor, towards using development funding for global priorities that are as 
needed by rich nations as by poor.  The OECD reports that since 2007 bilateral funding for 
climate change has grown fourfold with Japan providing US$7 billion, Germany US$4 billion, the 
EU US$2.8 billion and France US$2 billion in 2013 alone (OECD 2014d).  In 2013, the UK, 
Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark all disbursed over US$400 million each and the European 
Investment Bank provided another US$2 billion for climate change programming. In 2013 
climate change programming reached US$37 billion or about a quarter of all official 
development assistance. The majority goes to mitigation with 40% of this spending going to 
Asia and 30% on Africa, largely focused on South Africa, Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire.  
 
At a policy level, the increasing use of development cooperation for climate change mitigation is 
only expected to grow. The EU’s 2012 Agenda for Change and 2014 Joint ACP-EU declaration on 
A Decent Life for All, for example, integrate environment as a third pillar with social and 
economic programming as the primary components of development cooperation. In practice, 
this attention on mitigation, tends to mean using development cooperation to subsidise (often 
Western owned) private sector corporations moving over from carbon based energy to 
renewable energy sources. In terms of the findings of this research, the almost unquestioned 
consensus that is evidenced in donors defining what constitutes climate change and how its 
response is funded, implies further pressure on beneficiary countries to adopt donor sector 
definitions and policy approaches rather than vice versa. 
 
Fundamental Human and Democratic Rights and Civil Society 
The 2012 Agenda for Change, 2014 joint ACP and EU declaration on A Better Life for All, as well 
as Ban Ki Moon’s December 2014 Road to Dignity report, affirm the narrative on human rights 
and democratic principles as the cornerstone to sustainable development. Aside from the 
possibly genuine or “noble” (Concord 2015: 10) commitment to human rights and democracy, 
this is also a means to differentiate and broaden support for developed donors over countries 





democratic practices. The April 2014 Mexico High Level Meeting Communique116 went further 
to call for development cooperation to strengthen “the critical role of parliaments [in] 
overseeing development cooperation processes and action plans.” (GPEDC 2014) And the April 
2014 GPEDC report on Progress Since Busan117 called attention to the focus on democratic 
ownership as a central pillar of sustainable development. Development effectiveness as a whole 
has firmly enshrined these principles in what it asserts is good cooperation, the 2011 Busan 
Partnership Agreement calls for greater space for participation of civil society in national 
development processes. This now lays the foundation for donors to significantly diversify 
development cooperation away from an almost exclusive focus on influencing government to 
now being able to use development cooperation to secure influence with national parliaments 
and civil society organisations as well. At the same time, it also implies that invoking a moral 
imperative will remain foundational to the narrative justifying donor interventions globally. 
 
Trends Summary 
Traditional donors are investing considerable financial resources in manufacturing a narrative 
for why they should be seen as credible developmental partners rather than as self-interested 
actors. These donors are also shoring up their credibility and authority by placing their decision 
making processes under public scrutiny through such international mechanisms like the Global 
Partnership on Effective Development Cooperation and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. Put together with the shared global objective of combatting 
poverty, traditional donors have effectively created a justification for why they should be 
allowed to participate in and influence beneficiary country policy making processes. However, 
these initiatives are not focused on encouraging beneficiary countries greater ownership over 
defining what development cooperation will finance or now it will be described. The above-
detailed trends lead to the perception that in the medium term future traditional donors are 
investing more in creating new sector definitions, programming and policy dialogue fronts more 
so than their stated objective of aligning to and supporting beneficiary country developmental 
priorities. As such it seems likely that country programmable aid will continue to be focused on 
changing beneficiary government policy rather than supporting implementation of it. 
 
At the same time, through the OECD peer review mechanisms and in investing in developing 
their own human, technical and organisational resources, these traditional donors are also 









developing their comparative advantage over other donors. This comparative advantage is 
already advanced and allows traditional donors an almost unassailable advantage in such now 
commonplace themes in development cooperation such as public financial management, 
epidemiology, statistics, monitoring and evaluation. Trending priorities now show that 
traditional donors are likely to increase their investments in maintaining and expanding their 
competitive advantage through deepening and sharpening their technical skills in the areas 
listed above amongst others. This comparative advantage is vital to an advantaged position 
because, whilst the narrative in section two justifies why donors should get involved in 
beneficiary countries, the technical skills they can deploy justify why this involvement should be 
in terms of deploying their own government officials to the ground and to participate in policy 
making rather than just transferring financial resources. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Whilst the EU is committed to supporting beneficiary governments at a policy level, 
operationally the EU does not buy into or support beneficiary governments in more than half of 
its sectors of engagement. In the case of governance and human rights related programming 
(including gender) the EU appears to retains the authority to define the sector and 
demonstrates little willingness to focus on advocating for the beneficiary government to change 
its policy approach to that of the EU’s. This is apparent when comparing to HIV/AIDS or 
nutrition programming in which the EU bands together with other donors to develop common 
policies or strategies and openly incorporate advocacy efforts to convince beneficiary 
government to adjust their policy approaches to that of the EU’s. A good example of this is the 
EU’s support for nutrition in Bangladesh, through which the EU and other donors have 
developed a shared advocacy document (UNICEF 2012) and embedded technical assistance into 
the Bangladesh Ministry of Agriculture in an apparent attempt to integrate health with food 
security related responses to addressing nutrition. The table below illustrates the spectrum: 
 
Fully Aligned Sectors Calling for New Sector 
Definitions 
Donor Retains Authority to Define 
Sector 
E.g. health or 
infrastructure in which 
the EU buys into the 




E.g. Nutrition, HIV/AIDS or 
WASH where the EU works 
with government but invests 
in advocating the beneficiary 
government to adjust its 
policy to include donor 
concerns.  
E.g. human rights, gender, private 
sector development in which the 
EU demonstrates little investment 
in advocating for government 
policy change but rather finances a 
parallel narrative that essentially 
critiques government. 
 
Whilst in fully aligned sectors, the actual programming or activities financed are more clearly in 





joint strategies still invoke a moral and technological imperative. This invoking of a moral and 
technological imperative is regardless the country analysed or the capacity or will of the 
beneficiary government. In fact, there are signs that this invoking of a moral and technological 
imperative is a feature of EU Member State development strategies as well as that of the EU 
itself. The Netherlands, for example, describes its approach to development cooperation in 
Bangladesh as being about “strengthen[ing] the leadership of the Government of Bangladesh 
(GoB)…. despite progress, the GoB still has a long way to go to assume the lead.” (Netherlands: 
Section 2.7). On government capacity the Netherlands strategy goes further to say “Bangladeshi 
government institutions in general are characterized by lack of capacity and poor public service 
delivery.” (Netherlands: Section 2.6).  
 
Two other interesting considerations emerge from the case studies. Across all country cases 
(including the previous chapter on South Sudan), the EU and Member States consistently, hedge 
their cooperation with the assertion that aid and development cooperation is soon to be 
withdrawn. “As Bangladesh moves towards becoming a middle income country and as such the 
aid relationship with the Netherlands will be eventually phased out.” (Netherlands: Section 2.1) 
The problem is that this narrative of a cut in aid simply does not follow reason. After all, whilst 
there have always been machinations about spending on aid there is no indication that OECD 
donors will cut aid. One need looks no further, for example, than the United Nations July 2015 
Addis Ababa Agenda for Action (art. 51) in which the global community welcomes “the decision 
by the European Union which reaffirms its collective commitment to achieve the 0.7 per cent of 
ODA/GNI target within the time frame of the post-2015 agenda”. In fact, this commitment to 
meeting the 0.7 percent target is affirmed every year in the EU’s EU Accountability Report on 
Financing for Development (see EU 2014). Furthermore, it stands to reason that with the EU and 
EU Member States currently only spending 0.4% of Gross National Income (GNI) on aid (EU 
2014) that the overall size of aid will almost double to meet the stated 0.7% target. Combined 
with the fact that more and more countries (e.g. most of South America and particularly Brazil, 
China, South Korea and South Africa) are reaching middle income status and becoming donors 
in their own right lays question to what purpose this misrepresentation on the impending 
demise on aid serves. 
 
At the same time, recent agreements and policy statements made in international fora 
demonstrate the likelihood that donors will not in the medium term future improve their use of 
or extend greater ownership and authority to beneficiary countries in setting sector definitions. 





in advancing an increasing number of sector definitions and fields of intervention all of which 
prioritise what is presented as an international consensus on know-how and focus rather over 
that of beneficiary countries’. In every country case analysed, donors complained in their 
strategies of growing fragmentation and proliferation of stand-alone projects that tend to 
duplicate each other and make coordination more challenging. This identified problem of 
fragmentation, however, dates back to the 2005 Paris Declaration (OECD 2005) and even earlier 
for the EU (1976) such as with 1976 Council of the European Union Resolution on Coordination. 
The question that needs to be further unpacked, then is what the EU achieves in both continuing 









6. Discussions, Conclusions and Implications for the Literature 
 
The final chapter of this dissertation first summarises the focus of the research, methodology 
used and contributions to the field/literature. The second section of the chapter is a substantive 
discussion on the findings, comparing them to the literature, exploring how they are interpreted 
by practitioners in the field and what assumptions need to be considered in the conclusion. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with discussions on the implications for literature and the field. 
 
6.1 Focus, Methodology Used and Original Contributions to the Field/Literature 
The focus of this research was to compare and contrast international donors’ stated interest in 
supporting beneficiary country development plans with what happens in practice. The 
methodology used was to focus on a series of case studies in which donors have a stated policy 
intention to support the beneficiary country’s development plan. The core of the research then 
was comparing and contrasting what these donors planned to do with their aid at the country 
level with that of the beneficiary country’s development plan. The comparison focused on 
identifying where there are divergences and which of these recur in different country contexts 
and with different donors. The research looked at three different donors. South Africa as an 
emerging donor attracted a large amount of attention because it strives at the stated policy level 
to not repeat practices it associates as failures of other donors. The second donor case study 
was on the United States of America and its HIV/AIDS programming in Namibia. Finally, the 
European Union (European Commission) was selected as a multilateral donor with a focus on 
its programming in South Sudan. Finally, findings were compared and contrasted with the 
European Union’s programming in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Palestine and Mozambique in an 
attempt to weed out geographical bias. This comparison was then combined with an analysis of 
emerging trends in the post-2015 environment and their implications on the findings. 
 
Research and analysis of this nature will always only reflect a subset of what is now a global 
industry involving dozens of donors and even more beneficiary countries. However, by 
analysing an emerging African donor (South Africa), the largest bilateral donor in the world (the 
US) and an influential multi-lateral (the EU) it is hoped that generalizable findings can be 
justified (even if they may not be empirically indisputable or inevitable). Similarly, the findings 
draw on programming from a wide spectrum of beneficiary countries to avoid the possibility 
the findings speak more to features in the country context than that of donors: the research 





Southern Africa (Mozambique), the Horn (Ethiopia), South Asia (Bangladesh) and the Middle-
East (Palestine). 
 
This research is important to the academy because it speaks to the literature on what are 
perceived to be donor failures and/or unintended consequences of aid. Analysis of donor 
strategies for development cooperation in beneficiary countries puts forward the hypothesis 
that what are widely seen as failures or unintended consequences are in fact unacknowledged 
and possibly necessary features of an aid relationship. I say necessary because this occurs in all 
the case studies without any apparent differentiation to donor of beneficiary government. What 
this means for the literature is significant because it implies that the very act of programming 
aid in a beneficiary country is necessarily accompanied by what could be seen as unwanted 
side-effects. This finding is important because it speaks to aid as a tool or mechanism rather 
than commenting on a specific aid policy or to a particular aid approach. The finding thus 
implies that aid as ‘a tool’ produces these side-effects regardless the political priorities of the 
donor or the political economy of the beneficiary country. In other words, what is often 
categorised as an unintended consequence of failure is actually a predictable feature of aid itself 
and thus provides an insight into some of the implicit rules that govern what donors decide in 
allocating aid.  
 
6.2 Findings, Discussions and Implications for the Literature 
6.2.1 Limitations of the Research 
Across the case studies this research is based on, there are a number of observations that are 
not readily answered by the literature. Whilst these observations might not necessarily feature 
with donors or countries not analysed, they should be compelling for the academy to consider 
because they feature prominently in all three donor behaviours regardless the country in which 
development cooperation is taking place. It is worth noting that the case studies covered 
examples that include the world’s two biggest grant donors, the US and European Union118 
(OECD 2014:46). However, because the European Union case studies involve joint programming 
with up to twenty-eight other EU Member States, there are also implications for the wider donor 
community. At the same time the study on South Africa as a donor makes the findings more 
compelling explicitly because of South Africa’s stated intention to adopt a different approach 
                                                             
118 Country Programmable Aid as per the OECD ranks the US as the world’ biggest donor at $26 billion 
disbursed in 2012 and the EU second with $18 billion. Third is Japan at just under $15billion but when 
the EU Member States are added to the EU (European Commission) disbursements, as is the case in the 
joint programming case studies, the EU becomes the world’s biggest donor. South Africa by comparison is 





from that of traditional donors and the fact that South Africa is in no ways seen as a ‘traditional 
donor’ (SA DIRCO 2012). What this implies is that, insofar, as the South Africa case illustrates 
comparable findings, the findings might speak more broadly to the structural implications 
and/or side-effects of international development cooperation as well as to the specific donors 
analysed.  
 
The big risk or critical assumption to be guarded against in drawing conclusions from a multi-
case study analysis is to conclude that the findings are definitively universal. Whilst the findings 
are compelling, the scope of the research is limited. That being said because of the breadth of 
the case studies (covering three (and more) different donor approaches in seven different 
countries with vastly different cultures and social economic circumstances), the findings do 
provide compelling evidence that they apply to other donors and in other country contexts too.  
 
To further test the integrity of the findings, the analysis was also verified through confidential 
interviews with ‘senior’ development policy practitioners in an effort to check the likelihood 
that the finding was context specific as well as in an attempt to get further insight into what 
might account for the findings. In this regard, more than twenty ‘senior’ development policy 
practitioners were interviewed (see respondents’ profiles in annex). The first criteria for 
selecting these ‘senior’ experts were to ensure that they had significant exposure to the policy 
and programming decisions that inform development cooperation and strategy making at the 
beneficiary country level. Here it was important to guard against feedback from experienced 
development practitioners that are not intimately involved in either designing policy or 
conducting quality control on how donors allocate funding at the beneficiary country level119. 
Half of these respondents are officials working at the policy level in donor organisations; three 
are from think-tanks or specialised policy research organisations and the remainder were either 
officials or embedded technical assistants in partner country ministries of finance/donor 
coordination units. The interviews from these respondents were not treated as separate 
research findings but are referenced where valuable. 
 
In line with the original aim of the study120, this section focuses on findings that appear 
unintended consequences of development cooperation in the sense that they are either not 
                                                             
119 There are many senior development practitioners that only work at the project or sector level. Having 
extensive experience designing HIV/AIDS projects, for example, does not necessarily mean exposure to 
and understanding of how donors formulate their strategies for programming in a beneficiary country at 
the national level. 





explained by the stated policy intention of the donor nor by the country specific circumstances 
in which the donor is working. That being said, it is quite possible that the findings document 
intentional donor behaviours even though they are unstated and not based in official policy. In 
either case, however, the conclusions remain faithful to the original objective of the research to 
focus on adding to the literature by documenting what comes out of donor allocations of aid at 
the country level that are not explained or adequately explained by the literature nor by official 
donor policies. Here it is also important to emphasise that the research is on donor allocations of 
aid at the county level as part of the programming/fund allocation process. The research did not 
grapple with what could arise from specific project level implementation or operational 
challenges. It is important then to read this chapter as being only about what comes out of 
donor practices at the policy and strategy level rather than at the operational level. Essentially 
this means these findings are ‘pre-contextual’ in the sense that they arise before project 
implementation begins or funding is allocated. 
 
6.2.2 Findings, Discussions and Implications for the Literature 
Each finding is documented below in separate section. The finding is presented with reference 
to how it emerged from the case studies. The finding is then discussed with reference to the 
fourteen interviews conducted with ‘senior’ development practitioners in order to present to 
what extent the finding is corroborated with the experience of other officials. Because the 
purpose of this study is to contribute to the literature, the finding is then also discussed to the 
extent it contributes to the literature. On the one hand the finding is compared to the literature 
in the hope of corroborating the finding but on the other hand the finding is interrogated with 
the intention of identifying new and original findings that contribute to expanding the literature.  
 
The first finding (discussed below) is that contrary to their stated policies, when donors make 
strategies for how they programme aid in partner countries, contextualising their aid to the 
partner country political economy is often an afterthought or not a significant consideration at 
all. The second finding is that the way donors select and use sector definitions goes contrary to 
donors’ stated policies to align with the partner country’s development plan and, as such, 
appears to be primarily informed by donor political interests. The third finding is that donor aid 
appears to be accompanied by an assertion of technological superiority of the donor regardless 
of whether there is any new or better technology delivered by the donor. The fourth and final 
finding is that the assertion of a donor technological superiority also appears to be predictably 
accompanied by an assertion that the beneficiary country government officials are morally 






6.2.2.1 Development Cooperation in the Recipient Country’s Political Economy/Political 
Context 
All three donors state at the policy level their intention to adjust their programming to fit the 
local political economy of the recipient country. South Africa, as a donor, is amongst the most 
vocal about this in its attempt to distinguish its practices from what it sees as traditional donors 
simply delivering ‘one size fits all’ interventions that are not contextually relevant or valuable to 
the beneficiary. The research also shows that both the EU and USAID121 have substantive high 
level policy commitments to ensuring that programming fits the recipient’s political economy, 
social and economic context. Additionally, the EU and USAID have elaborated guidelines 
instructing their officials how to contextualise programming (the EU calls this variable political 
economy, conflict or context analysis; USAID has codified this in its Local Systems Approach).  
 
These high level commitments, however, only serve as a contrast to what donors do in practice. 
All three donor case studies show that a large proportion (if not the majority) of programming 
continues as is, despite the local context. USAID’s insistence that HIV/AIDS is a pandemic of 
emergency proportions clearly did not speak to Namibia’s leaders’ approach of treating 
HIV/AIDS as one of amongst a number of chronic health challenges that need to be addressed as 
part of a holistic and integrated systemic health response. The EU in South Sudan continued 
programming despite its own risk matrix illustrating that the political risks had reached a level 
threatening the viability of implementation. In fact, during the course of this study, the EU’s 
commitment to adjust its programming to the local context in South Sudan was proven to be an 
empty commitment as most development cooperation ceased rather than transformed when 
South Sudan slipped back into civil war in 2014. The EU’s inability or unwillingness to adjust to 
the political economy in South Sudan resulted in delayed disbursements that instead of being 
directed at contextually relevant programming in fact created an added incentive to make a 
decision that was clearly unviable and even damaging in the context. The result was that the EU 
reallocated its funds from project earmarked expenditure to general budget support the same 
month Human Rights Watch took to the international press its evidence that the South Sudan 
Government was complicit in targeted, ethnic based murder of innocent civilians. As 
importantly, South Africa’s commitments to distinguish itself as a ‘South-South development 
partner’ more in tune with the recipients context made no discernible difference on how South 
Africa’s country programming decisions were made. The research uncovered sufficient data to 
                                                             
121 USAID’s Local Systems Approach, EU’s Agenda for Change and Project Cycle Management guidelines, 





conclude that instead of South Africa pioneering new, contextually relevant approaches, it in 
fact replicated the same top down ‘imported foreign concepts’ as other donors do (albeit with 
the exception of one project that was cited as being mildly innovative in using regional 
networks to build capacity rather than sourcing Western experts). South Africa’s disconnect 
between policy and practice was clearly illustrated by the Institute of Security Studies’ (Lucey & 
Gida 2014) finding that South Africa co-financed a health care facility in Burundi that the 
government never planned for or took ownership of. The health care facility was justified and 
financed by South Africa without the buy in of the Government of Burundi resulting in it not 
being staff or resourced in any way, thus rendering the facility an empty building and for the 
purpose of this study an almost perfect example of a donor conceived initiative disconnected 
from the local context. 
 
It is difficult to make sense of this finding because it seems to confound common sense in that 
even donors should want to see their projects succeed and deliver value and that the only way 
to do this would be to contextualise them. One possible explanation could be that even though 
donors know they need to contextualise their aid to the beneficiary’s political economy, this 
knowledge is held in headquarters and has not distilled down to officials at the country level. 
Unfortunately, there was no evidence that this explanation could account for this finding except 
for the case of South Africa that have no aid officials posted at country level. In the cases of the 
US, the EU and the EU Member States, interviews with officials at country level found that the 
lack of contextualisation was one of the most commonly cited frustrations. Whilst two 
respondents questioned if the problem was wide-spread, all of the other respondents 
complained about the need for better contextualisation, with one official bemoaning that “it 
should be important for development cooperation to work with the right people on the right 
issue” but then going on to explain that his ability to contextualise aid was hampered by the fact 
that “it is for other people to do like the diplomats.” (Donor Official 1, 2015)  
 
The easiest solution would be to dismiss this finding as illustrating a system failure which would 
essentially mean that it is nothing more than a problem of officials not following instructions. 
However, this argument is not compelling because this problem recurs both in the findings and 
in the literature which broadens the relevance of the finding to many other contexts and 
different donor organisations. For example, the finding corroborates James Ferguson’s The Anti-
Politics Machine (2006) in which Ferguson talks about a “bovine mystique” to illustrate how the 
World Bank’s approach to improving farmers’ management of their cattle stocks ran contrary to 





was also corroborated by Li’s work on the Asian Development Bank in Indonesia (Li 2007: 282) 
where she finds in regard to political economy analysis “they had a diagnosis, but no 
corresponding prescription”.  
 
The nuanced difference, however is that Ferguson’s work implies that the lack of interest in 
contextualising aid is about a bigger project of enabling the beneficiary state to expand its 
administrative reach into previously inaccessible spaces regardless the country or context. 
Unfortunately, however, this study was not able to corroborate this hypothesis nor to advance 
an alternative real politick explanation. Whilst many donor activities clearly provide the 
potential for the state to exert further administrative control by way of expanding their reach on 
the back of aid projects, there was also sufficient evidence that this result was not guaranteed 
nor necessarily taken advantage of when it did occur. In fact, sometimes the contrary occurred 
such as when the Government of South Sudan refused to take control of donor financed 
education and health facilities or in Namibia where the government preferred to ignore rural 
populations rather than make use of donor mechanisms to better administer these populations. 
Instead what does appear to be guaranteed and might even be a necessary component of donor 
behaviour, is that aid manufactures a technical narrative that is presented as apolitical (even if it 
is inherently always political). Here it is important to recognise, to the extent that anything 
donors finance appears as apolitical or just a technical feature of public policy, it is in fact 
always political whether recognised by the donor or not. When donors, however, transform aid 
into a technical narrative and cast it as apolitical, they are not making aid itself apolitical. 
Rather, they are working towards a means to operate in the beneficiary country that affords 
them the privileged position of being outside of the beneficiary’s political dynamics whilst 
retaining the right to constantly critique and criticise political decision making. To illustrate, 
when donors say they are not political but, for example, only interested in the well-being and 
education of ‘the children’ they are intentionally or unintentionally criticising or endorsing the  
particular beneficiary government’s policy (in regards to the well-being and education of 
children).  
 
Needless to say, Ferguson’s (2006) notion of aid being an ‘anti-politics machine’ is very much 
corroborated by this research in the sense that built into the donor approach is the assertion 
that donors have a right to promote and push forward ‘development’ regardless of whether it is 
called for in the local politics or not. As was the case with the Namibian government largely 
sidestepping the possibility to use HIV/AIDS as a means to further project itself into new 





regardless of whether or not the beneficiary country takes ownership of these avenues. In this 
regard, this finding implies that at some level, donors’ branding aid as apolitical only masks the 
anti-politics role it plays in which it overrides, side-lines and dismisses local political processes 
regardless of whether it agrees with their priorities or not. As is demonstrated in the findings 
below, in all the case studies aid is also associated with a projection and accordant narrative of 
the donor as being superior and an authority to be learned from. In this regard, aid renders the 
developed world as reference points and benchmarks that is very effective at setting agendas 
for local political debates on what constitutes good public stewardship and more importantly 
what constitutes poor governance. At the same time, there is clearly a political or anti-political 
factor (related to the findings below) by way of which, when aid constitutes the beneficiary as 
corrupt or technologically inferior, aid itself corrodes the authority of beneficiary government 
appointed and elected officials.  
 
6.2.2.2 Sector Definitions Are Politically Motivated; Donors’ Country Strategies and their 
Relationship to PRSPs/Partner Country Development Plans  
The case studies on the US in Namibia and EU in South Sudan laid the foundation for a 
comparator chapter on Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Palestine with a specific focus on donors’ use 
of sector definitions and support to the beneficiary country’s national development plan. At first 
glance this issue may seem somewhat pedestrian but after delving into the four decades of 
international aid effectiveness commitments, it presents itself of paramount importance. The 
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was signed by beneficiary countries and donors alike 
and is even tacitly acknowledged by South Africa in its international policies. The first two 
principles here are of ‘ownership’ of and ‘alignment’ with the beneficiary country’s sector 
definitions and national development plan. This is explained as being important because when 
donors use their own sector definitions and do not frame their support within the beneficiary’s 
national development plan it becomes difficult to monitor or coordinate and only serves to 
fragment aid from government activities. Thus the Paris Declaration (OECD 2005: art. 16) is a 
commitment by donors to align with “partners’ national development strategies” that “includes 
poverty reduction and similar overarching strategies as well as sector and thematic strategies.”  
 
For the EU donors, the commitment to using beneficiary sector definitions and national 
development plans is even more important because it is intimately connected to the fear that 
the EU and EU Member States appear fragmented and thus erode their own influence and 
reputations in beneficiary countries. Furthermore, the problem appears to be as prevalent today 





fragmentation and proliferation of stand-alone projects that tend to duplicate each other and 
make coordination more challenging. But for the EU this problem of fragmentation, dates all the 
way back to the 1976 Council of the European Union Resolution on Coordination (EU 1976) and is 
not only justified by being important for the beneficiary but actually also seen as being about 
improving the EU’s brand abroad. The finding, needing to be further unpacked, then, is what is 
achieved through aid when donors assert their own sector definitions and bypass the 
beneficiary’s national development plan.  
 
In this regard, the results show that it is important to qualify that donors do not always assert 
their own sector definitions over that of the beneficiary’s. In as many as half of the case-studies 
the donors adopted the beneficiary country’s sector definitions and directly supported the 
national development plan. The table below (from the analysis in Chapter 5) summarises:  
 
Fully Aligned Sectors Calling for New Sector 
Definitions 
 
Donor Retains Authority to Define 
Sector 
E.g. health or infrastructure 
in which the EU buys into 
the government policy and 
wholeheartedly supports 
implementation. 
E.g. Nutrition, HIV/AIDS or WASH 
where the EU works with 
government but invests in 
advocating the beneficiary 
government to adjust its policy to 
include donor concerns.  
E.g. human rights, gender, private sector 
development in which the EU 
demonstrates little investment in 
advocating for government policy 
change but rather finances a parallel 
narrative that essentially critiques 
government. 
 
At first glance it might be easy to conclude that when donors agree with the beneficiary 
country’s development plan and adopting the beneficiary’s sector definitions this is because 
they endorse what the country is doing. Concurrently, the conclusion could be, however, that 
when donors do not subscribe to the beneficiary countries policies and sector definitions, they 
do so because they do not agree. Whilst appealing and disarmingly conclusive, this conclusion is 
entirely incorrect because there is no correlation between donors adopting the government’s 
sector definition and their greater support for the government’s approach. In Ethiopia, for 
example, the EU and EU Member States fully align to the transport sector but they are no less 
critical about the government’s competence or the credibility of government’s policy. Even in 
the road sector, donors applied the moral imperative in dismissing government policy as 
servicing the needs of elites and being meaningless because of the incompetence of government 
officials. 
 
What is more striking, is that in every country case study, the beneficiary country’s national 





that the beneficiary country’s development plan is nothing more than a “shopping list” (EU 
officials in multiple countries) with no credibility. More problematically, in all of the country 
cases donors themselves contributed to or even drafted the beneficiary country’s development 
plan. In Namibia, the development plan was collated and drafted by consultants financed by 
Germany; in Bangladesh and Mozambique, UNDP used pooled donor resources to finance the 
drafting of the plan and in Palestine the plans were extensively consulted and drafted by donor 
financed experts. The only outlier was Ethiopia in which case the development plan, Plan for 
Accelerated and Sustained Development and Eradication of Poverty (PASDEP), was largely drafted 
by government but with some donor support and still extensive consultation. The case of South 
Sudan, however, is the most damning with the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) being 
drafted by the Joint Donor Office. Nothing illustrates the contradiction in the finding of this 
section more than the Ministry of Finance Official in South Sudan who questioned, “why do they 
criticise it [the SSDP] if they wrote it?” Beneficiary Government Official 1 (2012) 
 
What is more interesting though, is that it is not a unified donor group putting forward 
alternative sector definitions or developmental approaches. In other words, it is not as though 
the donor community thinks the government sector definitions are wrong and are thus offering 
an alternative. The programming of aid in pursuit of objectives alternative to those of the 
beneficiary government’s thus does not appear to be about the credibility of the government 
policy to address the challenge at hand. Instead, this practice appears to be entirely about the 
priorities of the specific donor in question. Much like Malkki’s (1996) findings122 about how the 
international community reconstitutes the status and standing of people through branding them 
as refugees or stateless, it appears donors use sector definitions to reconstitute the status and 
standing of the government’s own plans and activities as needing support. This is testified to by 
the fact that there is discord on this regard even amongst similar thinking ‘like-minded’ donors 
that may have even signed up to common global objectives. The comparator case study showed 
that whilst the EU is committed to supporting beneficiary governments at a policy level, 
operationally the EU does not buy into or support beneficiary governments in more than half of 
its sectors of engagement. This finding was also recently corroborated in a study (Herrero, 
Knoll, Gregersen & Kokolo 2015) on the EU’s programming in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific 
                                                             
122 Malkki’s (1996:378) observed in Burundi that sympathy for refugees seemed to depend on them being 
helpless; once refugees started to exhibit agency, international actors were quicker to ignore them or cut 
support for them. As the third and fourth finding show the narrative surrounding and justifying aid also 
appears to depend on beneficiary governments remaining needy and lacking to give the development 
cooperation dialogue meaning. When questioning a interviewing a senior donor official (24/8/15 BE1) he 
explained, in reference to ‘middle income countries’: “middle income means it is a domestic issue and not 






in which the research found evidence that in the case of the EU, the proffering of these sector 
definitions is purposeful more so than accidental: “In many countries, initial 
programming proposals based on in‐country consultations, were superseded by HQ choices. 
Although…aligned with national development plans, there is evidence that a top-down approach 
to programming has led to a significant erosion of…. country ownership.” But even when it 
comes to raising new policy priorities such as in improving nutrition or community resilience 
the EU is fragmented even amongst its own family with some supporting the new policy 
objective and others refusing whilst directing their attention to what are largely exactly the 
same activities but branded as being in support of agriculture, rural development of local 
governance, for example. 
 
6.2.2.3 Technological Superiority  
For the purpose of this study, South Africa’s poorly conceived explanation (Besharati 2013) of 
its comparative advantages (that included peace building, tax reform, public financial 
management and proximity to the beneficiary) as a donor laid bare the notion that a sense of 
technological superiority stands prior to an analysis of the partner country and its own national 
capacities. Were it a single example it might be dismissed as the folly of a particular donor but 
the case studies show that the assertion of this technological superiority features in every 
country case and with every donor. Even so, a reasonable and cursory explanation would be 
that donors only choose to engage where they have a more advanced way of doing things than 
the beneficiary. Alternatively, a reasonable explanation would be that by their very nature, 
richer donor countries have capacities that poorer donor countries are lacking. This argument 
would hold water if, for example, the superiority to which donors referred to was tangible and 
identifiable such as, for example, if US was putting forward the best of its epidemiological 
modelling as a technology to be deployed to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The problem, however, is 
that in most cases (with some notable exceptions) the superior technology proffered by the 
donor turns out to be not at all sophisticated and hard to believe out of the reach of the 
beneficiary government. This finding goes a long way to corroborating Escobar’s (1991:667) 
conclusions that aid serves a functional role as “identifying [beneficiaries] as a "problem"” 
through which donor financed development is the “legitimate solution” and Mosse’s (2005a: 
124) observations about how aid actually uses ‘consultant knowledge’ to “cross boundaries of 
rank and status” rather than to bring identifiable and credible analytic resources and techniques 






With the US in Namibia, for example, the superior technology the donor is putting forward is the 
ability to extract HIV/AIDS data from the government’s own database and present it back to 
government officials in an easy to read format. To be clear this could be a valuable tool to inform 
the HIV/AIDS response but it is by no means a technology superior to that available to and 
already within the Namibia government. Much like Mosse (2005a) observed, aid does, however, 
enable USAID and its contractors to take largely unremarkable information already available to 
junior management in government and use it to cross hierarchical lines thus getting preferential 
attention of both government and donor decision makers.  Similarly, with the EU programming, 
the donor repeatedly invokes such things as evidence based research or monitoring and 
evaluation as if they are new and sophisticated technologies that will change the face of poverty 
globally. 
 
The case studies provide sufficient evidence to show that aid appears to be intimately 
intertwined with the assertion and proposed deployment of superior technologies to solve 
developmental challenges. The problem is that in most cases the assertion of the superiority of 
the donor technology precedes the identification of the specific problem at hand (similar to the 
first finding of this chapter that the context analysis is not connected to donor strategy making). 
When investigated more closely, the technology itself, in most cases, appears to be nothing more 
than an alternative administrative method or in the worst cases a donor manufactured 
description of a commonly used practice. ‘Evidence based policy making’, for example, recurs in 
the EU case studies as a newly advanced approach to public sector management. However, 
when unpacked ‘evidence based policy making’ appears to be nothing more than a commitment 
to use evidence (e.g. national statistics) in policy making. While an important principle, this 
hardly represents a new donor technology and is certainly no silver bullet to fixing national or 
sector policy.  
 
The use of the term technology rather than ‘technique’ or ‘approach’ is intentionally used to 
describe these findings because the case studies appear to show that aid is associated with the 
fetishizing of new approaches much as is the case with new technologies. Corroborating the 
analysis done by Latour (1996) on the expansion of the Paris metro, the hope and desires 
embodied in the use of new technologies appears to have primacy over whether the particular 
technology has any value to the problem at hand or is indeed a new technology or not. Here, one 
agenda of donors appears to be about the desire to deploy a new approach or technique 





“sufficiently magnificent and spiritual to convince them that the [technologies123] by which they 
are surrounded are cultural objects worthy of their attention and respect.” The extent to which 
it becomes a fetish is that some interviewees referred to donors shuttering well-functioning 
projects to replace them with projects deploying ‘new’ or ‘innovative’ approaches with little 
evidence that they would work or did work. Similarly, Li (2007: 75) observes how aid workers 
almost religiously put forward the notion “that any piece of land could be made productive with 
sufficient investment of labor and technology” despite the common sense acknowledgement to 
the contrary. 
 
When this finding was shared with respondents for their interpretation, there was a consistent 
recognition that aid is associated to a constant cycle of invoking new technologies and 
approaches that when investigated appear to be nothing more than a repackaged standard 
practice. All respondents expressed frustration with this tendency. One for example, complained 
that “Working with donors is just about new systems and frameworks that don’t do much 
different” (Southern/US Think Tank 2014). Another complained, “we are outsiders pretending 
we are experts; let us be honest that is how we get involved even though what would be better 
is to just support [the government’s] experts.” (Donor Official 6 2014) And that “without 
dialogue [meaning on new policy or approaches], aid is likely to descend into a confrontational 
relationship.” (Donor Official 7 2014).  
 
This finding is not entirely new but at least it is corroborated in the literature. Referring to a 
new approach put forward by the international NGO CARE, Li (2007: 138) reports that the so-
called experts were quick to say that rather than proffering exceptional technological progress 
as promised, “at best, they saw their work as a ‘door-opener’ for conservation activities and 
other project components [only] belatedly attending to the situation of the landless”. Li’s 
findings were further more poignant for this study in that she also found that many so called 
‘beneficiaries’ questioned the value of donor aid: whilst noting the continued presence of aid 
workers, Li’s respondents also cited no evidence of where the funding is going whilst always 
being accompanied by a new technology being put forward. Li’s respondents asked 
(rhetorically) “If outsiders are not to supply money or technology, why are they there?” (Li 
2007: 281). Whilst donor respondents from this study were adamant at least about the transfer 
of monies, they were equally as unconvincing about the value of their professed approach. 
Similar to Li’s findings, when pressed, donors were quick to point to the real value being 
embedded in the beneficiary’s own knowledge networks. One donor official when questioned 
                                                             





about the apparent lack of sophistication of public financial management systems (Donor 
Official 8) retorted that “in any case, the good practice is to find local good practices and 
replicate them rather than import foreign approaches.” 
 
6.2.2.4 Moral Imperative 
 
In all the case studies, donor 
strategies and approaches directly 
invoked a moral imperative as an 
apparent justification for the aid 
approach. This moral imperative 
appears to be partly used to justify 
giving aid in the first place but this 
aspect of the moral imperative is not 
of interest for this study because it 
does not relate to how donors behave 
in beneficiary countries. The moral 
imperative, however, comes into 
explicit focus in the case studies in 
that it directly casts many beneficiary 
decision makers as corrupt or 
morally disinterested in the welfare 
of their own people.  
  
What is of most interest, however, is that this moral imperative stands outside of any of the 
beneficiary country specificities. Whether the donors are justifying aid in Palestine, Namibia, 
Ethiopia, Bangladesh or Mozambique they deploy similar phrasing to describe beneficiary 
government officials as corrupt, unwilling and unable to combat corruption and/or to deliver 
social services to their own citizens. As the above poster, from a government building in South 
Sudan implies, corrupt beneficiary government officials are primarily responsible for the lack of 
services with these officials contrasted with donor officials that are not corrupted. What was 
especially interesting from the case studies, however, is the possibility that the moral 
imperative is able to transcend racialized or Western biased perceptions of the corrupted third 
world. Instead this assertion of a moral superiority was found to feature strongly even in the 
case of South Africa as a donor. South Africa’s predominantly black government is able to both 





other African countries whose officials are positioned as ‘corrupted’ and ‘disinterested’ in 
combatting the exploitation and oppression of their own citizens (PMG 2002). To be clear, there 
are undoubtedly bureaucrats in beneficiary countries that are corrupt and uninterested in the 
welfare of their citizens but this applies equally to developed countries and donor officials 
themselves. The importance of this finding is not related to its accuracy but to the fact that it 
appears as a feature of aid generated solely by the donor and seems to stand prior to analysing 
or working with the beneficiary. The question that needs answering is what purpose the moral 
imperative delivers and whether it can reasonably be assumed that it is a necessary feature of 
giving aid in and of itself? In this regard, the use of the moral imperative appears to be 
inextricably linked with the proffering of a technological superiority. 
 
When pressed most of the donor respondents acknowledge that the beneficiary’s own 
(indigenous) knowledge networks are likely more valuable than the donor’s own knowledge of 
the problem and possible solutions at hand. This occasional verbal acknowledgement of the 
value of indigenous knowledge systems, however, contradicts what is written in these same 
donor programming strategies. As was shown in the case study chapters, all the donors 
analysed emphasised theirs to be a superior approach or technique to what was available in the 
beneficiary country. The complex finding, then, is a contradiction between what appears to be a 
common sense acknowledgement that donors are not necessarily technologically or technically 
superior to their beneficiaries and the fact that their programming strategies are grounded in 
the deployment of a superior donor technique or technology. Put simply, the question becomes, 
if donor officials recognise that indigenous knowledge networks and approaches are likely more 
appropriate to what donors have to offer, why does aid not simply acknowledge the superiority 
of these systems and support them? Where there are gaps there would still be space to augment 
the beneficiary’s systems with a Western technology if needed but there is no obvious reason 
why donors need to assert a technological superiority regardless the country or context. 
 
One potential argument that respondents cited as a potential driver of this narrative of 
technological superiority is the vested interest donors have in procuring consultancy and expert 
services from their own headquarters. The line of thinking goes that aid is primarily self-serving 
and donors really use it to hire nationals from their own country.  This combined with a 
revolving door between staff of donor agencies, staff of international NGOs and staff of 
international consultancy firms creates a real incentive to procure at headquarters. Whilst this 
is certainly a credible argument, it has its challenges in that that it does not appear to be backed 





first glance appears prominent in that there were at least three Americana contractors/non-
governmental organisations (NGO) benefiting from USAID funding. However, the cost of these 
contractors was estimated to be a small proportion of the US’s overall aid spend. Furthermore, 
after meeting with the contractor/NGO teams, it appears the vast majority of the staff were not 
American citizens at all. When compared to the EU case-studies, this dynamic became even 
more marked because of the use of budget support. The EU’s proportional spend on consultants 
in the case of general budget support, such as were the cases in Ethiopia, Palestine and South 
Sudan, for example, approximated less than one percentage point. At the same time the EU has 
also liberalised its procurement rules to allow nationals and consultancy firms of non-EU 
countries to compete on an equal footing. In Namibia, the USAID procured international staff 
also comprised a larger proportion of non-America citizens than American as well as including 
large numbers of international ‘experts’ from other developing countries such as Zimbabwe and 
Kenya. With the South Africa case study, the use of consultants was not well documented but 
from the ISS findings, beneficiaries were more likely to complain about the lack of a South 
African presence on the ground than criticise the use of aid money to procure South African 
expertise, so the potential impact of vested interests in this context is muted at best. 
 
What gives nuance to the invoking of this technological superiority, however, is the finding that 
it is almost always accompanied with a moral imperative. In this regard, the donors studied 
tend to justify their aid and programming approaches by asserting that the beneficiary is both 
technically lacking and morally compromised such as through being corrupted or in being 
disinterested in the plight of the poor.  
 
 “When we perform well the donor says our systems are not sufficient to measure success but 
when we fail they say it is our fault for not using the systems available to us…. I sometimes 
think they [donors] believe all the locals are incompetent.” 
             
Beneficiary Government Official 2, 2013  
 
Referring to a meeting with a donor official, “Did you hear what that diplomat said? He said 
we have no capacity, he came into my office, said I cannot do my job, said that I am 
corrupted.”  
             
Beneficiary Government Official 3, 2013 
 
Interestingly this moral imperative and technological superiority even features strongly in 
circumstances where the programming or activities financed directly support the beneficiary 
government’s own efforts and policies. In the Namibia case-study on the HIV/AIDS sector, for 





more of the response than the donors are.  Similarly, the beneficiary’s moral standing and 
technical capacity are even disparaged in country contexts like Palestine in which the donors 
are financing direct budgetary support that is entirely about paying for the government to 
implement as normal (i.e. without added donor technical inputs). In other words, even though 
the donor is a minority partner and the donor fully invests in the government led initiative, the 
donor still invokes its technological and moral superiority over the government. 
 
The finding on the moral imperative is complex because it touches on post-colonial legacies and 
other complex theories of the rise and maintenance of a notion of Western, and now South 
African superiority. As such the finding needs no corroboration on its own. However, when 
combined with an assertion of technological superiority and in the context of development 
cooperation the finding becomes more complex and is thus analysed in detail in the conclusion 
below rather than in this section on the finding itself. 
 
6.3 Discussion and Conclusions  
 
6.3.1 Discussion  
 
“The Westerner has an aggressive mentality. When he sees a problem he will not rest until he 
has formulated some solution to it. He cannot live with contradictory ideas in his mind; he 
must settle for one or the other or else evolve a third idea in his mind which harmonises or 
reconciles the other two. And he is vigorously scientific in rejecting solutions for which there 
is no basis in logic.” 
Biko, 1978: 48 
 
Throughout this entire research project the ghost of racism, imperialism and post-colonialism 
such as expressed by Biko (above) have called for a conclusion that aid is nothing more than a 
relic or self-interested tool by which the West further subjugates the developing world. The 
problem is, that even though this easy explanation is echoed by some of the greatest minds in 
the field (Sylvester 1999, Escobar 1995, Ferguson, 2006, et al.), it simply does not provide a 
compelling explanation for what is going on. For a start the interviews with the key respondents 
did not convince that donor policy makers are self-interested or engaged in an imperial project 
at least not in a clearly apparent manner. In fact, most interviewed came across as earnest and 
committed professionals too often exasperated by what they themselves see as a project failing 
to deliver for the poor. Furthermore, South Africa’s involvement as a donor that displays 
behaviours similar to those of so-called ‘imperial powers’ seems to undermine the notion that 
aid is simply a form of imperialism. This is especially the case since South Africa is a tiny donor 





benefit or influence whilst also actively calling for imperial and post-colonial influences to be 
reduced. 
 
Another observation emerging from the case studies is that development cooperation is 
simultaneously accompanied with both a narrative of superiority and a baseless narrative of its 
own demise.  Across all country cases (including the previous chapter on South Sudan), the EU 
and Member States consistently, hedge their cooperation with the false reminder that aid and 
development cooperation is soon to be withdrawn. “As Bangladesh moves towards becoming a 
middle income country and as such the aid relationship with the Netherlands will be eventually 
phased out.” (Netherlands: Section 2.1) This narrative of a cut in aid whilst accepted without 
contestation by almost all correspondents, simply does not comply with reasonable analysis. 
Whilst there have always been machinations about spending on aid there is no indication that 
OECD donors will cut aid. One need look no further, for example, than the United Nations July 
2015 Addis Ababa Agenda for Action (UN 2015: art. 51) in which the global community 
welcomes “the decision by the European Union which reaffirms its collective commitment to 
achieve the 0.7 per cent of ODA/GNI target within the time frame of the post-2015 agenda”. In 
fact, this commitment to meeting the 0.7 percent target is affirmed every year in the EU’s EU 
Accountability Report on Financing for Development (see EU 2014). Furthermore, it follows basic 
arithmetic that with the EU and EU Member States currently only spending 0.4% of Gross 
National Income (GNI) on aid (EU 2014) that the overall size of aid needs to increase by three 
quarters to meet the stated 0.7% target. Combined with the fact that a large number of 
countries (e.g. most of South America and particularly Brazil, China, South Korea and South 
Africa) are reaching middle income status with some becoming donors in their own right, there 
is no evidence that aid is on its death bed even though donors continue a narrative of its demise. 
 
Furthermore, far from donor policy makers coming across as all powerful global influencers, the 
respondents interviewed were more likely to express disappointment and disaffection and were 
often quick to admit shame about what they see as a waste of public/‘tax payer’ resources. The 
most common unofficial confession was when respondents dually admitted that they did not 
know what solution to put forward in their day to day duty whilst confessing embarrassment 
for “[continuing] to live like kings on these tax free salaries and in paid housing.” (Donor Official 
9 2012). If there is any irony to take away from sharing the findings of this study with donor 
policy makers, it is that the self-same moral imperative and technological superiority donors 





industry is simply converting its denial of the privately held fears and failings of its own officials 
into a narrative that the beneficiary is worse still. 
 
Whilst this observation may come across as circumstantial or just a result of poor sampling it 
deserves considered attention because it accompanies a host of other observations that give 
credence to the argument that policy makers and donor officials themselves often struggle to 
understand the rationale behind decision making in the aid industry. When asked for examples 
of successful projects, most respondents cited experience of good projects but invariably 
commented that these projects were subsequently closed down or discontinued. One donor 
official explained, “The Quality Support Group refused to extend the project because they said if 
it is so successful, Government should fund it.” (Donor Official 3, 2014). Put together, the 
respondents were of the opinion that the aid industry tends to shutter good or effective existing 
projects in favour of funding new and often untested projects and approaches. When asked to 
explain the rationale for this respondents invariably referred to the role of aid being about 
policy dialogue by which they meant that sustainable solutions are to be found in promoting 
good beneficiary government policies and not in donors financing good projects per se. The 
problem is, however, that when pushed to explain what particular policy change was needed, 
donor officials interviewed were largely unable to cite any specific policy change aside from 
vague statements about the need for better corruption mitigation, public financial management, 
monitoring, evaluation and/or evidence based policy making systems. When pressed further, 
however, respondents explained that policy dialogue is valuable but not really in terms of how it 
influences policy reform: “without policy dialogue aid is likely to descend into a confrontational 
relationship.” (Donor Official 5, 2014) explained one official. Said another, “policy dialogue is 
about strengthening the partnership; political dialogue is about complaining about corruption 
or threatening to cut aid if corruption is not combatted…. this, of course, is a myth because 
politicians are almost obliged to lie about this.” (Donor Official 4, 2013) Policy dialogue then 
appears more about continuing a conversation and maintaining the relationship rather than 
about actually advocating for policy reform. Some respondents objected to this observation 
pointing out that policy dialogue was essential for creating pressure on beneficiary 
governments to combat corruption and grant rights to civil society and citizens. Again, however, 
when pushed for examples respondents had little in the way of good examples, explaining that 
combatting “corruption is never achieved through dialogue or conditionalities despite the fact 
that some donors want nothing more than to continue the dialogue.” (Donor Official 4, 2013) 
Even when it comes to the vaunted goal of protecting and consulting civil society, one donor 





always disagree on who to support, how to support, etc. The only time they agree on civil 
society is when to criticise the government on a civil society or foreign funding act.” (Donor 
Official 2, 2014) This perspective, to a greater or lesser extent, is corroborated by the case 
studies in which even though the donors uniformly call for greater consultation and 
participation of civil society in policy making, in all cases consultations with civil society only 
happened once the donors had already designed their strategy. It would seem that donor 
governments are no more willing to open their inner workings to scrutiny than beneficiary 
governments are. 
 
When questioned on how their performance is primarily measured, donor respondents all cited 
disbursement pressures as dominating decision making. Whilst it is difficult to conclude 
whether the pressure to disburse funds is in fact as influential as it is quoted as being, the size of 
the problem described is hard to ignore. Every interviewee cited experience observing or being 
forced to make a bad funding decision inevitably because of pressure from ‘headquarters’ to 
meet disbursement targets. The most significant cited waste of resources (in terms of size) was 
increasing the size of or continuing budgetary support despite elevated levels of suspicion (and 
even evidence in support of it) that at the highest level funds would be redirected illicitly or on 
unapproved expenditure. On the actual machinery that drives donor decision and policy 
making, real failure is equated with not spending allocated resources: Sweden: (Maputo 
290113) “We get seen as not performing if we do not disburse not if we do not have progress.”  
 
Combined with the findings from this study, the pressure to disburse also needs to be 
accompanied with the high standards imposed to approve a project in the first place. In order to 
get a project approved, a donor official needs to (EU 2004, Project Cycle Management 
Guidelines) promise measurable results, the like of which attract reputational benefit to the 
donor organisation. The problem is that aid projects rarely have funding available for more than 
three or four years meaning that there is an incentive to promise results even if the physical 
means are not there to achieve them. Whilst it is possible to build a road or a bridge in three 
year life span it is highly unlikely to deliver meaningful social change in such a short time frame. 
The result of these dual pressures to disburse funds and get projects approved is a perverse 
incentive to inflate what is achievable. So, for example, the EU in South Sudan (EU 2011b: 22), 
whilst in the middle of a full blown humanitarian emergency, deteriorating security situation 
and inaccessible communities, promised to measurably contribute to “raising the general 
enrolment rate to 92%, reducing the drop-out rate to 15%, ensuring a pupil to textbook ratio of 





of children having never attended school at the beginning of the programming period. This 
contradiction is not lost on policy makers, with all too often clear references in the 
programming documents that the targets are simply not achievable. In the South Sudan case, 
the promise to increase school enrolment rates to 92% in two years was followed in the very 
next paragraph with thee caveat, “there is a significant risk they may not be met in the short to 
medium term” (EU 2011b: 22). Such observations are cited in the literature, but none as well as 
by Abdelnour and Saed (2014) in Technologizing Humanitarian Space: Darfur Advocacy and the 
Rape-Stove Panacea. By documenting donor incentives and the drive by aid practitioners to 
offer every more innovative solutions, Abdelnour and Saed explain how a “US-based 
humanitarian advocacy organizations drew upon spatial, gender, perpetrator, racial, and 
interventionist representations to advance the notion that “stoves reduce rape” in Darfur” and 
then went on to show how this untested and largely untrue ‘solution’ was funded globally. In an 
isolated case this finding is only evidence of overly ambitious programming. However, when it 
recurs, as it does across all the case studies albeit to a lesser degree, it constitutes evidence that 
excessive, even on occasion, preposterously ambitious programming targets are a systemic 




“Knowledge doesn’t exist unless it is packaged and productised at least for the institution.”  
US Think Tank Respondent 2014 
 
This doctoral research contributes to the finding that when the case studies are analysed in 
comparison to beneficiary country development plans, aid produces donor strategies that 
promise results that tend to appear overly ambitious and within unrealistic timeframes. These 
overly ambitious results and timetables are presented as viable and financed as such in what 
appears to be a donor manufactured conceptual space that is delinked from the beneficiary 
country’s political economy. This act of creating and financing strategies disconnected from the 
political economy that governs them, recurs despite the same donors working to combat this 
practice at a policy level. Whilst the donors studied have simultaneously created a narrative, 
related policies and guidelines to guard against this practice, the practice continues and is, in 
many ways, a predictable feature of development cooperation. The analysis showed that in all 
the case studies and in more than half the sectors analysed, donors continue to use their 
strategies to promise results that are outside of and/or in parallel to government’s own sector 
organised systems and the beneficiary’s political economy. The first theoretical finding of this 
research is that an unstated but reliably predictable result of aid is that donor strategies 





economy and additional to the beneficiary’s own developmental priorities regardless of what 
they may be. Whilst the research does not have sufficient evidence to definitively conclude that 
this result is purposeful or intended, it does have sufficient evidence to conclude that it is an 
accepted (and possibly desirable) feature of aid that donors perpetuate or at least decide not to 
act against. The evidence that supports this conclusion is the finding that the donors analysed 
all have policies in place to guard against this act and deploy such policies when within their 
interest. In the case of the European Union and US Government such policies are further 
accompanied by organisational guidelines intended to build the organisations capacity to guard 
against this act. 
 
The second finding is that unrealistic strategies are accompanied by a narrative that paints 
beneficiaries as morally and technically lacking. My suspicion is that this narrative appears to 
serve the function of neutralising potential criticism by beneficiaries of the feasibility of donor 
strategies and approaches. Furthermore, by creating a narrative that calls the beneficiary 
corrupt and incompetent, aid creates a sort of ‘reverse halo’ in the sense that in comparison, 
donors are positioned as morally and technologically superior. At least at one level, this 
corroborates Mosse (2005a) in suggesting that one of aid’s unstated roles is in creating a 
knowledge system that serves to undermine the perceived authority of the beneficiary by the 
beneficiary him/herself. This finding is further reinforced with donors asserting their own 
rather than beneficiary government priorities and sector definitions despite donor policy 
commitments to the contrary. The case studies show that by using half of their aid to finance 
developmental priorities in sectors not explicitly identified in the beneficiary’s own 
development plan, donors are actually and actively investing in a narrative that positions the 
beneficiary either technologically lacking because they have been unable to understand the 
importance of the donor priority or morally lacking because the beneficiary understands the 
importance but does not care. The continued use of donor rather than beneficiary sector 
definitions despite donor commitments to the contrary shows a continued bias in the political 
economy of aid allocations towards projects and programmes of conceptual value to donors 
more so than to the beneficiaries regardless the feasibility of the project itself. 
 
“The biggest impediment to development is that these departments always review and 
change directions based on dialogue with the donors about new approaches….but it does not 
help, it just recreates the wheel over and over again.”  
 






One concern about these findings is the possibility that the beneficiary government itself is 
actually lacking authority. In this regard, aid would be seen as compensating for a weak 
beneficiary government that, in reality, lacks authority. Indeed, there is an argument to be made 
that an important feature of aid could be to undermine or compensate for the authority of 
problematic governments. The problem with this argument is, however, not that it undermines 
the finding but rather steers it into a more dramatic and potentially explosive conclusion that 
would find that aid acts as a tool to specifically undermine the authority of developing country 
governments. Whilst this researcher chooses to avoid this potential finding it might have some 
weight in the fact that aid’s presumption of a moral and technological superiority appears to 
precede identifying or designing a strategy to work with the beneficiary government. This 
presumption is self-evident in relation to global developmental objectives such as in the US’s 
combatting HIV/AIDS in Namibia or the global pursuit of climate mitigation both of which 
position developing countries as needing donor solutions to their developmental challenges. 
Interestingly the South Sudan case study illustrated that there might be space for another study 
on this particular aspect of aid. In South Sudan, when interviewed the donor sector leads were 
all asked to identify to whom they were speaking to in government in trying to achieve their 
policy dialogue objectives. In South Sudan, all of the sector leads, cumulatively responsible for 
over a billion dollars in aid, whilst largely able to name the minister responsible, they were 
unable to list government officials by name or even the specific units responsible for policy 
making in their respective sectors. When pressed many of the respondents confessed that 
programming and policy dialogue priorities (e.g. the need for a focus on nutrition or gender or 
public sector reform) were instructed by their respective headquarters even before dialogue 
with the beneficiary began. If indeed this finding applies to other countries, it would mean that 
there is some form of donor incentive in place that discourages donor officials from working 
with and building working partnerships with the same beneficiary government officials they are 
claiming to assist. 
 
In conclusion the findings of this study are that aid produces considerably more than its stated 
goal of poverty alleviation. Whether or not aid contributes to poverty alleviation and whether or 
not it works in the vested interests of donors, it also consistently (possibly necessarily) 
produces a narrative and knowledge system and narrative directed both at donor and 
beneficiary audiences. This narrative and knowledge system consistently puts forward the 
notion that poverty in beneficiary countries is at least partly due to the moral standing of 
beneficiary government officials and their lack of capacity, in the best case, incompetence and 





continuously works to adjust and change through shifting sector definitions, invoking new 
objectives and priorities. The narrative and knowledge system, however, are not primarily 
focused on delivering solutions (although on occasion it is) but rather on continuously evolving 
a narrative of new technologies and approaches that always imply that donors have the solution 
and that aid is the path by which beneficiaries can build their competence. Whilst the research 
findings do not conclusively prove as such, it would appear that aid is a power mechanism in 
line with Foucault’s notion of bio-power. Like an overweight television viewer that constantly 
watches weight loss programmes without ever intending to go on diet, there is a relationship 
between donors that continuously put forward solutions that beneficiaries review and engage 
with but rarely ever adopt. The failure to go on diet or to convince viewers to lose weight might 
be seen as an objective failure, such as is the case by Moyo (2010) and Easterly (2002), for 
example. However, it does not actually constitute a failure as much as it misunderstands the 
nature of the relationship between the overweight viewer and the experts that promise a 
solution. Similarly, in aid the failure to convince beneficiaries to solve their challenges has little 
impact on the broader project of aid itself. The broader project thus appears to be less about the 
stated goal of poverty alleviation even though it is inextricably connected with telling others 
how to achieve it. 
 
The findings imply that aid is better understood as a tool used by donors to project their 
influence abroad and not primarily aimed at helping the poor or alleviating poverty. This is not 
to say that donors would not opt to achieve both should it be feasible but rather that aid very 
much serves primarily to perpetuates a narrative and knowledge system. The findings imply 
that aid as a tool is not ideologically constrained (thus ready to be deployed by emerging or 
traditional donors alike) although in the form it is used it appears to be valuable in 
manufacturing a literature and purported evidence base that positions donor government 
officials as morally and technologically superior whilst contributing a narrative that invariably 
undermines the authority of beneficiary government officials. This is an important finding 
because it implies that aiming to improve the effectiveness of aid or changing its stated policy 
focus is not likely to address some of the problematic aspects of aid discussed in this thesis. The 
appeal of aid to donors, then, appears to be of significant value in that participating in the 
international aid project means participating in the dominant narrative of what constitutes 
effective and good government and by implication attributing responsibility for poverty to poor 
people’s government officials. There is a certain violence that accompanies helping others that 
is related to the humiliation associated with being a recipient and the invariable power 





This violence is wrought on the disempowered through incentives and disincentives to subvert 
their own voices in favour of what the donor says. Implied in the gift is demonstrating support 
for how the donor speaks and what he or chooses to say. There is nothing new to this notion of 
aid being also an act of violence and subjugation: Jewish biblical laws on charity and giving, for 
example, argues that gifts should be given in a way that the giver does not know whom the 
recipient is and the recipient not to know who the giver is124. The notion is to preserve the 
dignity of the recipient by not putting him or herself in a role where he or she may pander to the 
giver. Zizek (2008:22) similarly associates the global aid project with a Violence on multiple 
levels, both in terms of aid being used to tell others what is best for them thus undermining 
their own voices and as a grand distraction through which “developed countries ‘help’ the 
underdeveloped….thereby avoid[ing] the key issue, namely their complicity in and co-
responsibility for the miserable situation of the underdeveloped.” Zizek (2008:39) Regardless 
whether aid is in service of a grand project of deflection or not, this research does provide 
evidence that aid appears to systematically invest in a narrative of donor superiority through 
undermining beneficiary voices whether by writing over their explanations of the challenges 
they face (i.e. sector definitions) or by undermining the authority government officials have in 
systematically presenting them as corrupt and incompetent. It is no wonder, then, that aid tends 
to produce projects that are unrealistic and decontextualized: after all, without the beneficiary 
officials participating in an authoritative manner vital checks and balances that typically ensure 
programming is contextually relevant and realistic are simply not there. Insofar as aid fails to be 
contextually relevant or in pursuit of viable programming objectives, its cause may less be a 
failure to design interventions robustly and more a side-effect of a project that erodes the 
authority of discordant local voices, most notably of the very government officials who are often 
best positioned to advise donors on whether or not their proposed intervention is 
contextualised or realistic. 
                                                             







Adeley, F. (2004) Learning and Teaching about Participatory Development: The Practical and 
Theoretical Challenges, New York, Columbia University: Journal of Comparative Education, 
Volume 6, Number 2 
 
Ahnlid, A. (2002) The Consultative Process with Civil Society in the Formulation of Sweden’s 
Positions on Trade Policy within the EU, Inter-American Development Bank: 
www.iadb.org/int/drp/ing/Red1/tradedocument4.htm 
 
Alesina, A. & Dollar, D. (2000). Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? in Journal of 
Economic Growth 5:33–63.  
 
ANC. (2012). African National Congress’s 4th National Policy Conference of June 2012, 
Johannesburg, South Africa: African National Congress (ANC) 
 




Armstrong, J. (1997) From Levers to Legitimacy: Governance in Transition, Public Service 
Commission of Canada: www.psc-cfp.gc.ca/research/merit/levers_legit_e.htm 
 
Babbie, E. (1998) The Practice of Social Research Pretoria: Wadsworth. 
 
Bangladesh Government (2010) Bangladesh Joint Cooperation Strategy 2010-2015, Dhaka, 
Bangladesh: Ministry of Finance, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 
 
Bangladesh Government (2011) Sixth Five Year Development Plan 2011-2015, Dhaka, 
Bangladesh: Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning, Government of the People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh 
 
Bandyopadhyay, S & Wall, H. (2006). The determinants of aid in the post-cold war. Working 






Bermeo, S. (2008). Aid Strategies of Bilateral Donors. Paper prepared for presentation at the 
2008 Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society, Philadelphia, PA, USA: 
Department of Political Science, Yale University 
 
Berthelemy, J.-C. & Tichit, A. (2004). Bilateral Donors Aid Allocation Decisions - A Three 
Dimensional Panel Analysis in International Review of Economics and Finance 13:253–274  
 
Berthélemy, J.-C. (2006a). Bilateral donors’ interest vs. recipients’ development motives in aid 
allocation: Do all donors behave the same? in International Review of Development Economics 
10: 179-194 
 
Berthélemy, J.-C. (2006b). Aid Allocations: Comparing Donors’ Behaviours. in Swedish Economic 
Policy Review. 13(2006). 75-109 
 
Besharati, N. (2013). South African Development Partnership Agency: Strategic Aid or 
Development Packages for Africa?.  Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of 
International Affairs. Available from http://www.saiia.org.za/research-reports/south-african-
development-partnership-agency-sadpa-strategic-aid-or-development-packages-for-africa 
  
Bilal, S. & G. Laporte. (2004) Discussion Paper 53: How Did David Prepare to Talk to 
Goliath? South Africa’s experience of trade negotiations with the EU, Maastrich: European 
Centre for Development Policy Management 
 
Bisseker, C. (2014, December 3, pg. 38). Prices on a peel. Johannesburg, South Africa: Financial 
Mail 
 
Brewer, J.D. (2000) Ethnography Open University Press. 
 
Bryman, A. (2008) Social Research Methods (3rd ed.), New York, Oxford University Press. 
 
Burde, D. (2004) Weak State, Strong Community? Promoting Community Participation in Post-







Burnside, C. & Dollar, D. (2000). Aid, Policies, and Growth. In American Economic Review 90(4). 
847–868  
 
Burnside, C. & Dollar, D. (2004). Aid, Policies, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence. Policy 
Working Paper 3251, Washington DC, USA: World Bank  
 
Carbone, M. (2008) Better Aid, Less Ownership: Multi-Annual Programming and the EU’s 
Development Strategies in Africa in Journal of International Development 20, 218–229 (2008) 
 
Carmody, P. (2012) Another BRIC in the Wall, South Africa's Developmental Impact and 
Contradictory Rise in Africa and Beyond in European Journal of Development Research 24.2: 223-
241. 
 
Casoo, S (2012) The South African Development Partnership Agency presentation to ODI Cape 
Conference, London, November 2012, Pretoria, South Africa: Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation  
 
Chin, G, and F. Quadir (2012) Introduction: rising states, rising donors and the global aid regime 
in Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25.4: 493-506. 
 
Chomsky, N. (26 February, 2000) Control of Our Lives, New Mexico, Albuqurque Lecture: 
www.zmag.org/chomskyalbaq.htm 
 
Chomsky, N. (1991), Necessary Illusions, USA: Hill and Wang 
 
Chomsky, N. (1994), Keeping the Rabble in Line (1994), Cambridge, USA: South End Press 
 
Chomsky, N. (1994) Secrets, Lies and Democracy (1994), Tucson: Odonian Press 
 
Claessens, S., Cassimon, D., & Van Campenhout, B. (2009). Evidence on Changes in Aid Allocation 
Criteria. The World Bank Economic Review. 23(2). 185-208, Washington DC, USA: World Bank 
 
CONCORD (2015) AidWatch Report: Looking to the future, don't forget the past - Aid beyond 2015, 






Collier, P. & Dollar, D. (2000). Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction. Washington DC, USA: World 
Bank 
 
Crewe, E. & E. Harrison (2002) Whose Development? An Ethnography of Aid, London, United 
Kingdom: Zed Books 
 
Dymond, WA (2002) The Consultative Process in the Formulation of Canadian Trade Policy, Inter-
American Development Bank: www.iadb.org/int/drp/ing/Red1/tradedocument4.htm 
 
DAG (2010) DAG Statement - Human Rights Watch (HRW) report: Development without Freedom 
– How Aid Underwrites Repression in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Development Assistance 
Group (DAG) 
 
DANIDA Kenya (2009) Public and Non-public Provision of Services: Accountability, Efficiency and 
Support to Nation Building and Democratic Decentralisation, Danida Kenya. Nairobi, Kenya. 
 
Dollar, D., and Levin, V. (2006). The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 1984–2003. In World 
Development. 34(12). 
 
Easterly, W. (2002) The Cartel of Good Intentions: Bureaucracy versus Markets in Foreign Aid, 
Centre for Global Development, Working Paper 4: www.cgdev.org 
 
Easterly, W. (2002b) The Effect of IMF and World Bank Programs on Poverty, www.ssrn.com  
 
Easterly, W. (2004) An Identity Crisis? Examining IMF Financial Programming, NYU Development 
Research Institute No. 6. www.ssrn.com 
 
Easterly, W. (2006) White Man’s Burden, New York, USA: Penguin 
 
Easterly, W. (2007) Are Aid Agencies Improving? in Economic Policy. 22(52). 633–78  
 
Easterly, W. (2007b) The White Man’s Burden, January 11, 2067 Issue, New York, USA: The New 






Escobar, A. (1991) Anthropology and the Development Encounter, American Ethnologist, Vol. 18, 
No. 4. (Nov., 1991), pp. 658-682 
 
Escobar, A. (1995) Encountering Development Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press 
 
Essex, J. (2008) The Neoliberalization of Development: Trade Capacity Building and Security at 
the US Agency for International Development Antipode. 2008. 40(2) pp 229-251 
 
Esteva, G (1992) Development, in: The Development Dictionary: A guide to Knowledge as Power, 
London, United Kingdom: Zed Books.  
 
Esteva, G & M S Prakesh (1998) Grassroots Post-Modernism, London, United Kingdom: Zed 
Books. 
 
Ethiopia Government (2010) Growth and Transformation Plan, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Development 
 
EU (1976) Council Resolution on Coordination, Brussels, Belgium: European Commission 
 
EU (2004) Aid Delivery Methods: Project Cycle Management Guidelines, Brussels, Belgium: EU 
Devco 
 
EU (2005). ‘The European Consensus on Development’. Joint Statement by the Council and the 
Representatives of the Government of the Member States Meeting Within the Council. The 
European Parliament and the Commission. Brussels, Belgium: European Union Directorate 
General for Development   
 
EU (2009) Council conclusions on an Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness, 2974th 
External Relations Council Meeting, Brussels, 17 November 2009, Brussels, Belgium: European 
Commission 
 
EU (2011) Council conclusions on an EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness (Busan, 29 November – 1 December 2011), 3124th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Development 






EU (2011b) EU Single Country Strategy (Response Strategy) for South Sudan 2011-2013, Brussels, 
Belgium: European Commission (Devco) 
 
EU (2011c) EU Local Strategy on Development Cooperation, East Jerusalem, Occupied Palestinian 
Territories: EU Delegation to the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
 
EU (2011d). EU Common Position for the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. Council 
Conclusions of 14 November 2011. Doc. 16773/11, Brussels, Belgium: European Union 
Directorate General for Development 
 
EU (2012) Council conclusions Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for 
Change, 3166th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting Brussels, 14 May 2012, Brussels, Belgium: 
European Commission 
 




EU (2012c) Instructions for the Programming of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) and 
the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) – 2014-2020, Brussels, Belgium: European 
Commission (Devco) 
 
EU (2012d) EU Joint Cooperation Strategy for Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: European 
Commission Delegation to Ethiopia 
 
EU (2012e) Budget Support Guidelines, Brussels, Belgium: European Commission (Devco) 
 
EU (2013). Council Conclusion on Policy Coherence for Development, Brussels, Belgium: European 
Union Directorate General for Development 
 
EU (2014) EU Accountability Report 2014 on Financing for Development, Brussels, Belgium: 
European Union 
 
EU (2014b) Joint EU Response Strategy for Namibia 2014-16/17, Windhoek, Namibia: Delegation 






EU (2014c) The Busan Commitments: An Analysis of EU Progress and Performance, Brussels, 
Belgium: European Union 
 
EU (2014d). Joint statement by European Commissioner for Development Andris Piebalgs and 
Environment Commissioner Janez Potočnik on the joint declaration of ACP-EU countries on the 
development agenda beyond 2015, Brussels, Belgium: European Union Directorate General for 
Development Available from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-
202_en.htm 
 
EU (2015) ACP - EU relations after 2020: Issues for the EU in consultation, Brussels, Belgium: 
Devco, European Commission 
 
Eyben, R. (2010) Hiding Relations: The Irony of ‘Effective Aid’ in European Journal of 
Development Research (2010) 22, 382–397  
 
Fabricius, P (2015) Time to Pull the Plug on SACU in ISS Today. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute of 
Security Studies, Available from: http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/time-to-pull-the-plug-on-
sacu  
 
Ferguson, J. (2009) The Uses of Neoliberalism. Antipode Vol. 41 No. S1, pp 166-184  
 
Ferguson, J (2006) Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order’, UK: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Ferguson, J. (1990) The Anti-Politics Machine, UK: Cambridge University Press 
 
Ferguson, J. (1985) The Bovine Mystique: Power, Property and Livestock in Rural Lesotho in Man, 
New Series, Vol. 20, No. 4. (Dec., 1985) 
 
Financial Times (2009) Africa’s Dependence on Aid (Interactive graphic), London, United 
Kingdom: Financial Times 
 







Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and Punish, trans. A. Sheridan, New York: Random House 
 
Gasper, D. (1999). Problems in the Logical Framework Approach and Challenges for 'Project 
Cycle Management'. ACP-EU Courier, 173, 75-77. 
 
Gasper, D. (1999b). The Logical Framework Beyond the Project Enclave: Questions and 
Warnings for Monitoring and Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance in Complex 
Emergencies. Revista Espanola de Desarrollo y Cooperacion, 4, 51-82. 
 
Gasper, D. (2000). Evaluating the 'Logical Framework Approach': Towards Learning-oriented 
Development Evaluation. Public Administration and Development, 20 (1), 17-28. 
 
Gasper, D. & Muñiz Castillo, M. (2009). Exploring human autonomy effectiveness: Project logic 
and its effects on individual autonomy. (Maastricht Graduate School of Governance Working 
Paper Series2009-6 ). Maastricht: Maastricht Graduate School of Governance. 
 
GFATM (2014) The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Pledges, Geneva, 
Switzerland: GFATM  
 
Germany (2013) Namibian-German Negotiations of Bilateral Development Cooperation, 
Swakopmund 21-22 November 2013, BMZ Referat 305, Bonn, Germany: German Government, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BMZ)  
 
GoSS (2008) Monthly Salary Schedule in Sudanese Pounds, South Sudan, Juba: Government of 
South Sudan (GoSS), Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development 
 
Gould, J. (2002) Consultation and Empowerment: Governance Implications of Participatory 
Public Policy Formulation in Six Developing Countries, University of Helsinki: Institute of 
Development Studies 
 
Gould, J. & J. Ojanen (2003) Merging in the Circle – The Politics of Tanzania’s Poverty Reduction 






Gould, Jeremy (2005) The New Conditionality: The Politics of Poverty Reduction Strategies. 
London, United Kingdom: Zed books, 
 
GPEDC. (2014a). Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2014 Progress Report. Paris, 




GPEDC. (2014b). First High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Co-Operation: Building Towards an Inclusive Post-2015 Development Agenda. Paris, France: 
Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC). Mexico High level meeting 
Communique. Available from: http://effectivecooperation.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/ENG_Final-ConsensusMexicoHLMCommunique.pdf 
 
GPEDC. (2014c). Progress Since Busan: Country and Democratic Ownership. Paris, France: Global 




Green, M. (2003) International Development, Social Analysis…and Anthropology? Applying 
Anthropology in and to Development, Manchester: University of Manchester Department of 
Social Anthropology 
 
GRSS (2011) South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013, Juba, South Sudan: Government of the 
Republic of South Sudan (Ministry of Planning and Economic Development) 
 
GTZ, 1996. Project Cycle Management (PCM) and Objectives-Oriented Project Planning (ZOPP): 
Guidelines. Eschborn: GTZ. 
 
Gulrajani, N (2011) Transcending the Great Foreign Aid Debate: managerialism, radicalism and 
the search for aid effectiveness, Third World Quarterly:  Volume 32 Issue 2 Pages 199-216 
 
Hendricks, C. & Lucey, A. (2013a). Burundi: Missed opportunities for South African post-conflict 





Studies. Available from: http://www.issafrica.org/publications/policy-brief/burundi-missed-
opportunities-for-south-african-post-conflict-development-and-peacebuilding 
 
Hendricks, C. & Lucey, A. (2013b) SA’s post-conflict development and peacebuilding experiences in 
the DRC. POLICY BRIEF 47. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, Available  
 
Hilhorst, D (2003) The Real World of NGOs: Discourses, Diversity and Development, London: 
Zed Books 
 
Horwitz, R. (2001) Communication and Democratic Reform in South Africa, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
 
Human Rights Watch (2009) Development without Freedom – How Aid Underwrites Repression in 
Ethiopia, New York, USA: Human Rights Watch 
 
Human Rights Watch (2013) South Sudan Army Unlawfully Killed Civilians, New York, USA: 
Human Rights Watch 
 
Human Rights Watch (2013b) “They Are Killing Us” Abuses Against Civilians in South Sudan’s 
Pibor County, New York, USA: Human Rights Watch 
 
Hyndman, J (2009) Acts of Aid: Neoliberalism in a War Zone. Antipode Vol. 41 No. 5, pp 867–889  
 
IATI. (2014). Aid Transparency Index 2014. London, United Kingdom: International Aid 
Transparency Initiative (IATI). Available from: http://ati.publishwhatyoufund.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/EU-Report-2014-_Final.pdf 
 
IMF (2015) Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), Washington DC, USA: The International 
Monetary Fund: http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.aspx 
 
ISS. (2015). Statement made Senior Analyst (NAME WITHHELD) in Proceedings of Institute for 







Iturralde, D. (2011). 
Population and key labour indicators by 10 most common countries of birth, population 15‐64 yea
rs. ‘Special Run’. Pretoria, South Africa: Statistics South Africa 
 
Jacas, R,B. (2002) Interaction Between the Government and the Spanish Civil Society during the 
Negotiations for the Accession of Spain into The European Union, Inter-American Development 
Bank: www.iadb.org/int/drp/ing/Red1/tradedocument4.htm 
 
Johnson, J, Taxell, N and D. Zaum (2012) Mapping evidence gaps in anti-corruption: Assessing 
the state of the operationally relevant evidence on donors’ actions and approaches to reducing 
corruption Oslo, Norway: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre 
 
Kapoor, I. (2004) The Power of Participation, New York, Columbia University: Journal of 
Comparative Education, Volume 6, Number 2 
 
Keys, A., Masterman-Smith, H., Cottle, D. (2006) The Political Economy of a Natural Disaster: The 
Boxing Day Tsunami, 2004. Antipode, Vol. 38 Issue 2, p195-204 
 
Kragelund, P (2015) Towards convergence and cooperation in the global development finance 
regime: closing Africa's policy space? in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 28,  
Issue 2 
 
Latour, B (1996) Aramis or the Love of Technology, Massachusetts, USA: Harvard University 
Press  
 
Li, T (1997) The Will to Improve, Durham, USA: Duke University Press 
 
Lucey, A. & Gida, S. (2014) Enhancing South Africa’s post-conflict development role in the African 
Union. Paper 256. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies.  
 
Lund, Christian (2014) Of what is this a case?: analytical movements in qualitative social science 
research in Human Organization 73.3: 224-234. 
 
MacArthur, J.D., 1994. The Logical Framework. Pp.87-113 in F. Analoui (ed.) in Realities of 






Mail and Guardian. (2014, June 14). Donors slash Mozambique aid over corruption claims. 
Johannesburg, South Africa: Mail and Guardian. Available from:  http://mg.co.za/article/2014-
06-14-donors-slash-mozambique-aid-over-corruption-claims  
 
Makuwira, J. (2004) Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Participatory Development in 
Basic Education in Malawi, New York, Columbia University: Journal of Comparative Education, 
Volume 6, Number 2 
 
Malkki, L (1996) Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization in 
Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Aug., 1996), pp. 377-404, Wiley-Blackwell: American 
Anthropological Association 
 
Mannheim, K. (1936) Ideology and Utopia, trans. L. Wirth and E. Shils, New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and World. 
 
Martens, B (2005) Why do Aid Agencies Exist in Development Policy Review, 2005, 23, (6) 
 
Martinussen, J. 1997. Society, State and Market, A Guide to Competing Theories of Development, 
Zed Books, London.  
 
Matti, S. (2010) 'Resources and Rent Seeking in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', Third 
World Quarterly, 31: 3, 401 — 413  
 
Mitchell, T. (1995) The Object of Development: America’s Egypt. In Jonathan Crush (ed) Power 
of Development. London: Routledge. pp 125-151  
 
Mitlin, D. & Satterthwaite, D. (2007) Strategies for grassroots control of international aid, 
Environment and Urbanization, 19(2), pp. 483–500. 
 
MoHSS (2014) Ministry of Health and Social Services Namibia – Interviews Conducted with 
Ministry Officials in July 2014 in Confidence. 
 
Moore, S.F. (2001) The International Production of Authoritative Knowledge; the case study of 






Mosse D. (2004) Is good policy unimplementable? Reflections on the ethnography of aid policy 
and practice. Development and Change 35:639–671  
 
Mosse, D., (2005a) Cultivating Development. London: Pluto Press 
 
Mosse, D. & D. Lewis (2005b) The Aid Effect: Giving and Governing in International Development. 
London: Pluto Press 
 
Moyo, D. (2010) Dead Aid: Why Aid Makes Things Worse and How There Is Another Way for 
Africa, New York: MacMillan 
 
Mozambique Government (2011) Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza, Maputo, 
Mozambique: Government of Mozambique 
 
Mozambique Government (2012) Estrategia Nacional de Desenvolvimento, Maputo, 
Mozambique: Government of Mozambique 
 
Muguruza, M.I. (2002) Civil Society and Trade Diplomacy in the “Global Era”, Inter-American 
Development Bank: www.iadb.org/int/drp/ing/Red1/tradedocument4.htm 
 
Naidoo, J. & S.G. Lewis (2004) Whose Theory of Participation? School Governance Policy and 
Practice in South Africa, New York, Columbia University: Journal of Comparative Education, 
Volume 6, Number 2 
 
Namibia Government (2013) 2013 Fiscal Policy Framework, Windhoek, Namibia: Government of 
the Republic of Namibia 
 
Namibia Government (2012a) National Development Plan Four, Windhoek, Namibia: 
Government of the Republic of Namibia 
 
Namibia Government (2012b) Report on the 2012 National HIV/AIDS Sentinel Survey, Windhoek, 






Namibia Government (2004) Vision 2030, Windhoek, Namibia: Government of the Republic of 
Namibia 
 
Namibia Government (2010) National Strategic Framework for HIV and AIDS Response in 
Namibia 2010/11 - 2015/16, Windhoek, Namibia: Government of the Republic of Namibia 
 
Nueman, W.L., 2000 Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Boston: 
Allyn and Bacon. 
 
NEPAD (2006) The African Peer Review Mechanism: An Independent Preliminary Assessment of 
Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia: Namibia Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU)  
 
Netherlands (2012) Multi-Annual Strategic Plan for Bangladesh 2012-2015, The Hague, The 
Netherlands: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
OCHA (2011) United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Occupied 
Palestinian Territory West Bank: Area C Map, New York, USA: United Nations 
 
OECD. (2004). Survey on Harmonisation and Alignment of Donor Practices. Assessing Progress 
towards Effective Aid. Paris, France: OECD. Available from: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/assessingprogresstowardseffectiveaid.htm 
 
OECD (2005) The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Paris, France: OECD  
 
OECD. (2006). Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration. Assessing Progress towards Effective 
Aid. Paris, France: OECD. Available from: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/assessingprogresstowardseffectiveaid.htm 
 
OECD. (2008). Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration. Assessing Progress towards Effective 
Aid. Effective Aid. Paris, France: OECD. Available from: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/assessingprogresstowardseffectiveaid.htm 
 







OECD (2010) Aid Effectiveness 2005-10: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, Paris, 
France: OECD  
 
OECD (2011) The Busan Partnership Agreement. Paris, France: Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
 
OECD. (2011b). Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration. Assessing Progress towards Effective 
Aid. Effective Aid. Paris, France: OECD. Available from: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/assessingprogresstowardseffectiveaid.htm 
 
OECD. (2013) State of Development Financing Report Paris, France: OECD 
 
OECD. (2013b) Press Release on 2013 State of Development Financing Report Paris, France: OECD 
 
OECD QWIDS (2014) Statistical Run, Namibia Disbursements (interactive online data base), 
Paris, France: OECD 
 
OECD. (2014a) Measuring and Managing Results in Development Co-Operation: A review of 
challenges and practices among DAC members and observers. Paris, France: OECD 
 
OECD. (2014b). Official Development Assistance disbursements, average of 2003-2012, [Data run 
by Alexander O’Riordan using the OECD QWIDS online database), Paris, France: OECD 
 
OECD. (2014bb). Engaging with the Public: 12 Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews. Paris, France: 
OECD 
  
OECD. (2014c). Global Partnership Monitoring Framework. Assessing Progress towards Effective 
Aid. Paris, France: OECD. Available from: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/assessingprogresstowardseffectiveaid.htm 
 
OECD. (2014d). Mobilising Resources for Sustainable Development.  Development Co-operation 
Report 2014. Paris, France: OECD  
 







OECD (2015) Country Programmable Aid, Paris, France: OECD found at 
http://www.oecd.org/development/aid-architecture/cpa.htm  
 
Olivier de Sardaan, J (2005) Anthropology and Development: Understanding Contemporary Social 
Change, London, United Kingdom: Zed Books 
 
O’Reilly, K. (2010) The Promise of Patronage: Adapting and Adopting Neoliberal Development. 
Antipode Vol. 42 No. 1, pp 179–200  
 
O’Riordan, A, Benfield, A. and E. DeWitte (2010) Joint Multi-annual Programming, Belgium, 
Brussels: European Commission, DEVCO 
 
O’Riordan, A. (2013). South Africa’s foreign policy and Mozambique’s hydro-carbon economy. 
Cape Town, South Africa: South African Foreign Policy Initiative (SAFPI) 
 
Ostry, S. (2002) Trade Negotiations and Civil Society The Trade Policy-Making Process at the 
National Level, Inter-American Development Bank: 
www.iadb.org/int/drp/ing/Red1/tradedocument4.htm 
 
Palestine Government (2011) National Development Plan 2011-2013, Ramallah, Occupied 
Palestinian Territories: Palestinian National Authority 
 
Pavan-Woolfe, L. (2001) White Paper on European Governance – Report on Working Group 
“Consultation and Participation of Civil Society”, Brussels: European Commission 
 
Pepfar (2014) Namibia Country Operational Plan FY 2014, Washington DC, USA: US Federal 
Government 
 
PMG. (2002). 2002 Working Group on the African Union. Cape Town, South Africa: Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group (PMG). Available from: http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20020429-draft-
report-working-group 
 







RMB (2014) Where to Invest in Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa:  Rand Merchant Bank (RMB) 
 
Robins, S (2001) NGOs, ‘Bushmen’ and Double Vision: The Þ khomani San Land Claim and the 
Cultural Politics of ‘Community’ and ‘Development’ in the Kalahari, in Journal of Southern 
African Studies, Volume 27, Number 4, December 2001 
 
Roodman, D. (2005). An Index of Donor Performance. Working Paper 67. Washington DC, USA: 
Center for Global Development 
 
Rosseau, J.J. (1762) Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, translated by G.D.H. Cole, 
Public Domain: www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm 
 
Rowden, R. (2010) Poverty reduction is not development, Review of African Political Economy:  
Volume 37 Issue 126 Pages 503-516 
 
SA DIRCO. (2010). Strategic Plan 2010-2013. Pretoria, South Africa: Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), SA Government. Available from: 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/department/strategic%20plan%202010-2013/index.htm  
 
SA DIRCO (2012) The South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA): ODI Cape 
Conference, Pretoria, South Africa: Department of International Relations and Cooperation 
(DIRCO), SA Government. 
 
SA DIRCO South Africa. Department of International Relations and Cooperation). (2013). DIRCO 
and ARF 2013 Annual Report. Pretoria, South Africa: Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation (DIRCO), SA Government. 
 
SA NPC. (2012). National Development Plan 2030; Our Future – Make it Work. Pretoria, South 
Africa: National Planning Commission 
 
SA Treasury. (1999). Public Finance Management Act. Government Gazette. (volume 33059) 







SA Treasury. (2012). The Estimates of National Expenditure 2012. Vote 5: International 
Relations and Cooperation. Pretoria, South Africa: National Treasury 
 
SA Treasury. (2015) The Estimates of National Expenditure 2015. Pretoria, South Africa: National 
Treasury. Available from: 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2015/ene/FullENE.pdf  
 
Sachs, J. (2005) The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time, New York, USA: Penguin 
Press 
 
Sachs, J. (2006) How Aid Can Work, December 21, 2006 Issue, New York, USA: The New York 
Review of Books 
 
SASOL. (2004). First natural gas from Mozambique arrives in Secunda. Johannesbiurg, South 
Africa: SASOL. Available from: http://www.sasol.co.za/media-centre/media-releases/first-
natural-gas-mozambique-arrives-secunda  
 
Satterthwaite, D. (2008) The Central Role of Local Organizations in Meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) Planning Theory & Practice, 9(2): 260-266  
 
Schraeder, P., Hook, S., & Taylor, B. (1998). Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Com- parison of 
American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows. in World Politics. Vol 50. Pp 294–320.  
 
Sharp, J., Campbell, P, Laurie, E. The Violence of Aid? Giving, power and active subjects in One 
World Conservatism, Third World Quarterly, Volume 31 Issue 7 Pages 1125 - 1143 
 
Simpson, E. S. (1987) The Developing World: An Introduction UK: Longman Scientific and 
Technical (119, 137-42) 
 
Smith, Dorothy E. (2005) Institutional ethnography: A sociology for people, Toronto: AltaMira 
Press 
 
Staritz, C. & Morris, M. (2013). ‘Local embeddedness, upgrading and skill development: global 
value chains and foreign direct investment in Lesotho’s apparel industry’. Capturing the Gains. 






Stone, R. (2006). Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 
San Diego, CA, March 2006  
 
Sundberg, M. & Gelb, A. (2006). Making Aid Work. Finance and Development 43(4).14–17 New 
York, USA: United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2002).  
 
Svensson, J (2000) Foreign Aid and Rent-Seeking in Journal of International Economics 51, no. 2: 
437–461 
 
SWAPO (2014) 2014 SWAPO PARTY ELECTION MANIFESTO, Consolidating Peace, Stability and 
Prosperity, Windhoek, Namibia: SWAPO 
 
Sylvester (1999) Development studies and postcolonial studies: disparate tales of the ‘‘Third 
World’’, Third World Quarterly, 20, 1999, p 705. 
 
Time Magazine (2013) 10 Questions, August 26-September 2, 2013 Edition, New York, USA: 
Time Magazine 
 
Totemeyer, G (2014) Strengthening the Interaction between Civil Society and Regional and Local 
Government in Namibia: Study on the Status, Role and Performance of Regional and Local 
Government Development Committees in selected Regions of Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia: 
Namibia Institute for Democracy 
 
Troman G., et al. (eds) 2005 Methodological Issues and Practices in Ethnography Vol. 11 pp.1-
17. 
 
UN (2002) Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development. International Conference on 
Financing for Development Monterrey, Mexico. New York, USA: United Nations (UN). Available 
from: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf 
 
UN COMTRADE. (2014). UN COMTRADE. International Merchandise Trade Statistics. New York, 






UNICEF (2014) Undernutrition in Bangladesh: A Common Narrative, New York, USA: United 
Nations Fund for Children (UNICEF) 
 
United Nations (1998) Aarhus Convention - Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, New York: 
United Nations: www.unece.org 
 
United Nations, (2003) United Nations Convention Against Corruption, New York: United 
Nations: www.unodc.org 
 
United Nations (2015) Outcome document of the Third International Conference on Financing for 
Development: Addis Ababa Action Agenda, New York, USA: United Nations 
 
United Nations (2015b) Sustainable Development Goals, New York, USA: United Nations 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/sustainabledevelopmentgoals 
 
US Government (2009) PEPFAR Five Year Strategy 2009, Washington DC, USA: United States 
Government 
 
US Government (2013) Namibia Public Awareness Poster: Community Against HIV, Windhoek, 
Namibia: USAID 
 
US Government (2013b) FACT SHEET: Power Africa, Washington DC, USA: United States 
Government 
 
US Government (2014) Local Systems: A Framework for Supporting Sustained 
Development, Washington DC, USA: United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) 
 
Vickers, B. (2012). Towards a new aid paradigm: South Africa as African development partner. 
Vol 25 no (4). pp 535-556. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs.  
 
Wallerstein, I. (1997) States? Sovereignty? The Dilemmas of Capitalists in an Age of Transition, 






Wesgro. (2011). Mozambique: Country Fact Sheet. Johannesburg, South Africa: Wesgro 
 
Whitfield, L. (2010) The State Elite, PRSPs and Policy Implementation in Aid-dependent Ghana. 
Third World Quarterly, 31(5):721–737  
 
Whitfield, L (2008) The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors: African 
Strategies for Dealing with Donors. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press 
 
Wilson, Fiona (2006) From Humanitarianism to Human Rights: Reflections on a Danish-
Ethiopian Aid Model in Aid Impact and Poverty Reduction, US: Palgrave Macmillan 95-125. 
 
Woods, N. (2005). The shifting politics of foreign aid. in International Affairs. 81(2). 393-409   
 
World Bank. (2012). South-South Cooperation Stories: 2012 Palama – Building public sector 
capacities in post-conflict countries. Washington DC, USA: World Bank. 
 




World Bank (2014) Gini Index (World Bank Estimate) – online Statistical Database, Washington, 
DC, USA: The World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?page=1 
 
World Bank (2014a) World Development Indicators. Washington DC, USA: World Bank.  
 
World Bank (2014b) Worldwide Governance Indicators. Washington DC, USA: World Bank.  
Available from: www.govindicators.org 
 
World Bank (2015) Doing Business Washington DC, USA: World Bank.  Available from: 
www.doingbusiness.org 
 
World Development Indicators World Development Indicators, Washington DC, USA: World Bank 






Wright, S (2015) Refugee crisis: David Cameron calls for aid spending closer to Syria on whistle-
stop tour on http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/refugee-crisis-david-cameron-
calls-for-aid-spending-closer-to-syria-on-whistle-stop-tour-10500820.html, London, United 
Kingdom: Independent 
 
Yanacopulos, H (2014) The Janus Faces of a Middle Power: South Africa's Emergence in 
International Development in Journal of Southern African Studies 40.1: 203-216. 
 
Yin R.K., 2009 Case Study Research: Design and Methods (4th Edition) California: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Zanotti, L. (2010) Cacophonies of Aid, Failed State Building and NGOs in Haiti: setting the stage 
for disaster, envisioning the future, Third World Quarterly, 31: 5, 755 — 771 
 
Zizek, S (2008) Violence, London: Profile Books 
 











Annex: Respondents’ Reference/Profiles 
1. Bangladesh Government Interview 21 August 2014. The respondent was a section head in 
the Bangladesh Government’s loan management section. The respondent was intimately 
involved in negotiating loan terms with international lenders, the (Asian and World Bank), 
as well as China. 
 
2. Beneficiary Government Official 1 (10 August 2012). The respondent is a senior government 
official responsible for coordinating relations on behalf of the South Sudan government with 
its donors. The respondent is also the appointed government interlocutor responsible for 
commenting on and giving government input to donor country strategy papers. The 
respondent indicated his willingness to be identified as being from South Sudan but not to 
be identified by name or exact function.  
 
3. Beneficiary Government Official 2 (24 October 2013). The respondent is a senior 
government official responsible for coordinating relations on behalf of an important social 
service delivery line ministry with its donors. The respondent is the appointed government 
interlocutor responsible for commenting on and giving government input to donor country 
strategy papers in the particular sector of responsibility.  
 
4. Beneficiary Government Official 3 (16 October 2013). The respondent is a senior 
government official responsible for coordinating relations on behalf of his/her government 
with its donors. The respondent is the appointed government interlocutor responsible for 
commenting on and giving government input to donor country strategy papers.  
 
5. Editor, Major Namibian Daily Newspaper (4 July 2014). The respondent is the editor in chief 
of one of the largest Namibia daily newspapers in the country. 
 
6. DIRCO Official (4 March 2014) The respondent is a senior diplomat and policy maker for 
South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DRICO). The 
respondent has been responsible for developing and justifying South Africa’s policy and 
strategy towards developing the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). 
 
7. Donor Official 1 (12 August 2015). The respondent is a country representative of a major 





development strategy for the beneficiary country he/she was posted to in one of the case-
study countries.  
 
8. Donor Official 2 (13 May 2014) The respondent is a senior donor official in a major grant 
making donor who was at the time of interview contributing the governance, organisational 
capacity building and human rights components to the donor’s medium term development 
strategy for the beneficiary country he/she is posted to one of the case-study countries.  
 
9. Donor Official 3 (13 May 2014) The respondent is a senior donor official in a major grant 
making donor who was at the time of interview responsible for formulating the analysis and 
draft strategy for the donor’s country strategy for programming aid to the beneficiary 
country. The respondent was also responsible for coordinating with other donors on their 
country strategy making and acting as the key interlocutor with the beneficiary government 
on programming. He/she is posted to one of the case-study countries.  
 
10. Donor Official 4 (15 March 2013) The respondent is a country representative of a major 
bilateral donor who was at the time of interview designing the donor’s medium term 
development strategy for the beneficiary country he/she was posted to in one of the case-
study countries.  
 
11. Donor Official 5 (11 September 2014) The respondent is a country representative of a major 
grant making donor who was at the time of interview designing the donor’s medium term 
development strategy for the beneficiary country he/she was posted to in one of the case-
study countries.  
 
12. Donor Official 6 (11 September 2014) The respondent is a representative of a major grant 
making donor who was at the time of interview designing the donor’s medium term 
development strategy for the beneficiary country he/she was posted to in one of the case-
study countries and was responsible for sector programming related to governance, 
democratisation and rights.  
 
13. Donor Official 7 (11 September 2014) The respondent is a representative of a major grant 
making donor who was at the time of interview designing the donor’s medium term 





study countries and was responsible for sector programming related to agriculture and 
rural development.  
 
14. Donor Official 8 (14 March 2013) The respondent is a representative of a major grant 
making donor who was at the time of interview designing the donor’s medium term 
development strategy for the beneficiary country he/she was posted in one of the case-
study countries and was responsible for sector programming related to public financial 
management, general and sector budget support.  
 
15. Donor Official 9 (11 September 2012) The respondent is a representative of a major grant 
making donor who was at the time of interview designing the donor’s medium term 
development strategy for the beneficiary country he/she was posted in one of the case-
study countries and was responsible for sector programming related to private sector 
development, civil society and government institutional capacity strengthening.  
 
16. Donor Official 10 Interview (8 January 2014) The respondent works as a senior 
official/head of administrative unit responsible for ensure the quality control of a grant 
making donor’s country strategies for beneficiary countries on a global basis.  
 
17. Head of a Namibian Gender Rights NGO (1 July 2014) The respondent manages a gender 
rights non-governmental organisation in Namibia. The respondent is regularly involved in 
consultations and design of donor projects in the HIV/AIDS sector largely because 
transmission is linked to risky behaviours that are too frequently based on exploitation 
and/or abuse of women in one way or the other. 
 
18. MoHSS 2014 Respondent 1 (26 June 2014). The respondent is managing a unit in the 
Ministry of Health and Social Services (MoHSS). The unit concerned monitors 
implementation of the government’s HIV/AIDS programming and is involved in ensuring 
coordination and design of projects in the sector with international development partners 
and specifically USAID. 
 
19. MoHSS 2014 Respondent – Information Directorate (3 July 2014). Official is responsible for 
maintaining the Ministry of Health and Social Service’s national health database and is thus 
closely connected with USAID’s institutional strengthening programming that emphasises 






20. Namibia Consultant (July 8, 2014). The respondent is a consultant that managed the 
development whilst also doing much of the final drafting of the National Development Plan. 
The respondent also advises one of the bilateral donors in developing its country 
programmable aid (although not USAID). 
 
21. Namibian HIV/AIDS NGO (July 7 2014). The respondent is a project manager in a Namibian 
NGO that is a recipient of USAID funding to provide institutional strengthening in the 
HIV/AIDS sector. 
 
22. Namibian Journalist, Windhoek (3 July 2014). The respondent is a journalist, consultant and 
teacher of journalism at one of the tertiary education institutions in Namibia. 
 
23. Pepkor Interview (17 December 2014) The respondent was responsible for Pepkor’s 
expansion of retail stores in Southern Africa. Pepkor is a low cost South African retailer of 
apparel although in Southern Africa they brand themselves as targeting middle and upper 
income consumers. 
 
24. PIOJ Jamaican Ministry of Finance Donor Coordination Official (14 August 2014 interview by 
phone). The official interviewed is responsible for developing Jamaica’s national aid policy 
and strategy, structuring and ensuring policy dialogue and organising annual high level 
consultations with international development partners.  
 
25. Retailer Unnamed (December 4 2014) The respondent was responsible for a major 
supermarket’s expansions into Southern Africa. The respondent was also responsible for 
ensuring supply and logistics networks such as in stocking the retailer’s stores in Southern 
Africa but also in accessing the wholesale market. 
 
26. South Sudan Ministry of Finance (November [exact date mistakenly not noted in interview 
records] 2011) The respondent heads a unit in the government that coordinates donor 
assistance to South Sudan. The official had no objection to being named but the name is 
withheld anyway as anonymity was promised regardless. The interview included 
participate of two seconding UK financed public financial management experts, the one of 
which was revising the government’s national wage structure and the other of which was 





budgets to the Minister of Finance. Notably in South Sudan, the lack of numerate and 
qualified senior officials meant that many sensitive functions (such as those mentioned) that 
donors would otherwise be excluded from were performed by donor financed experts 
rather than government officials themselves. 
 
27. Southern Think Tank (12 February 2015). The respondent is a senior researcher at a 
‘Southern’/developing country think-tank who also had experience working with 
international donors and the United Nations system on translating international policy 
commitments into county strategies particularly in relationship to peace-building, conflict 
and security management in development cooperation.  
 
28. Southern/US Think Tank (24 June 2014) The respondent is a senior researcher at a 
‘Southern’/developing country but largely US funded think-tank that also implements major 
donor contracts (larger than ZAR50 million). The respondent was working with an 
international donor on elaborating its beneficiary country strategy in one particular sector. 
The respondent is working on one of the countries of the case study.  
 
29. UNDP Senior Advisor (12 October 2015) The respondent is a senior advisor to a beneficiary 
government ministry of finance. The adviser is financed through a multi-donor fund but 
contracted directly to the United Nations Development Programme. 
 
30. USAID Official (4 July 2014). The official interviewed is part of the team for programming 
and managing HIV/AIDS funds to Namibia. 
 
31. USAID Contractor (11 July 2014). The respondent is a contractor to USAID on providing 
technical support for the institutional strengthening components for the HIV/AIDS sector. 
 
32. US Government Official (11 July 2014). The official interviewed is part of the team for 
managing the US government’s communication and advocacy strategies in Namibia.  
 
33. US Think Tank (23 January 2014). The respondent is a director working for a US based 
development think tank and implementing organisation. The respondent works mainly on 
implementing and lobbying for international commitments to human rights and democratic 





donors such as the EU and UK. The respondent also had significant experience at the donor 
country strategy/priority setting level in two of the case-study countries.  
 
